Posted on 12/03/2003 12:55:07 AM PST by kattracks
When U.S. and British forces got bogged down last March in their run to Baghdad, legislators, media pundits, and armchair strategists claimed that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had skimped on troops. The decisive victory that followed silenced them.But now that our reconstruction efforts are encountering resistance by die-hard Baathists, foreign fundamentalists, and other assorted ne'er-do-wells, those same critics are now claiming that things would be a lot quieter in Iraq if we had listened to their advice and sent a bigger army to do the job.
Not so. The critics are compounding their earlier error with new ones. In the process, they are also overlooking an important new development—the role of reserves, a critical element in planning the future of the U.S. military.
The critics wanted more combat forces. The current situation, however, calls for peacekeeping and nation-building forces, which means military police who can establish order, public affairs specialists who can disseminate the message of the U.S. government, and civil affairs units who can deliver emergency aid to refugees. It also means intelligence units who can mix in with the local population and track down Saddam Hussein's remaining thugs.
The additional combat forces that the critics wanted back in March would have done little to help us in the current situation. Combat and peacekeeping require completely different capabilities.
Which brings us to the real problem today. The military has trained people in peacekeeping and nation building. But most of them are reservists, and those are the ones the Defense Department will need to rely more heavily on in the next few months.
The Pentagon claims that by 2004, 105,000 troops will be in Iraq, down from the current 130,000. Just over a third of those will be reservists—nearly three times as many as now.
Reservists disproportionately make up the forces used in peacekeeping and nation building. Ninety-seven percent of the army's civil affairs specialists are reservists; 82 percent of public affairs specialists are reservists. The figures are only slightly higher for military police, intelligence, and special forces.
Because it will be difficult to keep these people away from their civilian jobs, U.S. officials may come under pressure to cut the reconstruction process short, which could be disastrous.
Our current predicament is a legacy of the cold war, when it was assumed that reservists would be needed only for a short period and most likely in friendly locales, such as mopping-up operations in West Germany after a hypothetical Soviet invasion.
The situation has flip-flopped. The part of the war that combat forces perform is brief. But the operations in which reservists specialize—the war after the war—can take ten times as long.
Because we are likely to see this pattern repeated, we need to rethink our force structure. We may need to add more active-duty forces in noncombatant specialties or use more reservists in combat. Or we may need to spend more on defense.
Those are the costs of leading a war on terrorists and rogue states. The alternative is to rely on other countries or the UN—both of which have been unwilling to act decisively. Or we could hunker down and risk another attack like September 11. Today's debates over military reserve policy are really debates over America's role in the world
This war will not be over until we have neutralized Iran and Syria. The sooner that happens, the better.
We need to completely rethink the way we sell and use the National Guard and Reserve.
We sell it as a stop-gap, temporary force that will enable a person to live as a civilian with relatively little deployment. Bosnia/Kosovo/Iraq have shown that to be factually untrue.
Integrity demands that we begin to sell the National Guard/Reserve as more than part-time, but less than full time soldiering. There should be honesty about its demanding regular, extensive, lengthy tours overseas.
To accomodate that change, the NG/Reserve soldier should at all times receive full medical/dental coverage for self and family, and full commissary/PX benefits. This is only fair due to the additional time required and the greater difficulty in finding civilian employers willing to put up with extensive absences from work.
Likewise, any deployed SINGLE soldier should automatically receive housing allowance, BAH, separation pay, and separate rations pay along with basic military pay to pay for the apartments left behind. Active duty single soldiers live in government housing so they receive no allowance. NG/Reservists, however, live on the economy in whatever location they hail from and have rents/mortgages to pay. In addition to housing costs, many singles have "non-spousal partners" living in their homes with them. They also have recurring costs such as cable, water, etc. even if they are not present if they wish to maintain their living quarters. They also incur significant storage/transportation costs for certain items when they deploy.
In terms of retirement, any active duty time over 2 weeks length should qualify for time subtracted from the age 60 retirement of NG/Reservists. Since active duty can retire after a straight 20 years in service, it is possible for a retirement to take place as young as 38 years old. NG/Reservists must wait until age 60. Every tour over 2 weeks should result in the lessing of the retirement age after 20 years ng/reserve service by double the amount of time deployed down to age 40. If for 1 year, then 2 years reduction means retirement at age 58. If for 5 years, then retirement can begin at age 50. If for 10 years, then retirement can begin at age 40.
Additionally, promotions should be time-based and not intra-unit based on available spaces. Currently, we have 53 year olds holding down E-5 slots and preventing young soldiers from receiving promotions. That seriously reduces payrates for NG/Reserve troops compared to active duty in which all soldiers receive fair opportunities at Army-wide promotion. It also seriously reduces incentives to remain in the NG/Reserve. The current system seriously reduces readiness in that an E-5 slot is designed to be held by a young, vigorous soldier with extensive physicial ability. An E-5 (SGT) at 53 years old is a physical liability on the battlefield in the vast majority of cases.
Due to extensive deployment, ng/reservists will find it harder to find cooperative employers. Therefore, they should receive SIGNIFICANT consideration in terms of hiring points for governmental/civil service jobs.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.