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>>>>>>> DTA, you are persistent, but persistently wrong. The Macedonian Army was firing 120mm mortars in that area. Their range is 5400 meters, putting them in range of Krivenik. You can read all about it in the NATO report. <<<<<

mark502inf, thanks for the NATO report. I have never read it before.

NATO'S OWN KRIVENIK REPORT IS THE PROOF OF NATO SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISTS IN KOSOVO.

Briefly, the NATO's own report states black on white that on March 29th:

1. KFOR foreces received mortar fire from UCK/KLA/NLA/ the very morning Lawton was killed.

2. Observation Post (OP) belonging to the UCK/KLA/NLA/ was discowerd by KFOR in Krivenik with excellent view of the village and mortar impact sites.

3. Firing position of UCK/KLA/NLA/ was found in the village (mortar bipod holes in the ground)

4. Macedonian Army (ARM) observation post (OP) had NO VIEW of Krivenik.

Furthermore,

5. ARM never fired towards Kosovo before. UCK/KLA/NLA/ fired on numerous occasion towards MAcedonia from Kosovo.

6. The NATO report is the smoking gun that KLA is not disbanded.

7. Mortars are essentially tubes used to lauch shells. When firing to close targets (e.g. 200m away) tube is elevated at an angle of 80-85 degrees. When fired at distant targets (e.g. 5200m away) tube is elevated 40 -45 degrees. There is a difference in Crater made from high-angle and low angle moertar shell. NATO report speaks of "high angle ctrater (i.e. made from highly elevated tube) yet NATO CAT (crater analysis team) has no idea who made it. What they expected, to find "Made by KLA" sticker?

Having all this in mind, NATO conclusion that they do not know who has killed Lawton is an insult to intelligence. ridiculous. Even drill sargeant could tell the difference betwen mortar crater fired from high elevation mortar and one fired from the low elevation mortar.

NATO has the reason for cover up. Terrorists operating in Kosovo under NATO supervision have made agression on on independent, sovereign nation of FYROM. In legal terms, this is armed provocation.

Read the NATO document,and you will see that your brazeness is only matched by the sheer stupidity of the NATO team responsible for this report. THEY HAVE LEFT TOO MANY CLUES WHO KILLED LAWTON.

I sencerely hope that Lawton's family will hire a lawyer and sue NATO for damages.

NATO Krivenik Report

1 May 2001 ....Findings of Fact Report: 29 March 2001 Krivenik Mortar Shelling Incident...

25 Mar 01.

...Intelligence indicates unidentified elements of the NLA intended to conduct an attack against the Blace Border Crossing Point (EM 251 654) and/or target POLUKRBAT elements along the border...

27 Mar 01. POLUKRBAT Special Police Unit, a K-9 Team, and UNMIK-P conducted a cordon and search of Krivenik. Among other things, they discovered an AK-47 rifle, 27 rounds of ammunition, a bulletproof vest, and a vest with a UCK badge.

Comment: UCK is acronym known in English as KLA. KLA not disbanded.

2330, 28 Mar 01. POLUKRBAT OP at EM 231 624 observed two groups of three persons with weapons moving in a northeasterly direction and being followed by a group of about 50 individuals. These groups stopped at EM 234 607. At 0200 on 29 Mar 01, the 50-person group left in a southerly direction and 3 other individuals left in a northerly direction.

Comment: "Persons with weapons" ? Hunters? Poachers? Sodiers, or an euphemism for NATO-sponsored terrorists?

Chronology of Events on 29 March 2001.

Approximately 0850. KFOR aviation helicopter crews reported seeing 30 people with six tents and one horse in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at EM 234 607.

Comment: "30 people with tents". Scouts, bedouins or an euphemism for NATO-sponsored terrorists?

Krivenik Strike #1. Between 0900 - 1030, 3 mortar volleys of 2 - 3 mortar rounds each impacted south of Krivenik and southeast of Krivenik, and on the eastern outskirts of the town.

