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Transcript: Will Terror Derail Iraq's Transition of Power?

Thursday, June 24, 2004

This is a partial transcript of The Big Story With John Gibson, June 23, 2004, that has been edited for clarity.

JOHN GIBSON,HOST: Big attacks and small, they're all taking a toll on efforts to rebuild Iraq. Joining us now, Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute (search) and Harlan Ullman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (search). Today's big question, to you first, Michael, will a terror campaign against Iraqis derail a peaceful transition of power?

MICHAEL LEDEEN, AMERICAN ENTERPIRSE INSTITUTE: No, I don't think so. It's been going on since the very beginning. Everybody knew it was coming. Both Harlan and I predicted it long before the liberation of Iraq, and it's an ongoing struggle.

GIBSON: Harlan, you say it's ongoing ad infinitum.

HARLAN ULLMAN, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: It's going to go on I'm afraid for a long time. I think there are an awful lot of bad people who have a lot of reasons that they want to overthrow this government, they want to disrupt it. With June 30 coming they're going to use that as a date ...

GIBSON: You have no sense that the Iraqi people want to support this government in any way?

ULLMAN: First of all, I would say that the bulk of the Iraqi people are very unhappy with the American occupation, and I think there's far less support for this government until they prove themselves. And one of the problems with overreacting with what Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (search) is going to say is that this government, because of protection, is going to be finding it increasingly difficult to get out and be with its people. It's going to be increasingly isolated just like the old Iraqi government council was.

GIBSON: Michael, the logic we're operating under here now is, gee, you know, as of July 1, it's an Iraqi government. The Americans go off to their barracks and run security operations, and that's that. Whoever this is setting these bombs off is attacking Iraqis, not the Americans. Does that logic work in Iraq?

LEDEEN: I think really it's a distinction without a difference, John, and I think from the very beginning the countries that have been supporting this terror network — and, remember, Zarqawi we can place very firmly in the axis of Iran. Zarqawi for years operated out of Iran. He's been back and forth to Iran all the time. Europeans have endless transcripts, intercepts, and firsthand testimony of Zarqawi working out of Tehran and working closely with the Iranian revolutionary guards and so forth. It's a regional war. There was never any way we could win this thing in Iraq alone. We were forced into a regional context all the time.

For Zarqawi to come out now and say, well, we're going to kill the new prime minister is no news to anybody. They've been trying to kill every Iraqi that would, first, collaborate with the coalition and, secondly, serve in an Iraqi government, because all those people in Tehran and Damascus who are supporting this terror network know perfectly well that if Iraq is permitted to succeed — if there's a free and Democratic Iraq, they are doomed because their own people will get rid of them. People in the Middle East, by and large, want to see Iraq succeed. Regimes don't.

GIBSON: Harlan, is this an Iranian deal?

ULLMAN: It's beyond Iran. Michael and I agree about the notion of a regional war here. But have you to realize that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan are part of the this in addition to Syria and Iran. And the problem is by focusing on Iraq, we're making it increasingly difficult to deal with the larger problems which are going to take place in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and if Michael is correct, with Iran and Syria. In other words, we're dealing with a tactical issue in Iraq when the strategic issue really has to do with the region and the politics of the region. And I'm afraid we're not getting ahead of that power curve. That's the real danger.

GIBSON: All right, if that is the case, Michael, then is there an argument to be made, though, that even though we may be behind the curve on the strategic vision, we have a tactical emplacement in Iraq?

LEDEEN: Oh, for sure. We have to continue to fight in Iraq, and we might get lucky and actually get Zarqawi, although I would really be surprised if Zarqawi were in Iraq today. I don't think he is there. I think he has gone back to Iran, and I think his people are operating in Iraq, and they have elevated now. He used to be a kind of operational commander. Now more and more he is a media star. He has cassettes coming out and media statements. He is up there along with people like Usama bin Laden.

GIBSON: All right, Harlan Ullman, light at the end of tunnel or oncoming train?

ULLMAN: It's a long slog. And, unfortunately, rather like American politicians have learned to become celebrities rather than heroes, I think Michael is right. Some of the bad guys have learned to become celebrities and our media and the way that you can use the Internet and all sorts of communications can add to that, much more than we should make of it. Obviously, they want to try and kill the leadership, and I think we ought not to overreact. This is business as usual.

GIBSON: Harlan Ullman and Michael Ledeen, thanks to both of you. Appreciate it.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,123639,00.html

CIA planned guerrilla campaign in Iran to counter communists in 1953: documents

WASHINGTON, June 23 (AFP) - The US Central Intelligence Agency planned a sustained guerrilla campaign in Iran in case its 1953 plan to ouster the government of Mohammad Mossadegh fell through and communists increased their sway over the country, according to newly declassified US government documents.

