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Yes I did. Unfortunetely Stinnet neglects to mention that Japanese " admirals code" wasn't broken until 9 February 1943. Thus his entire thesis falls apart. A decoded message that was decrypted long after Pearl Harbor has no bearing on the events of Pearl Harbor.

His thesis that 4 US submarines spotted Kido Butai is laughable. The commanders and executive officers of those alledged subs would have reported those sightings and RDF logs and communications logs would have shown those entries. They would have been logged at Pearl and San Diego, Bremeton and certainly the Japanese would have picked up the transmissions and logged them. The Brits and Australians would have logged them. They would have had five point RDF fixes on the transmissions.

In order for events to have transpired as Stinnet says, it would require a conspiracy of hundreds of people. From senior admirals ( excluding Kimmel and His deputy) right down to enlisted radiomen from four different counties.

Regarding Toland - may he in God's Grace, rest in peace.

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There are far too many inconsistencies on this topic - just one example, the SS LURLINE as discussed in Farago's Postscript of the Bantam paperback edition of "The Broken Seal."

Another obvious point - starting in the mid-1970's a myraid of the German ENIGMA materials have been released, including raw intercepts ... To date, and after decades of FOIA requests, no such level of release has occurred on the Japanese naval operational codes. Why is that?

Within Stinnett there are many items revealed for the first time, and also a highlighting of materials identified but which remain beyond public inspections. For example, FBI files, 19 missing SMS (Secret Message Series) messages from Yamamoto which the US Navy did not release the the National Archives, ...

Other authors (e.g., Clausen, Costello, Hoelhing, ..., etc.)have in the past pointed to "partial" PURPLE messages, papers within the still classified Churchill papers, ...

On the removal of oscillators ... the story is more likely the "telegraphic keys" or a fuse ... but, then, the explanation of the famous COMSUM14 of Novemeber 30, 1941 " ... AKAGI heard on tactical circuits ..." is say - problematic. Another aspect here - navies at the time used "automatic" simultanenous {See Howeth) receive/rebroadcast equipment ... that is no "human" fist involved. Did anyone think to ask the IJN officers if they only meant operator-keyed transmissions ... or all means of transmitting.

Per chance, if you believe in "radio deception" - then I'd point to Rocheforts' comments in (a) the Hewitt Inquiry, and (b) the also famous "Memorandum A" having to paraphrase "Did the Japanese Picture Us a Picture."

Finally, another of Stinnett's points - much of the communications information is stripped from many of the Pearl Harbor materials ... To/From ... frequency used, time of intercept, ... Also why do the Mid_Pacific RDF records remain classified or partial or even multiated (See Wilford). Why is that?

And so it goes ...

The thing I find most goofy about the "FDR knew" debate is that everyone knew the Japanese were likely to attack. What people didn't know was where. All U.S. bases, including Pearl, had repeatedly been warned of the situation. Because of the ship activity spotted in the South China sea most people thought south and the most at risk U.S. possession was the Philipines. But no one knew the Japanese would strike two directions at once and be audacious enough to attack Pearl.

Did FDR want to join the Allied cause? Yes. Did FDR expect the Japanese to attack U.S. bases? He thought that was likely - that's why he made a last minute personal appeal to the Emperor for peace. Did FDR use the attack on Pearl to take us into the European war? Yes. Does this prove FDR knew of the plans to attack Pearl? Not even close.