COMMENT: "South of Krivenik" and "southeast of Krivenik" indicates the tactics of NLA (NATO Sponsored terrorists). See NLA mortar tactics below.

Approximately 0905. POLUKRBAT patrol at EM 230 627 reported NLA with five artillery pieces south of their position at EM 233 611. They further reported the artillery pieces were firing south towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

COMMENT: That means NATO-sponsored terrorists used Kosovo to fire "towards the former Republic of Macedonia" In legal terms, it was AGGRESSION OF UN PROTECTORATE ON SOVEREIGN STATE

0925. KFOR aviation helicopter crews reported seeing three mortars fired from NLA positions at EM 250 598 towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia forces to the south. The helicopter crews further reported seeing a red jeep carrying NLA personnel moving north from the border toward Krivenik.

0950 - 1055. POLUKRBAT patrol reported seeing a small force of 4-5 individuals at EM 230 613, approximately 500 meters southwest of Krivenik. The POLUKRBAT soldiers received mortar fire when they moved forward to EM 230 614 to make contact with the force at the firing position. The POLUKRBAT soldiers reported hearing three sets of three bursts, each close to their position, as they withdrew north. The POLUKRBAT soldiers fell back to Krivenik. POLUKRBAT soldiers in OPs on the outskirts of Krivenik reported 3 – 6 mortar impacts around Krivenik, which led to the POLUKRBAT withdrawing north from Krivenik.

COMMENT: This shows beyond the reasonable doubt that KFOR came under mortar fire from UCK, NATO-sponsored terrorists.

Krivenik Strike #2.

Between 1130 – 1145, a MNB-E convoy of 3 vehicles and 14 personnel (12 soldiers and 2 translators ) arrived at Krivenik as part of a previously scheduled visit. As three local residents were showing the KFOR soldiers the craters on the southeastern outskirts of Krivenik from that morning’s earlier mortar strike, the KFOR personnel heard 3-4 “whoump” sounds of a mortar firing in immediate succession. The KFOR personnel “got down” just as a series of mortar strikes landed near them, starting at the mosque in Krivenik and moving in a rough line from south to southeast to east of Krivenik. They identified these four rounds as impacting in the courtyard between the mosque and “old” school in Krivenik, on the small ridge to southeast of Krivenik, to the east of Krivenik just inside the road leading into Krivenik from the east, and northeast of Krivenik near the "new" school.

Strike #2 injured at least two people in the courtyard between the mosque and the “old” schoolhouse, an Associated Press reporter seated in a civilian SUV and the schoolteacher for the Krivenik school, who was found just outside of the SUV. The mortar round that struck the courtyard landed at the base of the SUV parked in the courtyard.

Krivenik Strike #3. Approximately 5 - 10 minutes later, three more mortar rounds impacted in or near Krivenik. Immediately after this strike the Deputy Commander for Maneuver, Task Force Falcon, made radio contact with a MNB-E helicopter flying near Krivenik and asked if its crew had seen from where the mortars were being fired. The helicopter crew reported it had seen nothing.

Krivenik Strike #4. Approximately 5 - 10 minutes after Strike #3, more rounds impacted in or near Krivenik. MNB-E helicopters flying above Krivenik did not see from where these mortar rounds were fired.

Krivenik Strike #5. Between 1200 –1230, 2 – 3 more mortar rounds struck in or near Krivenik.

During and Immediately After the Strikes. Following Strike #2, MNB-E soldiers remained in Krivenik treating the wounded civilians and helping them evacuate the village. MNB-E soldiers (POLUKRBAT) established a checkpoint outside of Krivenik on the road leading to Deneral Jancowic.

....TFF personnel arrived between 1300 – 1500 and began gathering evidence and conducting crater analysis.....

Chronology of Relevant Events Following 29 March 2001 Mortar Shelling of Krivenik.

a. 31 Mar 01. POLUKRBAT soldiers found an abandoned NLA camp at EM 234 610 while searching areas south of Krivenik. The 30x30m camp contained 4 tents, 30 sleeping bags, and a large cache of weapons and ammunition. POLUKRBAT soldiers observed another 60x80m camp at EM 2347 6071 with 10 tents and 8 foxholes.

