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Moving toward final status negotiations cannot be accomplished without a clear
vision of what that status will be. In our view, the only viable option now on the
table is statehood for Kosovo.
A return to provincial status for Kosovo under Belgrade’s authority cannot be
seriously contemplated, as it would almost certainly lead to armed resistance. The
creation of a tripartite union with Serbia and Montenegro is likewise a political
chimera, as even the current union between these two states is unlikely to survive.
The only alternative to full-scale independence is the partition of Kosovo,
along the model of the now-failed Cyprus plan. To that end, the late Serbian
prime minister Djindjic and leaders of the Serbian community in Kosovo have
proposed that “Kosovo should be separated into the Serb and Albanian parts”
(i.e., a federal arrangement for an independent Kosovo with an autonomous Serb
entity). While protecting the rights of the Serb minority is a top priority, the
creation of a Serb entity that is linked to Belgrade would undermine the statebuilding
process, and as the lessons of Bosnia demonstrate, a weak federal
structure with strong entity governments is an ineffective model for building the
national institutions necessary for implementing the rule of law, fostering
economic development, and encouraging ethnic reconciliation. Djindjic’s
proposal has been rightly rejected by Reno Harnish, the chief of the U.S. Office in
Pristina who observed, “All the proposals made by the Serbian prime minister,
starting from the request to return the Serbian forces in Kosovo, insisting for the
early solution of Kosovo status, as well as the last proposal for separation and
federalization of Kosovo, are nothing else but attempts for the creation of monoethnic
regions and new separations in the Balkans.” The partition of Kosovo
could set a much more dangerous precedent among all neighboring countries than
the acceptance of an independent Kosovo within existing borders.
The merits of independence go well beyond the reductionist argument that
statehood is the best of a bad set of options. Of all the options, only independence
offers the prospect of a promising future for Kosovo and its neighbors. The case
for independence can be elaborated on the basis of political, economic, and
regional security considerations.

Political

- A freely elected self-government will gain greater legitimacy as a
sovereign organ rather than as a simple tool in the hands of international
players, primarily the United Nations. Its authority and accountability to
the electorate will be enhanced through the successful completion of the
process leading to statehood. This will also undercut attempts to subvert or
circumvent the legitimate Kosovar authorities by nondemocratic and
organized criminal elements favoring a weak or uncertain state that allows
for their illicit operations, not only in Kosovo, but also across the border in
Macedonia.
- An international commitment to statehood would lessen the likelihood of a
social explosion in Kosovo provoked by painful economic conditions.
Public morale and discipline will also increase with the realization that
independence, which is overwhelmingly favored by the majority of the
population in Kosovo, is achievable, imminent, durable, and vital to
preserve.
- The creation of an independent Kosovar government, parliament, and
judicial and other institutions is the only way to develop a law-abiding
society and an inclusive democracy in which all citizens, regardless of
ethnicity, are granted the full array of human and civil rights, including the
right to return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. Most
importantly, an independent government will be in a position to set social,
economic, and institutional priorities and draft legislation—actions now
almost entirely in the hands of UNMIK and other international
organizations.

Economic

- There is little prospect for economic development until Kosovo is
independent and self-governing, as any other status solution would lead to
growing instability. Only responsible and empowered public institutions in
an independent Kosovo will set the political priorities and invest in the
infrastructure and services that will reduce the costs of production for
private entrepreneurs and spur economic growth. Moreover, few, if any,
foreign investors are likely to venture into a territory whose status remains
unclear and whose future is ambiguous.

Regional Security

- Only statehood for Kosovo would ensure a more durable regional security
in the Balkans—one that is not based principally on the presence of
outside forces. With the development of an internal police force and a
credible Kosovar military contingent, threats can be diminished and
deterred, and contributions can be made to the international struggle
against organized terrorism and criminality. Washington can then pursue a concrete timetable for a troop withdrawal, while NATO as a whole
continues to guarantee the security of the new state from external threats.
Local and European initiatives in the Balkans will also have greater
chances of success, as suspicions over the ultimate motives of neighbors
will continue to evaporate. Resources pumped into the region could then
have a more practical and genuinely international dimension with lessened
interference by foreign middlemen.
- The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU’s main program
for encouraging reform in the Balkans, requires participants to be, at a
minimum, functioning sovereign states. As other Balkan states make
progress towards the eventual goals of European integration, Kosovo is
unable to participate because of its status as international protectorate.
Only an independent Kosovo, not represented by UNMIK, can begin the
essential process of European integration.
- Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo will send a strong signal to
extremists and ethnic agitators in Bosnia and Macedonia that partition is
not an attainable goal. Dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines would only
serve to encourage destabilizing elements throughout the region.

Finally, fears have been raised that independence for Kosovo will lead to
further disintegration in the region. It has been asserted, for example, that
independence for Kosovo would open the door for the Republika Sprska (RS) to
secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and open the door for other ethnic groups
within Serbia and other countries to demand territorial separation. These fears are
misplaced. The case for separating the RS from Bosnia is frivolous, as it is an
artificial entity created by ethnic cleansing and therefore undeserving of further
status considerations. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the RS or any
other ethnic group could make claims to independence based on the criteria laid
out by the Badinter Commission. Ultimately, the international community must
make it clear that the resolution of Kosovo’s status will carry no precedents for
other ethnic groups or entities in the region.