Iraqis Embrace Politics
March 09, 2004
New York Post
Amir Taheri
Although no date has been set for polling day, Iraqi politics has already shifted into election campaign gear. The most dramatic illustration of this so far came last Friday when five Shiite members of the Iraq Governing Council, the nation's interim authority, failed to show up at a ceremony organized to sign a constitutional draft.
The boycott was not announced until the last minute and thus achieved maximum impact. TV audiences throughout the country saw other members of the council milling around, consulting their watches, and in some cases biting their nails, while a group of 24 schoolgirls, dressed in folk costumes, waited anxiously to perform a special number written for what was to be an historic occasion but wasn't.
Some in the Western media saw the Baghdad boycott episode as "a major setback for U.S. plans in Iraq" and "a rupture between the Shiites and the United States." That was quickly proven wrong - the signing took place yesterday. What did these "analysts" miss?
The boycott's point was not to torpedo the draft constitution or to upset plans for the transfer of power to the Iraqis - nor even to make life more difficult for L. Paul Bremer, the American "pasha" who heads the interim Coalition authority.
The five who stayed away are the most experienced politicians among the 13 Shiites who make up a majority of the Governing Council. Iraq observers agree that almost all the "boycott five" will secure seats in the transitional government to be set up June 30 when the occupation period officially ends:
* Iraqi National Council (INC) leader Ahmed Chalabi has had close ties to the United States for decades.
* Abdel-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), has done more than many to foster trust between the coalition and the Iraqi Shiites.
* Mohammed Bahr al-Oloum played a key role in the dialogue between the Shiite clergy and the coalition authorities.
* Ibrahim al-Jaafari, leader of the Al-Daawah (The Call) Party and Mouwafak al-Rubii, an independent politician, have emerged as moderate figures with genuine democratic aspirations.
Note, first, that only these five - of 13 Shiites on the Governing Council - decided to stay away. In other words, there was no collective Shiite action to postpone the signing of the draft, let alone derail the entire constitution scheme.
The boycott decision was taken late last Thursday after a grand meeting of Shiite religious, tribal, business and political leaders at the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali Muhammad Sistani, the primus inter pares of Iraqi clerics, in Najaf.
The meeting had been convened to work out strategy in the wake of the terrorist attacks against Shiites in Karbala and Baghdad last Tuesday.
Two Governing Council members briefed Sistani and other clerics about the constitutional draft and invited them to support the document. (Sistani and other ayatollahs have not been given a formal role in the constitutional process because most Iraqis agree that religion should not become directly involved in politics.)
They raised two objections. One concerned a mechanism by which the interim constitution could be suspended if two-thirds of voters in just three of Iraq's 18 provinces so decide. The measure was inserted as added assurance for the minorities, notably Kurds and Turcoman, who fear that the new Iraq, dominated by the Shiite majority, might threaten their legitimate aspiration to autonomy and cultural self-realization. Because some provinces are sparsely populated, such a mechanism could give a few hundred thousand voters a veto power.
The second Shiite objection concerned the composition of the presidential council that will supervise the period of transition: The Shiites will not receive the two-thirds share of the seats that they believe reflects their demographic position in the country as a whole.
In short, the objections concerned technical points that could be ironed out through negotiations.
What is significant is that the Shiite community has been almost unanimous in endorsing the constitutional draft. The Shiites have learned the lesson of 1918-1919, when they refused to cooperate with the British occupation authorities in setting up Iraq as an independent nation-state. As a result, the Shiites shut themselves out of politics for decades, ending up living in a country ruled by the Sunni Arab minority. (The British even imported a Sunni king for Iraq from neighboring Arabia.)
During the past few months, the politics of liberated Iraq has developed its own careful choreography.
This is how things proceed: The "pasha" puts his ideas in circulation. They are immediately attacked by everyone, most notably by the Shiites. Then all sides enter into negotiations that include a great deal of posturing. Eventually, a compromise emerges.
This is almost invariably rejected by Sistani, whose tactic has been to play the democratic card and to call for people power. Then follows another series of negotiations, which lead to new compromise. This is then endorsed by Sistani, often with a wink and a nod.
The tactic is to push the Coalition and the Governing Council to the edge, but not beyond.
The "boycott quintet" is using a similar ploy. They need to do three things at the same time:
* Keep the political process on course.
* Keep their popular base motivated and mobilized.
* Counter claims that they are mere puppets in an American game.
In other words, they are acting as any normal politician would do wherever decisions are not imposed by a despot or a dictatorial ruling clique. That is: The Iraqis are learning democracy on the job.
In the weeks and months ahead, Iraq is going to have a lot of politics with a great many cliff-hangers. Don't be surprised if Chalabi emerges as the leader of a movement to end "American occupation." It would also be no surprise if the next boycott is organized by the Kurds.
Iraqi politicians on all sides are beginning to learn how to use the full bag of tricks that comes with normal politics. The Shiites wish to highlight their numerical strength without scaring away other communities. The Kurds emphasize their 12-year experience in democratic self-rule and their privileged relations with Washington. Sunni Arabs seek to make the most of their administrative experience and the contribution they could make to the nation's new armed forces, diplomatic service and cultural life.
All in all, Iraqis seem to be developing a taste for politics, something they had been deprived of for almost half a century. And that, believe me, is a privilege that few other nations in the region enjoy today.
E-mail:
amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com - www.benadorassociates.com
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