02 Apr 01. POLUKRBAT patrol found a NLA weapons cache at EM 238 616 while searching areas south of Krivenik. The site was approximately 300 meters from the camp found on 31 MAR. It contained 86 boxes with ammunition of different types, 8 boxes with grenades for RPG-7s and RPG-2s, 2 magazines for machine gun PK, 112 sleeping bags, 144 blankets, 24 military raincoats, 19 vests, 8 tents and 6 German uniforms. All of the equipment found was packed inside of sleeping bags in disarray. POLUKRBAT also found 10 sacks with food and a bag with medical dressings and syringes. The UNHCR abbreviation was on several sleeping bags and tents. Ammo boxes and a beret found in the area bore the UCK (Ushtria Clirmtare Kombetare, or National Liberation Army) acronym.

COMMENT: UCK acronym is known in Engluish as KLA - a smoking gun that KLA was not disbanded.

04 Apr 01. While conducting a search of the terrain south and southwest of Krivenik, members of the Krivenik Shelling Investigation Team discovered an apparent OP at EM 22574 62157 overlooking Krivenik from the south. A camouflage poncho was rolled up in the middle of the OP. Inside of the poncho were a 7.65 mm pistol, two rounds of ammunition in a magazine, two pistol holsters, two hand-held Yeasu radios, and a survival knife. Also present were a small package of C4 explosive material with a blasting cap and a sleeping bag of the style formally used by the British military. The poncho also contained an AK-47 bandoleer with the letters “UCK” handwritten three times on it. The bandoleer bore a “Tirana” manufacturer’s mark.

COMMENT: Another smoking gun of KLA not being disbanded. Also proof that Albania armed KLA terrorists.

The OP was located less than 250 meters from the mosque, 450 meters from the POLUKRBAT checkpoint to the east of Krivenik, and 550 meters from the “new” school. With a small tree cut down in the OP to improve its line of sight, the OP offered good observation of half of the crater impact sites in or near Krivenik. This OP is along the gun-target line of the western grouping of lines (See paragraphs 8a and b).

COMMENT: NATO can not say who made craters. Perhaps NATO jokes will replace Blond and Polish jokes .

Crater and Fires Facts.

Witness statements establish 13 – 19 mortar rounds fell in or near Krivenik on 29 Mar 01. The KFOR Crater Analysis Team (CAT) located 10 mortar impact areas in or near Krivenik and two mortar impact sites several hundred meters southeast of Krivenik. They retrieved seven 120mm mortar tail fins and numerous pieces of shrapnel and parts of fuses. All pieces retrieved were from 120mm mortars with a maximum range of 5400 meters.

ARM Mortars. The ARM has both 82mm and 120 mm mortars of various makes in the area of interest. Most are models of former Warsaw Pact mortars. Fuses and ammunition are usually Russian, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian.

COMMENT: Macedonia was not a part of Warszaw pact. Warszaw pact is used to invoke COLD WAR reflex with the reader. Cheap and transparent trick.

NLA Mortars. The NLA has both 82mm and 120mm mortars in the area of interest. Arms caches discovered by KFOR and results from traffic control point seizures have produced 120mm rounds in the previous months. KFOR radar tracks indicate mortar use in the area of interest in the past. No 120mm mortar ammunition or equipment was found south of Krivenik during this investigation.

COMMENT: KLA fired mortar on KFOR that day, as this document attest. KLA OP was found, as well as mortar firing position in the village.

Crater and Fires Analysis.

The CAT analysis indicates there were at least two mortar firing points based on the back azimuths taken from each crater.

Types of Analysis.

...Three methods may be used to determine direction from a high-angle mortar shell crater—main axis, splinter groove, and fuse tunnel.

