I'm not arguing in favor of getting rid of artillery, witness my comment about battelship guns. I was trying, obviously unsuccessfully, to put forward the argument that the army needs to re-shuffle some of it's force structure away from the traditional massed fire approach for all things and put more of it's assets in newer, lighter, easier to deploy, forces. I think that's how I understand Rummy's comments and actions.
We need the traditional artillery units, just like we need the traditional tanks and infantry, etc. I think that they should, however, be full time assets, organically integrated with each other, not weekend warriors. Similarly we need to have more special operations as full time units, able to engage in the type of combat we are more and more facing. Shifting headcount from units designed to meet the Russians in the Fulda Gap to more sneaky peaches type operations will more effectively utilize our manpower. Those forces need the support of the conventional units, tanks, artillery, etc., but they also need the lighter, more easily deployed systems that are coming on line now. Witness the Marines choice of the 120mm mortar for some of their new units.
The NG forces need to shift to roles that are now becoming more important but are also more oriented towards the kinds of tasks they would be drawn from in the "real world," such as MPs, hospital and other civic administrators, conventional engineering (as opposed to combat) and the like.
Again, I'm not trying to argue we need to get rid of artillery. I do see the need to bring some of the force structure in line with the combat we're likely to encounter.
Oh, and perhaps I shouldn't have used the term rocket, if that designates unguided weapons 'by definition' in the lexicon. Again, sorry. As you can tell I don't have direct experience. Instead I should have referred to the types of rocket propelled precision armaments that are rapidly making life hell for some conventional forces, such as tanks. I know that this particular one is short range, but look at the video of what the Javelin does to a modern tank. We both know there are similar systems for delivering ordinence, in addition to MLRS, that do have very high levels of accuracy.
As stated, I'm an ameteur putting in my two cents in a college dorm type discussion. The closest I come to knowledge about this topic, besides what I read, are conversations with my brother, who did some time in artillery in the Marine Reserves. I understand your direct knowledge and bow to those things you know that I don't. If I were able to better frame what I'm trying to say I think we'd agree.
Regardless of any aspects of this discussion, I want to make sure to thank anyone who has done it for both full time and National Guard duty to our country. Doesn't mean I won't put in my two cents, but it does mean I will always respect what you have done and what you say.
I would second your motion as to needing both heavy and light forces and more of them on active duty. Unfortunately, Secretary Rumsfeld is pushing for the light forces to the detriment of the heavy. Each can be capable of responding to security needs that are unique and call for those respective force organizations. There is no one-size-fits-all force structure but it seems some in the current defense establishment believe the light force structure is the Holy Grail.
Your point on the types of jobs for the NG (MP, civil affairs, construction engineering) is well taken. The pitfall remains that this would mean lots of call-ups, such as we are experiencing now. This challenges personnel retention for the NG.
Overall, I believe it is time to totally re-evaluate the force structure (light v. heavy, active v. reserve, combat v. combat support v.combat service support, etc.) because we have now eclipsed the reasons for the current structure that are rooted in the Cold War and Vietnam fallout.
Unsuccessfully is right. We all know the argument. The argument is just horsefeathers. It is buzzword bilge with no relation to actual military facts. Not just your version, the whole groupthink idiocy of only light is modern and "transformative". Newer? Newer is only better if it is an improvement. Lighter? Lighter is only better if it is an improvement. That everything is improved by being lighter is simply false. Instead of asking actual military questions about combined arms and how it works, we weigh things and let a buzzword and branch sexiness decide everything instead.
If it were true that light is always better, we'd send only amazons in their PTs with 22 caliber pistols, because boy are they light. Easier to deploy? A towed 105 will go anywhere on a chopper. Strykers don't - in case nobody noticed, they go by ship in practice. An M109 will fly wherever a C-17 can land - we spent billions on those for what, exactly? So AF types could get high paying jobs for Southwest, or so we could get heavy equipment to theater fast when necessary? Easier to deploy? The 173rd was real easy to deploy. It sat in the Kurdish mountains and watched the war. The 3rd was supposedly hard to deploy. It landed easily in Kuwait and went straight to Baghdad, through everything they had, in a few days. It isn't deployment that takes time anyway, it is diplomacy, and if you don't bring some armor, decision once battle is joined. Somebody is focused on the wrong "D".
