Apologies for missing that in the exchange above, I'm just returning to these boards after a long hiatus and thought it was from another thread I had missed.
By that definition above, the Japanese Akagi transmissions were fraudulent, but I'd prefer if we used the word deceptive. It's been documented that the Japanese Navy sent out deceptive signals to trick the US and British into thinking that much of their carrier force was still in the home islands. Akagi's regular operators were at Sasebo Naval Base on Kyushu when they sent out traffic "from" Akagi.
I have never understood the relavence of the IJN Nachi papers. She was in a totally separate force. Yes, the Top Secret Op Order #1 recovered from Nachi specified ships broadcast, but the Kido Butai was given separate orders AFTER the release of Op Order #1 that ordered them to proceed with "the utmost secrecy." See Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1.
TastyManatees: I did enjoy your original piece; it's a great work. We've all got our agendas however, and you shouldn't be surprised that even great pieces get co-opted ;)
I thank you very much for your patience here; I'd also like to point to the Wall Street Journal of Friday, November 7, 2003, page A10, the article "Flagrantly Dishonest" - paragraph three - "... The Democratic memo is a hit job, spelling out how to create the maximum embarassment to President Bush during his re-election campaign..." [Not quite the Dewey analogue, but close. Senator Rockefeller and "minority staff director" Christopher Mellon are mentioned.]
Tracy White,
Thank you for that clarification - as you know I never said nor implied that CA NACHI was part of the Striking Force. So good of you to clear that up. Glad also to see that you found those papers - their value to you is clearly your call; but please see below for some of my requested help.
On, deceptive ... as to imply "radio deception" - you know of the Rochefort (and he should know you might agree - perhaps not) several commentaries on that ... namely that it did not happen relating to Pearl Harbor [See, for just one, Layton, And I Was There , last paragraph on page 317 ... " 'How do you know it's AKAGI?' I asked. Joe explained, 'It's the same ham-fisted radio operator who uses his transmitting key as if he is kicking it with his foot.' ..." [Oops, seems said operator is not ... where did you say ... the inland sea?]
And of, course, please, any pointer to the order(s) which superceded that found in the CA NACHI Papers, would very much be appreciated - the full citation, if possible, and especially when using any of the known SRN's. Why? Because it is important to highlight the different between shortwave and longwave - as the Imperial Japanese Navy (i.e., IJN) did in 1941.
So, this gets everyone to the original AKAGI question:
[Start of question]
Why have none of the source materials used to develop the COMSUM14 of November 30, 1941 (a summary statement which can be found in the Joint Congressional Hearings, for example), ever been released, even after a myriad of FOIA requests?
[End of question]
Of interest, of course, are several things - time/date of the intercept(s), the raw intercepts themselves (as in not redacted), the oil tankers called, frequenc(ies) used, signal duration, signal quality, how recorded, ..., RDF bearings, monitoring stations, ..., just how was it determined to be the AKAGI ... etc. ...?
[Finally, do you presume that the communications methods used were strictly operator-centric? You might re-consider that ... so-called "spurt" messages ... simultaneous receive/re-broadcast ...
A point of interest, perhaps, when that list of IJN officers, who swear that no radio transmissions - on any frequency and at any time were made - did they mean solely human-keyed?]
Thank you for you help.
LS,
What Safford said ...
But, that AKAGI information would be helpful.
Thank you very much.