Iraq WMD: Key Findings from the ISG

Find Law - Text of the full report from Charles Duelfer (Iraq Survey Group) ^ | 9/30/04 | Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

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Samples of Key Findings:

1. "Senior Iraqis—several of them from the Regime’s inner circle—told ISG they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended."

2. "Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001. These efforts covered conventional arms, dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs."

3. "The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW [chemical weapons] program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions."

4. "ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations."

5. "ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its BW [biological weapons] capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose."

6. "...after 1996 Iraq still had a significant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW cadre."

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These findings of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD should make us thankful that the United States finally dealt forcefully with this threat. The MSM has severely mischaracterized these findings, saying that the ISG concluded there was no effort by Saddam to reconstitute WMD capability. Who can conclude anything other than press distortions are intended to undermine the war in Iraq?

Saddam's intelligence service was developing chemical weapons and poisons for "intelligence operations". Was the IIS involved with terrorists? A President of the United States who is committed to protecting his country could not afford such a risk.

[tomnbeverly]

I find it hard to believe that The Senate Intelligence committe did not have fore knowledge of the above events... Senators Kerry and Edwards have some explaining to do...

[GailA]

MASTER LIST UN OIL/SEX FOR FOOD SCANDALS

[jwalsh07]

4. "ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations."

Sheesh, they might run an op by mailing letters to Congress laced with anthrax.

[Shermy]

"primarily for intelligence operations."

Yep. Small scale, like "Amerithrax".

[CDB]

Re WMD, I always find it absolutely unbelievable the no one in the MSM or elsewhere has ever mentioned that the fact that the Japanese Army in the-Manchukuo, China (currently, NE China), which carried out a lot of grim chemical and bacterialogical "experiments" during WWII, and which was ordered to dispose of its WMD in 1945, did such an effective job of hiding them, that mustard gas containers have been uncovered OVER 50 YEARS LATER by unsuspecting Chinese construction workers. If the Japanese Army could do such a "good job" of concealment in 1945, isn't it reasonable to expect the Iraqi bad guys to have done the same in 2003?

[pushforbush]

Bump to keep this before Mainstream Media before it sinks without a trace.

[GailA]

last bump of the night