It is easy to see why. The heavy types inside the army have no political pull. Everybody else has decided to turn them into a hidebound dinasour strawman and to wail away at them as the uncool geeks on the playground of the funding wars. The marines say they deploy better because deployment is nearly their entire mission. The AF says it will do all the shooting, don't fund anything else, because F-22s and JDAMs are both effective and expensive and the budget is limited in size; they want every scrap of it. The navy says you can't deploy there unless we win. Then the light airborne snakeaters types within the army say "OK OK, we will agree with you and gut the army, as long as we are henceforth forevermore in charge of the remainder, the only guys who'll get promoted, and whatever we want we get".
The reality is the truly effective weapons we have are JDAMs on the one hand, and heavy ground combat systems on the other. That means M-1s, MLRS, Brads, and M109s. Those fight and win the nation's wars. Snakeaters hog the promotions and brownnose the bottom line boys by agreeing to gut everybody else. The marines can get there and fight if the army lends them some M-1s if they ever encounter any actual enemy, or the AF blows it out of their way. They will be a week behind the heavy army, through no fault of their own. Simply because they are built for a dozen other things instead of being specialized at blowing their way through real ground opposition without loss.
They told us you'd need light infantry to fight in cities. Wrong. They told us heavy stuff wouldn't get there in time. Wrong. They told us we'd never need a ground footprint because SF and local allies and the airforce would do all of it. Wrong. They told us a Stryker would fit in a C-130. Wrong. They told us it'd stop a 50 cal round. Wrong. They told us an F-16 could do the work of all fire support. Wrong.
In Anaconda, they dropped multiple 2000 lb laser guided bombs on a single MG in a log bunker 200m away, without actually getting it (men bleed to death in the meantime), because they had nothing between a .223 caliber SAW and an F-16. These days troops in Afghanistan carry AT-4s, unguided with 250m range, just to have something that will KO a mud hut. We've got automatic grenade launchers and ATGMs and smart rounds for 81 and 120mm mortars and flyable 105 and 155 arty, but they didn't bother to bring any of it. Why? They were told to be "light". So all the heavy weapons companies and arty battalions either didn't deploy at all, or remain stationary in base camps.
In the march to Baghdad, in contrast, they went right through multiple armor divisions into the heart of hostile cities, blowing through multiple RPG and HMG ambushes, with a casualty toll that looks like peacetime traffic accidents. What in God's name will it take before any of the mindnumbed robots droning on about "lighter, more deployable" see that armorand firepower win wars and saves lives, and funding fight buzzwords do neither?
What will you get in response? You will get on call fire timed in seconds not hours, exactly where you want it, powerful enough to neutralize any target you care to name. Then the light guys up front will have some real combat ability - as forward observors, not as a terror to snakes. They won't have to wait hours for it to come in, and it'll have infinite "loiter time". It will kill stuff as fast as you can see it and phone home, and as fast as completely unsexy trucks can haul the ammo up to the guns.
Why are we in this mess? It is clear the present revolution in military affairs is all about smart weapon firepower. Firepower has increased in importance drastically. And range. Instead of doctrine running with this, outside the airforce it is all razzle dazzle maneuver warfare theory instead. That is the real hidebound idea - it is so 1940.
A big part of the reason why is that the important arms for it are the least sexy in the force. Why are they unsexy? Because sexy is synonymous with needs lots of courage, and it doesn't take a lot of courage to feed a gun or truck it ammo. It works just fine. But because it works so well it doesn't really even involve serious risk to life and limb, military culture turns up its nose at it. It is geeky. No snakes are eaten. At least in the air force, the officers go off to fight in risky ways. Arty is a bureaucracy by comparison. Move guns into position, set up guns, process fire support requests, feed guns, enemy evaporates. Not sexy. Just extremely effective death-dealing.