Posted on 03/29/2004 11:26:41 AM PST by cyncooper
In the 1990s, hard-line national security experts outside the government regarded Richard Clarke as a rare kindred soul inside the Clinton administration. That's mainly why he alone of Bill Clinton's senior team was kept on by George W. Bush. So, how did Clarke become President Bush's scourge, taken very seriously at the White House as a threat to the re-election campaign?
The answer lies with personality rather than ideology, with personal relations rather than political strategy. Clarke is now painted as a miscreant by Republicans and as a martyr by Democrats, but he really is a super-bureaucrat accustomed to working behind closed doors who has been thrust into the public arena. Downgraded and disrespected at the Bush White House, he became an anti-Bush activist with his testimony last week.
Clarke had complained to friends about the Clinton administration's weakness on terrorism, and probably expected to prosper in a Republican environment. Instead, he has become a leading witness for the Democratic prosecution. His past frustration with Clinton is minimized in his book Against All Enemies, which excoriates Bush.
Until the past week, Clarke was best known inside Washington as one of the most skilled manipulators ever of the national security bureaucracy. He is the hero of journalist Richard Miniter's 2003 book, Losing Bin Laden, a scathing exposure of Clinton's anti-terrorism failings. Clarke was described as ''blunt, tough and unrelenting'' in pursuing terrorist Ramzi Yousef, sought in the first World Trade Center bombing. ''Imagine what he could have accomplished if Clinton had publicly endorsed his efforts,'' Miniter wrote.
Clarke was not only the hero but also obviously a prime source of Losing Bin Laden. Miniter for the first time revealed, directly quoting Clarke, the meeting of Cabinet-level officials on Oct. 12, 2000, after the terrorist attack on the USS Cole. The vote was 7-1 against an attack on Osama bin Laden. Only Clarke wanted action.
In his own book, Clarke quickly brushes off the Cole meeting that he described in detail to Miniter. Instead of complaining about Clinton's failure to come to grips with al-Qaida and bin Laden, Clarke recites what sounds like Democratic talking points. He even interprets U.S. intervention in Bosnia as having ''defeated al-Qaida,'' adding that Clinton ''had seen earlier than anyone that terrorism would be the major new threat facing America.''
Clarke's experience with the Bush administration appeared to heighten his appreciation of Clinton. Whereas he had briefed Clinton, Bush was briefed by CIA Director George Tenet. Clarke found himself at ''deputies'' rather than ''principals'' meetings. The final indignity was his rejection by Secretary Tom Ridge for a high-ranking Homeland Security post.
While Clarke had worked closely with Clinton National Security Adviser Sandy Berger in bureaucratic maneuvers to further Clarke's anti-terrorist agenda, Condoleezza Rice as Berger's successor was not engaged. Clarke described her to close associates as ''shallow.''
Beyond Rice, friends say, Clarke felt uncomfortable with the conservatives brought in by George W. Bush as he had not felt with George H.W. Bush's or certainly Clinton's team. The White House team is not hospitable to outsiders, and Clarke was surely an outsider.
Clarke since he left the government is described by friends as becoming much closer to Rand Beers, who succeeded him as chief terrorist official in the Bush administration. Beers quit his high-ranking post to become Sen. John Kerry's foreign policy adviser. Since then, Clarke and Beers have been collaborating.
That Beers is a registered Democrat and Clarke says he is a registered (but never an active) Republican is inconsequential. Clarke's only political contributions in 2002 and 2004 were to two former colleagues on the Clinton National Security Council staff who are running for Congress as Democrats.
While Clarke testified under oath last week that he would not join a Kerry administration, he is now, in effect, part of the Kerry campaign. His book's publication was timed to coincide with his testimony, and his transformed posture is one of political partisan.
He says Clarke felt pushed aside by the new administratin so turned, but he never voted for Bush so I'm not sure he was awaiting a Republican administration where he expected to prosper. On the other hand, Novak correctly points out that Clarke's past statements, including the Miniter book, were critical of Clinton and laudatory of Bush.
Also he presents the Clarke line describing Rice as "disengaged" as if it had a factual basis, when emails have been produced from Rice informing Clarke he was missing meetings at which his attendance was requested. I just don't think the documentation supports that portrayal of Condi Rice.
I would like to see more mention of the concerns raised by Christopher Shays going back to 2000 and that he brought to Rice's attention immediately upon the inauguration of President Bush.
One reason I was curious to read Novak's take is there has been some speculation on FR that Clarke may have been involved in the Wilson/Plame affair so may have been one of Novak's sources. I don't see any hints of that here, (darn it).
The most likely reasons for treason are:
1. Money. (Certainly plenty of that here, and there could easily be more than we know.)
2. Blackmail. (If Clarke has skeletons, the Clintons would certainly know about 'em.)
3. All of the above.
Also he presents the Clarke line describing Rice as "disengaged" as if it had a factual basis...
I'm not sure that this is what Novak is trying to say. I think he means that Clarke & Rice didn't have the same working relationship that Clarke had w/ Sandy Berger. The sentence is somewhat ambiguous--my first take was the same as yours.
Also the memos where Rice requested Clarke start attending meetings he was missing go to it being a two-way street and not a matter of a disengaged Rice not holding meetings or not wanting to deal with an issue she was in fact very much dealing with.
So I do think by leaving out those aspects, Novak's analysis is flawed in that area.
In a letter to the 9/11 commission on Wednesday, Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) told panel members that ''Clarke was part of the problem before Sept. 11 because he took too narrow a view of the terrorism threat.''
Shays said that before the Sept. 11 terror attacks, a House panel held twenty hearings and two formal briefings on terrorism -- and Richard Clarke ''was of little help in our oversight.''
''When he briefed the subcommittee, his answers were both evasive and derisive,'' Shays said in his March 24, 2004 letter.
Shays noted that ''no truly national strategy to combat terrorism was ever produced during Mr. Clarke's tenure.''
Shays also released a copy of a letter he wrote to Clarke on July 5, 2000, telling Clarke that Shays' subcommittee found the information Clarke had given them ''less than useful,'' and asking him to answer additional questions.
And Shays released a January 22, 2001 letter he wrote to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, complaining that Clarke had not answered the subcommittee's questions. ''During a briefing to this Subcommittee, Mr. Clarke stated that there is no need for a national strategy,'' Shays wrote to Rice.
''This Subcommittee, and others, disagree with Mr. Clarke's assessment that U.S. government agencies do not require a planning and preparation document to respond to terrorist attacks,'' Shays wrote.
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