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Iraq: Here We Go Again By Mark H. Kagan
March 6, 1998
 Not so long ago in a universe not so far away...
In August 1990, Iraq shocked the world by invading and brutally occupying Kuwait, which it declared annexed to Iraq. Despite almost universal condemnation, economic sanctions, the threat of force, and then the large-scale use of force in a prolonged and devastating bombing campaign, Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Only a massive ground assault by a U.S.-led coalition was able to force Iraqi military forces to withdraw from Kuwait. However, Iraq did not sue for peace or ask for surrender terms. Desert Storm ended with a unilateral cease-fire declaration by the United States, which was formalized by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 686.
Following the defeat of Iraq in 1991, the U.N. Security Council imposed Resolution 687 on Iraq. It required the destruction of all Iraqi nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and ballistic missiles and the infrastructure for building them. Iraq was also forbidden from engaging in any future research, development, acquisition or production of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was created to carry out both the search and destroy mission and to set up and maintain the long-term inspection and verification regime. At the time, most diplomats and government officials assumed that it would take no more than a year for UNSCOM to complete the search and destroy mission, and to put in place an inspection and verification regime that would ensure Iraq's compliance with UNSC 687.
Saddam Strikes Back
However, in 1992, I asserted in JINSA's National Security Quarterly (see Vol.1, No. 3, "Global Missile Trade: The Iraqi Case,") that Saddam Hussein would try to wear down the international community's resolve to prevent him from rebuilding Iraq's capabilities for producing weapons of mass destruction and missiles. I wrote that Saddam's policy aimed at ...the withdrawal of the long-term monitoring regime envisioned under UNSC 687, or at least its emasculation, so that Iraq will be able to resume its prewar activities with minimal interference. Whether it succeeds or not will depend largely on the international political leadership of countries that shared a large responsibility for helping create the Iraqi missile and NBC weapons programs the first time around.
That prediction has unfortunately come true, though the extent of Iraq's forbidden activities inside the country has still not been determined. In fact, it was a core issue in the recent crisis. Contrary to the statements of apologists for Iraq, like Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov and American newspaper columnist Robert Novak, the question is not "if" Iraq is still engaged in these forbidden activities, but "where" and "how much"?
There is no question that for seven years, Saddam's regime has engaged in a systematic, massive, and blatant program of deception, deceit, denial, diversion, evasion and intimidation against UNSCOM. Its aims have been to prevent or delay the destruction of Iraq's NBC weapons and ballistic missiles and the infrastructure for building them, and to sabotage or negate the inspection and verification regime. It has also succeeded in its third aim, which is to wear down the will of the international community, as evidenced by the calls in many quarters for declaring that Iraq is in compliance with UNSC 687, which would allow the lifting of U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
At the same time, Saddam has spent billions of dollars to construct about 60 palace complexes all over Iraq. These "presidential sites," along with dozens of other military and security sites were declared off-limits to UNSCOM inspections on the grounds of "dignity, security and sovereignty." It should be noted that UNSC 687 mentioned nothing about Iraqi dignity and security for the simple reason that its terms were imposed on and accepted by a defeated Iraq because of its gross violations of Kuwait's dignity and security. Sovereignty was mentioned, but only in the context of preserving Iraq's territorial integrity, which was explicitly tied to preserving Kuwait's territorial integrity as well.
The strategy behind the construction of the "presidential sites" is to create a "parallel universe" in Iraq. Within this parallel universe, barred to U.N. inspections, Iraq can resume or continue its forbidden activities to research, develop and manufacture nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Because the forbidden activities would be taking place where they would be out of sight and inaccessible, the network of sophisticated monitoring devices that UNSCOM has set up around Iraq would actually become an integral part of the Iraqi shell game of deception. Iraq would then be able to claim that since UNSCOM was not finding any violations of the inspection and verification regime, Iraq was in compliance with UNSC 687 and the sanctions could be lifted. Meanwhile, Saddam's people could continue working unmolested on their NBC weapons and ballistic missile programs, bolstered by the additional financial and technical resources that the lifting of sanctions would bring.
In the same National Security Quarterly article, I also predicted that one way Iraq would try to evade UNSC 687 would be to copy the strategy of the German Ministry of War during the 1920s. The ministry evaded the Treaty of Versailles restrictions on possessing or constructing U-boats, tanks, chemical weapons, and military aircraft by sending its scientists and engineers to other countries, most notably the Soviet Union, to engage in forbidden research, development, and production.
Unfortunately my second prediction apparently has come true as well. According to a February 10 draft report of the U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, as reported in U.S. News and World Report (February 23, 1998), Iraq has been carrying out forbidden activities in foreign countries since 1991. Iraq has smuggled ballistic missiles and chemical weapons to Yemen and Sudan and highly enriched uranium to Algeria, and it has built and is operating chemical weapons plants in Sudan. I had noted that Germany's foreign activities were not so secret after all, and that British, French, and U.S. embassy attaches had filed reports on them with their respective ministries throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. Nevertheless, "the governments that should have been concerned chose to look the other way, whether they could have done anything or not." In the 1990s, not only has Iraq followed in Germany's footsteps, but the Russian, Chinese, and French governments, among others, have adopted the same "see-no-evil, hear-no-evil" attitudes of the British, French, and U.S. governments in the 1920s. There is plenty of blame for the current situation with Iraq to be spread around starting, of course, with Saddam Hussein, although he could claim that he can't help himself and blame it on an abusive childhood. Countries like Russia and China clearly have made their financial and commercial interests in Iraq a higher priority than the serious threat that Iraq still poses to regional and international security. Other countries are genuinely concerned about the terrible suffering that the Iraqi people have endured under crippling U.N. sanctions, while others are just tired of dealing with Iraq-which are precisely the reactions that Saddam has worked for during the past seven years.
