Head of U.N. Agency Defends Iran Dialogue
[ Excerpt] December 03, 2004
The Wall Street Journal
John Holland
Mohamed ElBaradei, at the center of the United Nations' efforts to monitor countries' nuclear-energy programs, portrays his agency as part "caring mother" to help nations take benign advantage of the technology and part detective to ensure purportedly peaceful programs aren't aimed at churning out arsenals of horrific weapons.
The Egyptian-born diplomat acknowledges playing that dual role as director general of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency makes him a lightning rod for critics who see the agency as either too lenient or too intrusive. "It's a very stressful job," he says. "I have been vilified by as many countries [as] have been subject to inspection," including Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
The U.S. has been among the IAEA's loudest critics, expressing skepticism most recently that Iran is acting in good faith after the agency earlier this week endorsed a European deal with Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment program. Mr. ElBaradei concedes a "confidence deficit" has been created by two decades of Tehran's secret work on a nuclear capability and less-than-full cooperation in the first year of IAEA inspections.
But Mr. ElBaradei, who has worked at the agency since 1984, seems determined to press on with the balancing act, saying he is "fairly open" to election to a third, four-year term as director general by the IAEA's 35-nation board and pledging to maintain strong ties with the second Bush administration. "The stakes are so high that we cannot afford to disagree," he says of the agency's relations with the U.S. "We must continue to work as partners." ...
Below is an edited transcript:
Why is there so much focus on Iran ?
Iran is a very important test case -- how verification and diplomacy work in tandem. I have always advocated that we need to use every possible way to resolve issues of concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Confidence building means a variety of things and not just dialogue and exercising pressure. We should not think of coercive measures before we exhaust all possible ways of resolving issues. In many cases, confrontation is not the best option. It leads to the exact opposite to what you want to achieve.
We have made a lot of progress in Iran . The last 18 months the knowledge we have now in terms of the extent of the Iranian program is nothing compared to 18 months ago, and shows that inspection really works. But at the same time because the Iran program has been undeclared for almost two decades, Iran has not been fully cooperative for the first year of our inspection. We have a confidence deficit, and that's why the international community is concerned. We are still holding our horses before I can give you the assurance that everything in Iran is declared. I still need to do a lot of work in Iran before I can come to that conclusion. The more transparency and cooperation I see in Iran , the easier my job will be. But I am not jumping to the conclusion that because we have seen smoke, it is absolutely fire -- that because we have seen Iran developing the know-how in a clandestine way, this must be a nuclear-weapon program. We have not seen a clear proof that these activities are linked to a nuclear-weapon program. What we are saying is the jury is still out.
What do you say to critics who say dialogue with Iran won't work?
The dialogue between Iran and the Europeans deals with the causes of the symptoms that are our concern -- the need for social and economic development in Iran , the need for conventional technology and security. The discussion is how we can integrate Iran with Europe and the rest of the community, how we can address their security concern, how we can have a trade and cooperation agreement. In return, Iran will be asked to provide full transparency, full cooperation. Basically at the end of the day our objective is for Iran to feel secure enough and integrated enough and the rest of the world to feel secure enough that Iran is not trying to build a nuclear-weapon program.
But don't you also need a credible backup if that doesn't work?
Of course you can have the [United Nations] Security Council as a backup. If you conclude in a particular country -- and I am not talking about Iran -- that there is an imminent threat, a clear and present danger of using weapons of mass destruction, then you can obviously think of a pre-emptive action. But that pre-emptive action should be collective, in the Security Council, to have the legitimacy required. We are not there at all in the case of Iran , I think.
Unlike the situation in Iraq, if you use force simply because a country has a [nuclear-weapon] know-how, you will force a country to rebuild the program underground and have the goal of achieving a nuclear parity as an absolute national priority. I am not sure that the use of force at all in the case of Iran could be a solution. There is a sense of insecurity and isolation on the part of Iran and this sort of issue can only be resolved in a dialogue, where both parties put their concern on the table and find a solution. That is what the Europeans are trying to do. I hope that will work. I do not want to jump the gun. We can assess the situation a year from now and see how things are.
You cannot continue to have a club of nuclear-weapon states saying that we will keep our weapons but nobody else will have these weapons. I've always said a situation of "haves" and "have-nots" is not sustainable. Everybody will try to achieve parity because nuclear weapons are perceived around the globe as a source of power, prestige and deterrence. We need to build a system of collective security that does not have nuclear deterrence as a base. Until we do, we are going to have a lot of proliferation efforts.
Are we destined to have a world where most countries have a nuclear-weapon program and we have to get them to use it responsibly?
We are either going to have in the next 10-20 years, scores of countries sitting on either nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon capability, or we are going to say this is not the kind of world we would like to live under -- this is really a recipe for our self destruction and let us try to see an alternative system of collective security where everybody feels secure and does not rely on nuclear weapons.
How do we achieve that?
That is a major challenge because we really haven't faced it so far. Many countries feel we have to rely on nuclear weapons because that has kept the peace since the second world war. It's a question of time before we face the possibility of a miscalculation, an accident, or a crazy leader using nuclear weapons. We have to understand that we have a major problem on our hands. We need to think differently in terms of how our global security is going to look like in the future.
Isolation is not the solution. That's simply a jolt to national pride [where people say] "we are isolated. Let us then huddle together and overcompensate." Usually with isolation, it's extremism from either the right or left that takes control.