Shell Fragment Analysis. Identification by weapon type and caliber may be determined from shell fragments found in shell craters. Dimensions of the parts, as well as those of the complete shell, vary according to the caliber and type of shell.

Tail Fins. A mortar can be identified from the tail fins. Tail fins often are found in the fuse tunnel of the crater. A mortar that is not fin-stabilized may be identified from the pieces of the projectile on which the rifling is imprinted.

COMMENT: Serial numbers of mortars fired were found. Where the ammo came from?

Fuses. The same type of fuse may be used with several different calibers or types of projectiles. It is impossible to establish the type and caliber of a weapon by examining the fuse.

Analysis of Individual Craters.

Crater #1. This crater was located at grid EM 2288 6244. Using the Splinter Groove Method, the CAT determined that the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 4400 mils or 248 degrees. The crater was in a wooded area with signs of damaged tree limbs. The crater was also on sloped terrain; this would have affected the crater analysis. An MNB-E soldier retrieved a 120mm mortar tail fin from this site. The tail fin is marked with #K9407 23186 TK BK on the top and MK, M74 and KB9505 on the bottom.

COMMENT: Where the ammo came from? Who used it?

Crater #2. This crater was located at grid EM 2286 6242. Using the Main Axis Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3860 mils or 217 degrees.

Crater #3. This crater was located at grid EM 2267 6233, near the “old” school and mosque. Using the Main Axis Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3860 mils or 218 degrees. There were no crater fragments found at the time the crater analysis was done. At 1930, 29 Mar 01, the CAT retrieved several pieces of apparent 120mm shrapnel from around the site.

Crater #4. This crater was located approximately one and a half meters from a house at grid EM 2246 6254. An eyewitness says he saw the round as it came in and impacted next to his house. The direction he pointed to is on an azimuth of 3080 mils or 217 degrees. There was evidence of broken tree limbs on that gun target line. This would alter the effects on the ground.

Crater #5. This crater was located in a garden at grid EM 2245 6259 approximately 75 meters from Crater #4. Using the Main Axis Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3060 mils or 172 degrees.

Crater #6. This crater was located at grid EM 2292 6235. Using the Main Axis Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 4180 mils or 235 degrees. There were fragments of a fuse from a 120mm mortar found close to the crater.

Crater #7. This crater was found 20 meters from the “new” school at grid EM 2282 6261. Using the Main Axis Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3700 mils or 208 degrees.

Crater #8. This crater was located at grid EM 23633 61752. Using the Fuse Tunnel Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3050 mils or 173 degrees. The CAT found a fuse tail fin in the crater from a 120mm mortar with markings MK, M74 and KB9402 on the bottom. The mortar round looked like it hit the base of a bush and spread shrapnel that hit trees nearby. In addition, approximately 75 meters west of this location, shrapnel markings and broken limbs on trees indicated a mortar round detonated near grid EM 23557 61752. The CAT could not find a crater.

COMMENT: who used it?

Crater #9. This crater was located at grid EM 23689 61324. Using the Fuse Tunnel Method, the CAT determined the direction of fire was on an azimuth of 3340 mils or 187 degrees. The CAT found a fuse tail fin in the crater from a 120mm mortar with markings KB9407 23186 TK BK on the topside of the tail fin and MK, M74 and KB9505 on the bottom of it. The mortar round looked like it hit the base of a bush and spread shrapnel that hit trees nearby.

COMMENT: Again, who used it?

Approximately 75 meters to the east of Crater #9 at grid EM 23723 61333, the POLUKRBAT showed the CAT what appeared to be a mortar firing position. The location had a hole approximately 5 inches wide and 4 inches deep and what appeared to be impressions on the ground from a mortar bipod. The CAT could not determine the orientation of the weapon and did not find any residue.

COMMENT: Whose firing position? It was KLA firing position.

The CAT found evidence of three more mortar strikes in or near Krivenik that left no crater. The CAT found an impact area to the east at EM 2279 6230. Evidence indicated an impact had occurred, but there was no sign of a crater, only burned bushes and loose dirt in the area. The CAT did not conduct a crater analysis because of inconclusive evidence.