The top secret papers, produced in late 1952 and 1953 by the State Department and the National Security Council, provide proof that the widely-known US-British efforts to destabilize the government of prime minister Mossadegh were backed up by broad contingency plans that called for bolstering US military presence in the region and launching an anti-communist guerrilla force in the south of Iran.

The Mossadegh government, which drew the ire of Washington and London because of its persistent attempts to increase control over the country's oil resources, was toppled in an August 19, 1953, coup led by US-backed general Fazlollah Zahedi who allowed pro-American Shah Reza Pahlavi to return from exile.

US officials have grudgingly acknowledged that the coup had become possible due to CIA-designed Operation "Ajax" that helped plunge Iran into chaos and paved the way for Mossadegh's downfall.

But the administration of then US president Dwight Eisenhower was seriously concerned that the plan could go awry and Iranian communists from the Tudeh Party would capitalize on instability and the unraveling economy to seize power, according to the documents released by the National Security Archive on Tuesday.

To counter that possibility, the CIA made preparations for unleashing a guerrilla campaign targeting Tudeh members and other Iranian politicians, then-undersecretary of state Walter Smith reported to the White House.

In his memorandum dated May 20, 1953, Smith noted that the CIA had reached an agreement with Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clandestine safe haven from which US-funded guerrillas and intelligence agents could operate.

"To date CIA has trained and equipped a total of approximately 10 indigenous clandestine radio operators to be located throughout Iran and who can be called upon to maintain communications with CIA when desired," Smith wrote. "Others are being trained."

Stockpiles of weapons and ammunition were being secretly assembled at Wheelus Field, an air base in Libya used at that time by the US Air Force.

Smith reported that the base already had enough war materiel to equip a 10,000-strong guerrilla force and allow it to operate independently for at least six months. Other supply bases were being established in Tripoli, the Suez Canal zone and the US state of New Jersey.

"These supplies could, within three to four weeks, be transported by air and sea to certain strong tribal elements in southern Iran," the undersecretary of state assured.

Reception points for this materiel were being set up in the Tehran and Tabriz areas, along with secret caches of gold and currency, while the CIA drew plans for forming eight, three-person teams to run its secret guerrilla army.

The plan also called for deploying several dozen additional US warplanes to southern Turkey and positioning a naval force of an undetermined size in the vicinity of the Iraqi southern city of Basra to create a barrier to "the spread of communist power."

In addition, the US government was determined to seek access to the Saudi military base in Dhahran "as a transit point in connection with contemplated US covert operations," Smith wrote.

http://www.iranmania.com/news/230604a.asp

Note: This may prove that US actually though erroneously believed Dr. Mossadeqh to be a communist - The British on the other hand conned the US to overthrow Dr. Mossadeqh for their own greedy reasons... cheap Iranian oil.

Persian Language And Literature, Cultural Symbol Of Iran: Official
TEHRAN, June 22 (MNA) – The secretary of the Development of Persian Language and Literature, Ali Asghar Mohammad Khani, said Persian language and literature are the greatest cultural symbols of Iran.

He made the remark in a press conference in "Khaneh Ketab" (Book House), stating that literary works and Persian language are the main assets of Iran, which encourage freedom, prosperity and joy.

He said Persian language and literature could be examined in present and past perspectives and that our literature has spawned towering figures.

He cited the Shahnameh as a major masterpiece just like "Iliad and Odyssey.

Mohammad Khani said that Persian is a widely-spoken language after Arabic in the world of Islam and literary works constitute a major part of spiritual history of the world.

He said the council has established an educational headquarters of Persian language and it has identified 220 works in the last two centuries and published 40 books in the last two decades in different languages.
He stressed that training Persian in foreign and domestic courses is among the activities of the council, adding that the council is determined to upgrade its programs in a 45-day courses in Iran and develop several courses in China, Kazakhstan and Lebanon.

The secretary of the Development of Persian Language and Literature said 15 scholarships would be granted to non-Iranian students.

Among the programs of this council are establishing data banks in foreign universities, providing Persian dictionaries, introducing Persian masterpieces and translating these works and introducing special days in Iran and abroad like the day of Attar, Hafiz, Rumi, Khayyam, Sa'di, Ferdowsi, Ghazzali and other literary figures worldwide.

Mohammad Khani pointed out that the establishment of national document of promotion of Persian language and literature is the most outstanding programs of the council.

http://www.mehrnews.com/wfNewsDetails_en.aspx?NewsID=89087&t=Cultural