Ok, we can discuss details 27/4 for decades, and in all considered likelyhood, at the end of the argument, I'm simply not going to agree that there's a necessity for any significant change in current US policy with respect to Pakistan and President Musharraf.
I have examined your credentials and areas of expertise, and for the most part will now withdraw any questions regarding your credibility in these matters.
In fact, now that we have distilled the discussion down to its foundational elements, for the most part I choose not to contest your basic premise, regarding the reliability and intent on the part of Musharraf, and even its significance with respect to our ultimate objectives in Pakistan.
I will further grant your professed support for America and President Bush in the general sense, but I must confess, concerns remain regarding your additional influences, most especially those regarding apparant sympathy for an Indian take on current events.
I confess that much of this doubt may be in part due to the manner in which you have chosen to present your point of view. I must caution you that regardless of your intent and possible additional obligations, you would be more successful in selling improved walking sticks to hikers by hitting them over the head to demonstrate ther structural integrity than you have been or will be, in raising doubts about Musharraf, through the support of strongly anti-American or anti Bush references in this venue.
Further, there is no...valid...benefit in doing so as there are countless open source examples of corroborating evidence that raise this kind of doubt without the anti-American, anti-Bush, or anti-Pak/US coalition timbre of the efforts to date.
Having made these concessions, I am still 100% comfortable with the current US policy in the matter, both on a regional and on a global scale.
Not only can I make your case for you, indisputably, using more recent and pinpointed anecdotal evidence, without any disparagement except that focused directly on Musharraf, I can do the same, for example, Prince Nayaf in Saudi Arabia, and even raise similar doubts regarding Prince Abdullah in that country.
However, I also am of the considered opinion that neither of these situations is any more indicative of a need for policy change, either diplomatic or military, than are the doubts you attempt to raise.
I am not prepared to go into more detail in this matter, either privatly with you, in light of the remaining questions concerning your intent as outlined above, or in this venue, due to implications involving security.
If the day ever comes when America's primary, overriding terrorist and security concerns devolve to center on Pakistan and General Musharraf, I may revisit and quite likely even share your doubts, but for now, larger considerations demand a set of priorities and objectives which render the question of Musharraf's true intent both irrelevent and ultimately impossible to determine with any real confidence.
I further believe and wish to re-emphasize that in attempting to make your point, the choice of materials used in support of your point of view negatively affect our position in light of these larger considerations.
The key element in the future of the war on terrorism right now and for the forseeable future, is the question of who will formulate US global policy for the next four years.
Clearly the use or propagation of materials hostile to an Administration you say you favor, in support of what is curretly a sideshow in the strategic picture, is counter-productive.
By your own repeated admissions, the WMD threat level from Pakistan is unlikely to change, regardless of who runs that country, and I am sure that both you and I are aware of situations where this isn't
the case.
In order to meet the now minimal objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan, I believe we have ample resources in that country to verify that which we need to verify. The country's electronic communications systems are transparent to us, and I am more than satisfied with the organic elements of US oversight we have managed to place, at this time.
Unless you manage to raise unexpected dimensions in your final rebuttal here, I am reasonably convinced that further discussion on this subject will result in exponentially diminishing returns, and this is about as far as I'm willing to pursue this for now.
According to Saberwielder...
1. Pakistan is rife with Islamists that permeate every segment of society and government. (no news there)
2. Mushi could clean up this mess, but he's won't.
3. Instead, he just jerking us around and stalling us.
4. We have the means to push him harder to do much more.
5. And if we do push him harder, Mushi is unlikely to fall, but...
6. If he does fall, all that will happen is another Mushi clone from the Army will take his place. No harm, not foul.
7. But in any event, "there is no chance of a Islamist coup", to fear as a consequence of pushing Mushi too hard.
1. Pakistan is rife with Islamists that permeate every segment of society and government.
REBUTTLE: Duh!
2. Mushi could clean up this mess, but he's won't.
REBUTTLE: Mushi may be a "strong man" leader, but he is not omnipotent, i.e., he can't just go ahead and do anything that he damn well pleases without any repercussion. As Saberwielder himself has pointed out, Mushi serves at the pleasure of the nine Army corps commanders, and, of course we know, the army is riddled with Islamists who hate America.
3. Instead, he just jerking us around and stalling us.
REBUTTLE: Passion, fervor and hot blood are no substitute for patient, thoughtful strategic planning and follow through.
4. We have the means to push him harder to do much more.
REBUTTLE: I don't believe that Pakistan is in as financially precarious a position as Saberwielder characterizes. And even if it were, I don't think that this is the kind of ace-in-the-hole leverage that he claims. Pakistan has their own leverage to use against us. (a.)It's a sellers market and they've got something we want, more than what they want from us. (b.)They can cut off our access to Afghanistan (see below).
5. And if we do push him harder, Mushi is unlikely to fall...
REBUTTLE: From your lips to God's ear.
6. If he does fall, all that will happen is another Mushi clone from the Army will take his place. No harm, no foul.
REBUTTLE: If as the result of a coup, Pakistan cuts off our access to Afghanistan, we're dead. Despite the BS that Saberwielder lays down, his laughable "air bridge to Bagram via Uzbekistan and Germany" would have great difficulty supporting a withdrawal from Afghanistan, much less supporting ongoing operations. And that's giving the Russians and the former Soviet republics (not to mention Europe) the benefit of the doubt that they wouldn't take political advantage of the situation by denying further over-flights.
7. But in any event, "there is no chance of a Islamist coup", to fear as a consequence of pushing Mushi too hard.
REBUTTLE: But how can there be NO chance (not "virtually" no chance) of an Islamist coup if, as Saberwielder asserts, the Army, the ISI and virtually every other organ of government is overrun with Islamists? Now ask yourself what would be the worst possible scenario would be, for a nuclear armed country to fall into the hands of Islamists?
Saberwielder's cavalier disclaimer of any possibility of an Islamist coup may someday have to be paid for with the lives of 10 million New Yorkers. Would a person whose allegiance was solely to America, be that blasé about such a possibility?
--Boot Hill