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I agree the Army is a much more visible target than the Marine Corps; however, many of the Army's problems are self-inflicted, eg the problems with the Paladin artillery piece and the Cheyenne scout helicopter.
Moreover, the "political" problems within the Army are as deleterious as the problems the Army has with Congress. For example, the almost moronic personnel system the Army has clung to like a security blanket and the squabbles between the various "branches" within the Army.
Now, the Army is setting itself up for the biggest fiasco of all: the Future Combat Systems. Its too expensive to be funded, too high tech to withstand the wear and tear of combat for sustained periods, and - more importantly - it takes the Army's eye off the most critical problem it faces: putting more trained boots (worn by enlisted soldiers not officers) on the ground.
The Army's leadership seems to be falling into the same mindset as Roger Smith when he was CEO of General Motors. Smith wanted to transform GM into a high tech company. To that end, he spent billions and let GM's manufacturing capacity run down.
In a way you are correct about the V-22. This aircraft has the potential to revolutionize mobility, but it should not have been developed by the Marine Corps. The Corps lacks the technical and management base to sustain development of such a revolutionary project. If the Air Force, which has that sort of skill, had been assigned to develop the V-22 from the beginning, the plane might be flying now.

One of our major bitches before I retired was the introduction of high tech for the sake of high tech. One great example was the LACV – 30.
Someone in Army procurement thought we needed it. – and as it was off the shelf we got it. It is a high speed air cushioned vehicle for amphibious operations. Jet turbine engines required a lot of maintenance and were susceptible to damage from salt and sand, as were the propellers that drove it. They were made to use in Alaska on ice, not in warm salt water on sandy beaches. These craft had more down time than operational time – as I remember, it was about 25 hours maintenance for every hour of running by the book, but they seldom were up that much. The Future Combat Systems sounds similar – high tech for the sake of high tech. A high “Gee Whiz” factor.
Hopefully some of the in house problems will disappear in the next decade. Many of our highest ranking Generals came up when officers who wanted quick promotion earned degrees in business administration and political science, not military history. The legacy of McNamara’s Best and Brightest. Today it is different – military history is again a favored degree for the rising young officer.