Krivenik residents showed the CAT a mortar impact site on a side slope of a road located at grid EM 2259 6248. There was evidence of an impact, but civilians moving the rock and dirt fragments away from the road contaminated the site and prevented the CAT from performing a crater analysis.

Intelligence Analysis.

In the days preceding 29 March, the ARM was heavily engaged in operations against the so-called NLA forces along the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia border with Kosovo in the Krivenik - Gracani axis area. The ARM was primarily conducting clearing operations in the towns of Gracani and Caska and search and destroy operations against NLA camps in the border area.

The NLA was primarily attempting to defend areas it deemed key to its supply routes and safe-areas, while at the same time infiltrating, equipping, and training new NLA recruits from Kosovo. Starting in mid-March, the ARM began to fight with better coordination and harder than expected.

COMMENT: "Expected". Expected by whom? Terrorist sponsors in NATO intel?

In response, the NLA began to gradually filter back to its camps straddling the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia border with Kosovo. Regular mortar exchanges occurred between the ARM and NLA, at times becoming heavy. Heavier KFOR patrols and interdiction efforts along the border hindered the NLA’s usual practice of slipping north across the border into Kosovo when it needed a safe area. The NLA has increasingly had to use a strip approximately one kilometer on either side of the border. This area is the buffer zone KFOR and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia forces (military and police) try to keep between themselves to avoid friendly fire casualties. Due to the success of both KFOR interdiction and anti-insurgency operations by former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia forces, elements of the NLA leadership broadcasted a message threatening retaliation/revenge attacks against KFOR elements serving along the border or against forces serving at the Blace border crossing point.

COMMENT: Mind the language used: "KFOR ELEMENTS" not "KFOR UNITS". That means against POLUKRBAT not cooperative with NATO support to terrorists.

On the night of 28-29 March, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia forces began a heavy attack against NLA forces in Gracani, to include the use of armed helicopters and tanks. NLA insurgents were observed leaving the town and withdrawing towards the Kosovo border. Intelligence reported the ARM was planning to fire artillery or mortars along the border early on the morning of 29 March. While the ARM has fired close to the border in the past, there are no known instances where the ARM has purposefully fired across the border at NLA troops or positions, even when these forces were clearly visible in open fields, valleys, or ridges.

COMMENT: this document shows that NATo-sponsored terrorists used KOSOVO territory to fire on Macedonia.

Mortars. Both sides use similar mortars.

The NLA has used a classic insurgent method of using one or two tubes at a time to fire a few rounds from positions close to the target, then shifting firing position to fire a few more. This type of fire mission may last for only a few rounds in a short period, or last over many hours.

The only pattern is the lack of a discernable pattern in their fire missions.

COMMENT: "fire a few rounds from positions close to the target, then shifting firing position to fire a few more." Exactly that happen. Firing position was discovered as well as Observation POint(OP) belonging to KLA.

The ARM uses a combination of former Warsaw Pact/Yugoslav Army tactics, techniques, and procedures, with an increasingly western style of fire direction and command and control. The ARM favors heavy mortars in their northern territory over conventional artillery due to the ruggedness of the terrain and the relative cheapness of mortar fire vice artillery.

COMMENT: Again, MAcedonia was not WARSZAW PACT member. Insistence on this term shows the writer's intent to influence the reader and perceive MAcedonia in COLD WAR terms and evoke COLD WAR reflexes (Ruskies, Commies etc.)

It is difficult to directly assess the training and expertise of mortar crews from both sides. Generally, the crews have been firing for long enough to become proficient in the use of their particular type of weapon in the terrain along the common border. ARM mortar crews have a more traditional type of military-style training in the use of mortars, but may not have long-term experience. NLA crews may lack the technical training, but have months, if not years, of experience. Reports indicate both ARM and NLA crews generally hit what they are shooting at. Observers in the ARM are also more traditionally trained, but lack much of the support equipment Western crews have, such as laser range finders, sophisticated optics, and computers. ARM observers are generally proficient using close line of sight and basic optics observation with FM radios and landlines. NLA observers tend to be experienced, but usually rely on handheld radios and cellular phones.

