Posted on 12/05/2003 10:48:41 AM PST by SJackson
The security fence in the Northern West Bank helps to prevent suicide bombings and shooting attacks inside Israel by terrorists in the area:
[IDF Background 5 December 2003]
Since the beginning of the Palestinian war of terror in September 2000, 117 suicide bombings and shooting attacks have occurred inside the state of Israel, in which 477 people have been murdered and 3239 wounded. Many of these attacks were perpetrated by the terrorist infrastructures in the Samaria region. Prior to the establishment of the security fence, which currently stretches from, Ram-On to Elkana, these infrastructures succeeded in entering many suicide bombers into Israel from regions where the fence now exists. The building of the security fence was intended to thwart and prevent the terrorist infrastructures from entering terrorist into Israel to carry out suicide bombings and shooting attacks against civilians.
Interrogations of operations in various Palestinian terrorist organizations in Samaria, show that the security fence in this region, does indeed comprise a considerable obstacle, affecting the ability of the terrorist organizations in Samaria to enter terrorists into Israel. Thus the organizations' attempt to send terrorists via areas where the fence has not yet been completed and also divert them toward the Judea region, where the fence does not yet exists.
During recent months there have been repeated attempts to enter terrorists in areas where the fence has not yet been completed - the area south of Elkana, close to Kfar Kasem; the area of Azun-Atma, and the Gilboa region.
* Amjad Abidi, head of the Islamic Jihad in Jenin, responsible for a series of terrorist attacks and terrorist attack attempts, among them the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, divulged in his interrogation details relating to the affect of security fence on the execution of terrorist attacks he planned. Abidi noted that if the fence had stretched all the way to the Jordan Valley the operations of all terrorist organizations would have to think of completely other ways to carry out attacks.
* Abdallah Basset Hassan Milham, a resident of Aanin, arrested in August 2003, admitted in his interrogation that he was to lead a suicide bombers from Jenin to Baqqa al-Rarbiya, whereupon the suicide bomber was supposed to board a taxi and enter Israel with the intent of carrying out a suicide bombing on behalf of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Jenin. He noted that in October 2002, (prior to the building of the fence) he could easily transfer a suicide bomber from the village of Aanin to Um el-Fahem, and then into Israel; today however, it is no longer possible to travel from Aanin to Um el-Fahem due to the existence of the fence.
Increase in number of terrorist attacks carried out by terrorist infrastructures in the area of Bethlehem and Hebron (Judea) in comparison to the terrorist infrastructures in the area of the West Bank, north of Jerusalem (Samaria).
The difficulties faced by the Samaria terrorist infrastructures to carry out terrorist attacks due to the existence of the fence, have led to a sharp decrease in the number of attacks they have been able to execute inside Israel. At the same time, the Hamas infrastructures in Judea, a region where the fence has not yet been built, has been able to perpetrate many "high quality" inside Israel. The Hamas infrastructures in Hebron has carried out four suicide bombings in Jerusalem (the suicide bombing on the number 6 bus on French Hill in may 2003, the suicide bombing close to the Dahit al-Barid checkpoint in May 2003, the suicide attack on bus number 14 close to the clal building in central Jerusalem in June 2003, and the suicide bombing on bus number 2 in august 2003 - all resulting in the murder of 46 Israelis and 239 wounded). This infrastructure is also responsible for the suicide bombing on bus number 37 in Haifa (murdering 17 and wounding 42). The Hamas infrastructure in Ramallah carried out the suicide attack at the bus stop in Zerifin and the suicide bombing in the Hilel café in Jerusalem, both on September 9, resulting in 16 murdered Israelis.
The Samaria Hamas infrastructure has not succeeded in carrying out a single suicide bombing inside Israel since the attack on Bar-Ilan Junction in October 2002.
Diversion of terrorist attacks from Samaria to the Judea region:
We have recently witnessed several incidents in which the Samaria terrorist infrastructures have planned the attacks and supplied the explosives, but the terrorist were planned to be sent by operatives from the Judea region - where the fence does not longer exists.
Taufic Mustafa Hatib - a resident of Hizma (near Jerusalem) a Hamas operative, arrested on October 30, 2003, admitted during interrogation by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) that he was recruited to the Hamas by the Hamas military infrastructure in Nablus. Two weeks prior to his arrest Hatib was sent an explosive belt weighing 10 kg from Nablus to a candy store in Ramallah. Hatib concealed the explosive belt in a closet next to his baby daughter's crib. In his possession were manuals with instructions on how to activate the belt.
Summary
We can see that the existence of the security fence in the Samaria region poses a considerable obstacle for thwarting and preventing the terrorist infrastructures from carrying out suicide attacks inside Israel. The fence has led to a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks from the Samaria region. The continuation of the fence to the Judea region, provides a central and vital component of our ability to prevent terrorist attacks inside Israel.
A surprise benefit from the fence built to keep farmers from their fields.
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