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A receipt doesn't help because there's no guarantee that the receipt matches what the machine tallied.

Actually -- if the receipt has a random but unique ID on it, then simply requiring the precinct to publish the full voting results, by ID, will allow each individual to double-check his/her receipt against the tally roster to ensure that the two match. The tally sheets could be posted at the polling location, online, or in newspapers.

Combine that with the previous comment about catching "spikes" of votes, and it has considerably better validation of results than traditional methods.

"weegee"'s post 21 addresses the problem inherent in having identifiable information available. You can end up with a situation where an employer demands an employee's receipt number. So, there's a potential loss of secrecy in the ballot process inherent in the verification process you suggest.

I do agree, though, that it would work.

The general concept of a receipt has another problem which is related to its mischief-making potential. If you recall the way the first moments of the Florida recount unwound, the demo phone-banks made numerous calls to people suggesting that their vote was being miscounted, and, by golly, produced a significant number of seniors who decided that had, in fact, happened.

Issuing receipts presents a candidate who wishes to put the results in doubt with the opportunity to send a few "ringers" to the polls instructed to vote for his opponent. He then has them display the receipts showing a vote tallied for the opponent and claim that they had actually voted for him, and therefore the machines weren't counting votes properly.

Given sufficient publicity, this claim would result in a number of other people checking their receipts and would turn up a number of people who, through human error, hadn't voted for the candidate they wanted to. Of course, knowing human nature, none of them would accept that the error was theres, so they'd present themselves as additional "victims" of the "machine problems".

Essentially, you create a situation where every election can become a "Florida-type" contest.

OH, and....

The work around for the unique ID number would be to create an ID number for each possible combination of choices. The machine would issue you a number for the combination that matched what you voted for, but would actually record a modified version of your vote under another ID number.

Unless you compared ID numbers with someone else who voted exactly the same way you did, you'd never catch on. And even then, if it was only done enough to swing the majority and not on every vote, you'd have to get lucky.