Posted on 03/29/2004 8:27:28 PM PST by erk
Speakers: | Samuel R. Berger, Wolf Blitzer, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Edward Djerejian, Andrew J. Goodpaster, Lee Hamilton, Robert C. McFarlane and Walt W. Rostow. |
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Location: | Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC |
Date: | April 12, 2001 |
Topic: | Forum on the Role of the National Security Advisor |
Participants: | Former national security advisors included Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Andrew J. Goodpaster, Robert C. McFarlane and Walt W. Rostow. Wolf Blitzer, CNN anchor, moderated the panel. Edward Djerejian, director of the Baker Institute at Rice, presented opening remarks. Lee Hamilton, former U.S. Congressman and director of the Wilson Center, presented closing remarks. |
Links: | Forum transcript (HTML); Forum transcript (PDF); Rice News article, April 12, 2001; Baker Institute for Public Policy; Woodrow Wilson Center; WWICS news article; Forum on the Role of the White House Chief of Staff |
. . .(snip)
BRZEZINSKI: Well, I want to make a distinction, which I don't think was made here which needs to be made. One should not confuse Cabinet status with Senate confirmation. They're not the same thing.
BLITZER: Right.
BRZEZINSKI: Now in my case, I didn't have Senate confirmation, but I had Cabinet status. But it was totally irrelevant. You know, I had to attend the Cabinet meetings. And I think the only difference between me with Cabinet status as a national security advisor and my colleagues who weren't is that I sat at the table instead of sitting against the wall. But most Cabinet meetings are routine, nonsignificant events, especially when it comes to foreign policy.
(LAUGHTER)
Now confirmation is a different issue. Now the national security could be confirmed. And there have been ideas to that effect, just as the head of the Bureau of the Budget is confirmed. I personally preferred that it not be so, because if you get confirmed you also have to testify a lot, you have to go down to the Hill a lot. The schedule demands on you are so enormous already that that would be an additional burden and would greatly complicate the issue we talked about earlier, namely, who speaks for foreign policy in the government besides the president? And it should be the secretary of state. And if you are confirmed, that would become fuzzed and confused.
BLITZER: You were a member of the Cabinet. But, Sandy Berger, you were not a member of the Cabinet.
BERGER: Well, I sat at the table. I don't know if I was a member of the Cabinet or not.
BRZEZINSKI: You were a semi-member.
BERGER: 1:26:20 of Video Clip #1) No one ever told me whether I was or not. (LAUGHTER) I just, I guess, took the chair there. But I think the point that Zbig just made is a key point here. With confirmation comes an almost legal obligation of accountability to the Congress. The secretary of state, secretary of defense spend enormous amounts of time on the Hill. The secretary of state, secretary of defense may have to testify six or eight times on the budget of their agency. And each of those testimonies, of course, is an occasion to answer the question of every member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which may or may not be related to the budget. I actually think that this has become too burdensome on the secretary of state, secretary of defense. But perhaps a third of their time is engaged in this. And so the one benefit of not having confirmation is that you can say no to a congressional committee. In fact, most presidents have taken the view that under executive privilege that the their national security advisor, just like their chief of staff, can't be compelled to go up on the Hill.
GOODPASTER: I'd like to reinforce that. . . .
CARLUCCI: Well, would you make the chief of staff accountable in the same way, or virtually every White House staff member?
HAMILTON: Frank, I think the national security advisor occupies a very special place. He is, if not the principal advisor, he's among the two or three principal advisors to the president on foreign policy. You're perfectly willing to go before all of the TV networks anytime they give you a ring, if you want to go. Why should you discriminate against the Congress?
(LAUGHTER)
BERGER: ... I think any national security advisor...who got a call from the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to come on up and talk in their office would be out of their mind not to go up. In fact, during my period, I regularly met with the House and Senate majority and minority leaders and many others, as Bud was saying, is important informally. But there's not only a chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. There's a chairman of Foreign Operations. There's a chairman of the House Defense Committee. And it's hard, of course, once you've submitted to the proposition that you can be summoned up to the Hill, it's hard to say, well, the Foreign Relations Committee is more important than the Defense Committee, or the appropriators are more important than the authorizers. And I think you really have changed the nature of the job. I think the national security advisor is accountable. I can't imagine not responding to a request to come up. My frustration was often that I couldn't get enough people in the House of Representatives to come down to the White House to talk about foreign policy. I think best left informally.
HAMILTON: Let me make two comments. One is the point several of you have made, and you just made, Sandy, is right, that secretaries spend an awful lot of time on Capitol Hill. And to me, that says Capitol Hill has to reorganize the way they make inquiries of secretaries. But it is not the same thing for a national security advisor to come into the private office and meet behind closed doors with members of Congress. That's not the same thing as going into a public body and answering questions, in my judgment. They're two different things. And every one of you -- every one of you -- responded to congressional questions and went up to the Hill, and Bud McFarlane was particularly sensitive to the Congress because, as I recall, your father was a congressman. But I draw a distinction there. I know how you feel about it. I guess it's a kind of a different perspective, one from the executive branch, one from the congressional branch.
CARLUCCI: Can I come at it from a slightly different perspective, that the person who is accountable is the president.
GOODPASTER: That's my point. Yes.
. . . (snip)
QUESTION: General Goodpaster brought up the issue of executive privilege, and I wonder how the rather more aggressive subpoena activity from the Congress has affected the role of the national security advisor and the method of operation that you all think would be most appropriate?
BERGER: One of the unfortunate consequences is that no one keeps a diary. No one keeps notes. No one keeps any pieces of paper in the United States government. And I think history will be poorly served by a few e-mails that it can get perhaps some kind of insight into what was happening. Obviously, there are the documents and the memos that are generated for the president -- the official record. But the aggressive role of the Congress and the politicizing of foreign policy -- I'm not talking about things that are other than foreign policy. I'm talking about foreign policy. If Congress doesn't agree with our policy on Haiti, it turns it into an investigation with subpoena power and uses that, then, often to summon people and to turn this into a quasi-almost inquisition. And I think it's destructive to the policy process, and I think it's very important for national security advisors and the president to defend the prerogative of the presidency. And I suspect that most of us have done that pretty assiduously.
BERGER: One of the unfortunate consequences is that no one keeps a diary. No one keeps notes. No one keeps any pieces of paper in the United States government. And I think history will be poorly served by a few e-mails that it can get perhaps some kind of insight into what was happening. Obviously, there are the documents and the memos that are generated for the president -- the official record. But the aggressive role of the Congress and the politicizing of foreign policy -- I'm not talking about things that are other than foreign policy. I'm talking about foreign policy. If Congress doesn't agree with our policy on Haiti, it turns it into an investigation with subpoena power and uses that, then, often to summon people and to turn this into a quasi-almost inquisition. And I think it's destructive to the policy process, and I think it's very important for national security advisors and the president to defend the prerogative of the presidency. And I suspect that most of us have done that pretty assiduously.
We pay good money and cast good votes to elect Congress.
They should do their damn jobs and crap can Commissions.
These idiots think they are coequal to President Bush. If Condie testifies under oath in public, it won't end there. The next demand will be for Andrew Card and then President Bush.
Just say NO President Bush.
![]() U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites) (R) walks with Clinton administration National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on the south lawn of the White House March 29, 2004, following a ceremony where U.S. President George W. Bush (news - web sites) welcomed seven new NATO (news - web sites) alliance nations. The White House today looked for a deal with the Sept. 11, 2001 commission under which Rice would appear in private before the panel, but it refused to budge in the face of demands she testify in public and under oath. Berger testified publicly last week. REUTERS/Jason Reed
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