Posted on 08/01/2004 8:40:38 PM PDT by knak
Continued Russian support for Iran’s nuclear-energy program despite U.S. objections that this could help Tehran acquire nuclear weapons appears to be a source of great pride to many Russian officials and commentators. Indeed, Moscow’s defiance of Washington feeds into the notion that Russia is still a great power. Moscow’s continued contribution to the Iranian nuclear program may, however, ultimately serve to weaken Russia, not strengthen it.
The U.S. government has long been worried that Tehran is using its nuclear-energy program to develop nuclear weapons, and has therefore repeatedly urged Moscow to halt work on the reactor it is building for the Iranians at Bushehr. The standard Russian response has been that Iran is in compliance with all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations, and thus has the right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop a peaceful nuclear-energy program. But with the revelation that Iran possesses hitherto secret nuclear facilities that it had not declared to the IAEA and that some of the equipment IAEA inspectors have found in Iran bore traces of weapons grade uranium, it has become increasingly clear that Iran is not in total compliance with IAEA regulations
Yet despite these revelations, Russian work on the Iranian nuclear-energy program has continued. While the United States wanted the IAEA to declare Iran to be in violation of the NPT and refer the matter to the UN Security Council, Russia sided with European and other states that were unwilling to do so and sought to "engage" Tehran instead. In the past few months, though, it has become obvious to the Europeans that their engagement efforts have not succeeded, and that Iran appears determined to acquire the equipment and technology that could enable it to fabricate nuclear weapons, although Iran insists it seeks only to develop a peaceful nuclear-energy program.
Moscow meanwhile has continued to declare that it will complete the nuclear reactor it is currently helping to build at Bushehr, and to express its hopes of building several more. True, the Russian government insists that Iran must agree to return to Russia all spent fuel (which could be used for nuclear weapons), but the value of such an agreement (if it is signed) as a nonproliferation measure is dubious. Aleksandr Rumyantsev, head of Russia’s Federal Atomic Energy Agency, said in May that any such spent fuel would not arrive in Russia for at least seven or eight years.
It would seem that Russia would have as much of an incentive -- or an even greater one -- than the United States and the EU in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia is much closer geographically to Iran, and thus is much more within range of the type of missile currently available to Tehran. Nor would Russia be less vulnerable to an Iranian attack if Tehran were to succeed in developing longer-range missiles.
Yet, while Moscow genuinely does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, it has a strong incentive to continue assisting the Iranian nuclear-energy program. In December 2002, Radzhab Safarov, who is director-general of the Russian Center for Contemporary Iranian Studies, noted that the Russian nuclear-power industry faced an uncertain future after it lost customers both in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union itself following the 1989-91 collapse of communism. "Therefore, Iran has in effect saved Russia’s nuclear-power sector. And we should be grateful to Iran for having provided tens of thousands of Russian companies with 70 percent of their work," Safarov told Ekho Moskvy. In other words, without the work in Iran, the Russian nuclear industry, which Moscow places a high priority on preserving, may not have enough customers to survive.
Iran regards the United States as its greatest opponent. One strong motive the Iranian hard-liners would appear to have for acquiring nuclear weapons is to deter the United States from military intervention against Iran. This motive was undoubtedly heightened after witnessing how rapidly U.S.-led forces overthrew first the Taliban and then Saddam Hussein in countries neighboring Iran. Iran, then, would appear to have a strong incentive to remain on good terms with Russia -- at least, that is, until Tehran actually does acquire nuclear weapons. What is surprising, though, is that Moscow does not attempt to exploit Iran’s dependence on Russia in the nuclear arena to obtain concessions in other areas, especially the delimitation of the Caspian Sea. However, Iran is refusing to accept an agreement signed in May 2003 by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan that would give those three states nearly 70 percent of the seabed; Iran is holding out for dividing the seabed and the waters into five equal parts among the littoral states.
Iran’s intransigence has negatively affected Moscow because it has prevented Russian oil firms from participating in the exploitation of oil deposits in the area of the southern Caspian to which both Azerbaijan and Iran lay claim, and has motivated Azerbaijan to seek military assistance from the United States, which Moscow sees as undercutting its own influence in the region.
Moscow could attempt to link its continued participation in the Iranian nuclear-energy program to Iranian concessions on the delimitation of the Caspian. Alternatively, or simultaneously, Russia could cooperate with the United States in trying to persuade the IAEA to refer Iran’s violations of the NPT to the UN Security Council. Iran would then become much more dependent on Russia to prevent sanctions from being imposed on it -- and presumably consequently more willing to accommodate Moscow both in the Caspian and on the issue of nuclear safeguards (assuming that Tehran really is only developing a peaceful atomic energy program, as it claims, and is not seeking nuclear weapons).
Russia, though, has not made any such linkage, and Iran’s continued stubbornness on the Caspian issue suggests that Tehran does not fear it will do so. Instead, it is Moscow that seems afraid that annoying Tehran could result in the Russian nuclear-power industry not receiving contracts to build any more nuclear reactors for Iran after the first one at Bushehr is completed.
But if Tehran is unwilling to accommodate Russian interests in the Caspian before it acquires nuclear weapons, it is hardly likely to do so after acquiring them, when it will be less dependent on Russia. A more belligerent Iran armed with nuclear weapons might also confront Moscow with the choice between continuing to provide Tehran with nuclear know-how in order to appease it, or reluctantly turning to the United States for support. Thus, instead of enhancing Russia’s status as a great power, the sale of nuclear technology to Iran is far more likely to undermine it.
You know what I think they wholeheartly are into good relationship that there is not muscle both country everybody know Vlad want be MAIN KGB agent of the world so he give Russians scientists be allow work in Iran
It is absurd that Russia would help an Islamic state acquire nuclear weapons. What are they smoking?
It's absurd that Iran would be developing nuclear power plants for peaceful energy generating purposes. When you live in a country where oil practically oozes out of the ground and water is scarce the last thing you need is a nuke plant. Unless you want a bomb, that is.
Personally I'm a big fan of nuclear power and I wish we got all our electricity from it, but we're in a different situation than Iran. If we had the oil supply that Iran does I'd think that nuke plants were a waste of money. Nuclear reactors also require a great deal of water and although I'm sure it's perfectly safe after it's been used I still wouldn't want to drink it.
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