COMMENT: And observers in OP close to the target as discovered KLA OP shows.

Ammunition. The ARM primarily uses mortar ammunition and fuses from Russia, Yugoslavia (Serbia), Bulgaria, and Ukraine. The NLA uses ammunition and fuses from diverse sources. They steal, capture, purchase, or receive ammunition and fuses from all of the above sources, as well as pilfered KFOR stocks and supplies donated from around the world by sympathetic organizations. Both sides, but mainly the NLA, still use old Yugoslav Army (VJ) stocks left behind when the VJ left the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, or which were otherwise acquired.

Comment: PILFERED KFOR STOCKS? Or stocks GIVEN TO KLA and later declared as "pilfered KFOR stocks" There are no media reports about pilfering of KFOR stocks.

Line of Sight (LOS) Analysis.

LOS analysis of the suspected ARM observation point (EM 2235 6020) shows observers would have no view of the valley in which Krivenik lies. Observers at this OP can see all known or suspected NLA positions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The suspected OP at EM 2257 6215 south of Krivenik has a LOS view of the area where rounds impacted to the east and west of the village. Direct LOS to the town square (mosque) is limited to the top of the building and minaret.

COMMENT: ARM can not see the impact site, NATO-sponsored terroists can. The vehicle was 5200m away and the range of mortar is according to NATO 5400m. It can not be done on a firing range in the desert. There was a mountain between Macedonian position and the village. The possibility of direct mortar hit of a vehicle is next to impossible.

Specific Findings of Fact.

The attack occurred on 29 March 2001 between 0900 – 1230.

On 29 March and the week leading up to 29 March, ARM and NLA forces had engaged in mortar attacks against each other south of Krivenik between the border and the areas around Gracani and Caska in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Between 0900 – 1300, seven volleys of 2 - 3 mortar rounds each were fired in, near, or in the direction of Krivenik on the Kosovo side of the border.

Analysis of these crater sites indicated the mortar rounds were fired from at least two locations – south to southeast of Krivenik and southwest of Krivenik. The crater analysis and the 5.4 km maximum range of 120mm mortars further indicate the mortars could have been fired from either the Kosovo or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sides of the border, and from locations where both ARM and NLA forces were known or suspected to be operating.

Witnesses in Krivenik on 29 March heard mortars being fired from at least one mortar tube immediately before a volley of four mortar rounds struck in and on the outskirts of Krivenik.

MNB-E forces saw unidentified forces during the morning of the mortar attack south of Krivenik with five artillery pieces firing south towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

COMMENT: UNIDENTIFIED FORCES? UFO CREW or NATO-sponsored terrorists? NATO MADE TRANSPARENT MISTAKE OF HIDING THE IDENTITY OF TERRORISTS.

MNB-E forces received mortar fire the morning of the Krivenik mortar attack when they moved south from Krivenik to investigate suspected NLA activity.

COMMENT: In other words, KLA was shooting at KFOR forces or in the lingo of NATO intel "KFOR elements" when speaking of POLUKRBAT

The only known ARM OP south of Krivenik did not provide line of sight observation of Krivenik or its immediate vicinity.

Both ARM and NLA forces are known to possess 120mm mortars.

After the Krivenik attack, MNB-E forces found mortar fins and fuse fragments with identification numbers on them. The mortar rounds came from Slovenia.

Presently, there is insufficient evidence to confidently suggest who attacked Krivenik on 29 March. Either ARM or NLA forces, or both, could have conducted the attack on Krivenik. More information is needed from ARM forces and, if possible, NLA forces, to determine who fired the mortars that landed in Krivenik on 29 March.

COMMENT: This NATO documents provides sufficient evidence of NATO involvement to shelter terrorists in Kosovo.