While the U.S. Slept...
However, a major part of the blame must be laid at the feet of the United States for the situation in which we now find ourselves. It is also a bipartisan affair, for which both the Bush and Clinton administrations must take responsibility. For the Bush administration, the fault is not that the U.S. should have "taken out" Saddam in 1991 when it had the chance and blew it. Former President Bush and former Secretary of State Baker are correct when they say that that was technically and politically unfeasible. However, not declaring a cease-fire to Desert Storm until Iraq had formally surrendered was entirely feasible and very desirable. Including a demand that Saddam step down and be tried for war crimes would probably have brought about the Iraqi army coup desired by the Bush administration. Instead, the cease-fire removed the Iraqi military's incentive for self-preservation, particularly when they could also see that Saddam was still treated as the legitimate leader of his country by the Persian Gulf War allies.
Finally, standing back and doing nothing while Saddam's still potent military and security forces devastated southern Iraq and slaughtered thousands with ferocious brutality after the U.S. had incited Iraqis to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein was not the Bush administration's finest hour. It was the Iraqis' best shot at overthrowing the butcher of Baghdad and those who survived were not likely to try again or trust the U.S. again. It was this shameful debacle for U.S. foreign policy that gave birth to the belief in some corners of the Arab world that Saddam Hussein was really a U.S. agent who had just gotten a little too big for his breeches when he invaded Kuwait.
...And Slept Some More
The Clinton administration inherited an admittedly difficult Iraq hand when it took office, but its pattern of not dealing with foreign problems until they become crises has been especially problematic with respect to Iraq. As a result, most of the Desert Storm coalition has fallen apart, and even Iraq's neighbors seem to have a problem understanding why the U.S. is making such a fuss about Iraq. The Clinton administration also compounded the shame of the Bush administration by doing nothing when Saddam's forces swept into northern Iraq in 1995 and slaughtered opposition forces that had sought sanctuary there.
There is also considerable and justified confusion in domestic and international public opinion about why Saddam has become such a threat recently if, as the administration says, he has been violating U.N. resolutions on banned weapons programs all along for seven years. The obvious questions are why were such serious violations tolerated for so long, and what is so different now that it justifies a bombing campaign against Iraq? In fact, the question should be why the U.S., and the international community, didn't do something much earlier?
The rhetoric of the Clinton administration leads, one would think, to a carefully planned, long-term, and sustained campaign to remove Saddam Hussein (though it may be hard to find anyone left alive in Iraq who would want to take another chance on U.S. support for such a campaign). Unfortunately, careful long-term planning and sustained follow-up are not terms usually associated with this administration's foreign policy in general, and with Iraq in particular.
Instead, failing a diplomatic solution of the crisis, the administration's primary justifications for a U.S. bombing campaign in Iraq had been to "send a message" and to "diminish," but not destroy Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Because of prior sins of omission and commission, that set the U.S. for a lose-lose situation. Bomb Iraq and Saddam gains face for standing up to Washington while Iraq gains international sympathy as well as support due to civilian casualties. Don't bomb Iraq, and the U.S. loses face and credibility while Saddam keeps his weapons.
How to Turn a Pig's Ear...
The agreement brought back from Baghdad by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan contains the "justification" for Saddam's next crisis. While Iraq has agreed (again) to allow UNSCOM free and unfettered access to all sites in Iraq, the agreement also says that UNSCOM will respect Iraq's "legitimate concerns relating to dignity, security and sovereignty." These "concerns" are precisely the grounds on which Iraq has repeatedly refused access to sites to UNSCOM teams in the past, and which led to the most recent crisis. Moreover, Hussein's consistent pattern of behavior has always been to pocket the other side's concessions while immediately ignoring his own once they have achieved their purpose.
...Into a Silk Purse
Therefore, the U.S. must make it very clear, and continue making it clear, that there are no grounds whatsoever for future Iraqi delays and evasions. The U.S. must constantly remind the world that Hussein will no longer be allowed to drag out the process of destroying his weapons of mass destruction, delaying the day that the U.N. sanctions can be lifted.
The U.S. must stay constantly in Hussein's face to remind him that there will be no more second chances. The centerpiece of U.S. policy towards Iraq should be behavior modification based on the principle of, "No access means no access." Any future attempts by Iraq to deny access to inspectors to any site in Iraq will result in denial of access to Iraq. That site (or a presidential palace) will be destroyed without delay or warning. The warning will already have been given.
The U.S. must also keep the world alert about Saddam's behavior. If the administration falls back into its previous narcoleptic behavior about Iraqi cheating and evasion regarding U.N. inspections and let's the rest of the world do likewise, then it can truly say "fool me twice, shame on me."
A policy of "no access means no access," followed up by a relentless and sustained educational campaign, would be clear, direct, and understandable to all. It would prevent another incident from turning into a painfully drawn-out international crisis. It would force other countries to maintain pressure on Iraq, as in, "President Hussein, the U.S. really means it." It would keep the U.S. from getting into situations in which its prestige and credibility were put on the line. Finally, the U.S. would not have to decide whether or not to launch a full-scale bombing attack of questionable effectiveness because a full-scale attack would not be necessary.
Clausewitz said that "war is merely the continuation of state policy by other means." Saddam Hussein's policy has always been that "diplomacy is the continuation of war by other means." In order to make this agreement work, it will be necessary for the U.S. to make it clear to both Iraq and the rest of the world that, if necessary, the U.S. can and will follow a Clausewitzian strategy.
Mark H. Kagan, a Washington-based consultant, has been a military analyst at Jane's Information Group and an Middle East intelligence analyst at the U.S. Department of Defense.
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