Posted on 02/04/2005 7:15:50 AM PST by Alex Marko
On February 1st the Spanish parliament debated—and rejected—a proposal to allow the country's three Basque provinces to secede from Spain. Given that more than 90% of parliamentarians are opposed to the plan, which was put forward by the president of the Basque region, Juan José Ibarretxe, the result was a foregone conclusion. However, with the regional government of the Basque Country considering holding a referendum on the plan in the months ahead, the threat of a major constitutional crisis will hang heavy over Spain this year.
The Basque regional parliament took a step closer to precipitating a clash with the central government at the end of last year, when on December 30th it passed a statute calling for de facto independence from Spain. The statute, known as the Plan Ibarretxe, proposes to introduce Basque citizenship, a Basque legal and penal system, Basque representation abroad, as well as loosen the link between the Basque Country and the rest of Spain to one of "free association". It would also make full secession in the future little more than a formality, to be decided unilaterally by the Basque parliament.
Although the plan has been at the centre of political debate for the last three years, its final approval by the Basque regional parliament signalled the apparent willingness of the regional government to challenge the Spanish state. Both of Spain's mainstream political parties, the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the main opposition Popular Party (PP), are hostile to the proposals, which they say are not only unconstitutional but are divisive even within the Basque region. Although the prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, has met with Mr Ibarretxe to discuss the plan, he has demanded its complete withdrawal. Unsurprisingly, when Mr Ibarretxe presented the plan to the Cortes (national parliament) in Madrid on February 1st, it was overwhelmingly rejected, by 313 votes to 29.
In itself, the vote is of little consequence: even before it took place, Mr Ibarretxe had already said that the opinion of the Cortes would be irrelevant because, he contends, it does not have the legitimacy to overrule his parliament. In public at least he remains as committed as ever to pushing ahead with the plan, and has reiterated his intention to hold a referendum on the proposals in the Basque Country after elections in the region, which must be held by May. Such a move would contravene Spain's constitution—which does not allow for a region to unilaterally decide on constitutional matters—and could plunge Spain into its gravest constitutional crisis for decades.
Heading for a showdown?
The Economist Intelligence Unit has long held the view that any attempt by the Basque regional government to secede unilaterally from Spain would provoke a clash between region and state of such magnitude, and with such potentially serious consequences, that restraint would ultimately be exercised by all parties—most particularly the Basque regional government itself. We continue to stand by this view, but recent developments have increased the chance of a full-blown constitutional crisis. Although we ascribe a probability of only 20% to this scenario, it is sketched here owing to the gravity of such an outcome.
How events unfold over the coming months will depend first on the outcome of the regional elections. Although these must be held no later than May, rumours have been circulating that Mr Ibarretxe may seek to capitalise on the rejection of his plan in Madrid by calling an early vote. If the current Basque government loses power in these elections, which cannot at the moment be ruled out, moves towards independence will be abandoned, as all possible alternative coalitions oppose the plan. If, however, the current Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)-led government is re-elected, Mr Ibarretxe may believe he has obtained a mandate to move ahead by holding a referendum.
This would almost certainly provoke a response from the Spanish government. Most seriously, this could entail the suspension of the institutions of regional government and the imposition of direct rule from Madrid, as allowed for under Article 155 of the constitution. In such a scenario, opinion in the region, which is fairly evenly split between regionalists and those who want no dilution of the Basque Country's position within Spain, could be expected rapidly to become more polarised and radical. Given a long history of violent street demonstrations in the region, significant levels of violence directed at the security forces could be expected. The potential for events to spiral out of control has already led to frequent talk in Spain of the "Balkanisation" of the country.
In fact, even in the case where the current PNV-led government is re-elected, we believe a number of factors will work against the holding of a referendum. First, the turmoil that such a move could unleash, combined with the relatively small gains it would bring (the Basque Country already enjoys very considerable autonomy within Spain), should ensure that moderation and reason will prevail. Although Mr Ibarretxe continues to stand by his intention to hold a referendum, his recent declaration that following rejection by the Cortes he would take his plan to the Constitutional Court may suggest that he is seeking a way to back down without losing face.
A second reason for not calling a referendum is the fact that the Ibarretxe plan has failed to generate consensus within the Basque Country itself. According to a poll by the newspaper El Mundo, 36% of Basques would vote against the plan and 34% in favour; a poll by a radio station, Cadena Ser, found that 42.3% are opposed and 39% in favour. Even the Basque Country's three provinces are split on the issue—one has said that it will leave the region altogether (and remain part of Spain) if there is an attempt to secede. An internal debate within the PNV over the referendum call is ongoing, with some key figures markedly less enthusiastic about confrontation than Mr Ibarretxe. If the more moderate forces prevail, his removal or eclipse cannot be ruled out.
Finally, Mr Ibarretxe himself has said that such a vote could not take place unless the militant separatist organisation, ETA, halts its campaign of violence. In mid-January both ETA and the separatist Socialista Abertzaleak (SA), the political wing of ETA, released conciliatory public statements calling for talks to "demilitarise" the Basque conflict and reach a definitive resolution of the region's problems, entailing an agreement between nationalists and non-nationalists. But the government insists that no political talks can take place until ETA unequivocally announces an end to its campaign of violence and arranges for the decommissioning of its (illegally held) weapons. With ETA having been severely weakened by the successful action of security forces against it, there has been considerable speculation that the group will call a ceasefire in the coming months. Whether it does remains to be seen—the fact that the group planted two bombs in as many weeks in late January may suggest a cessation of violence is still some way off.
Softly, softly
Although Mr Zapatero has rejected the Plan Ibarretxe outright, he has at the same time tried to maintain good relations with the Basque leader. The government is likely to continue to try to persuade Mr Ibarretxe to withdraw his current proposal, urging him instead to join with the government in re-examining the region's status and drafting a new plan that respects the constitution and that commands broader support within the region. Last month Mr Zapatero met with the leader of the opposition PP, Mariano Rajoy, and agreed in principle to form a bilateral commission in which both the PSOE and the PP (which together enjoy the support of 80% of Spanish voters) would address future constitutional reforms.
However, the government—which does not have a majority in parliament—is having to tread very carefully over the issue, aware that it risks losing its parliamentary support. Since coming to power in March 2004 the PSOE has depended on the support of the communist-led United Left (IU) and the left-wing Catalan nationalists, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). However, the ERC, a supporter of the Basque sovereignty plan, has threatened to withdraw its support if the government seals an alliance with the PP, which opposes any changes to the constitution. To add to the pressure, the Catalonian regional parliament is due to present its own proposal for a new self-governing statute in mid-2005. It is likely that Mr Zapatero will struggle to satisfy the conflicting demands of the ERC and the centralists within his own party. And if the ERC withdraws its parliamentary support for Mr Zapatero, pressure will mount for an early general election.
Excellent analysis!
The Economist Intelligence Unit has excellent analysis, Pricey info, but worth it if you have a related job field.
Has there ever been an instance of a significant region, wanting to leave its current state to form its own smaller state, successfully doing so without being attacked?
Lets see Holland-Spain, okay, I'm glad you posted it!
The breakup of Czechoslovakia was handled very maturely. The Czech republic and Slovakia don't always see weye to eye but I don' think there's been anything more than terse comments occasionally...
Oh I don't know....yes there are secessionist movements like these but there are also the larger groupings springing up like the EU, the UN, the WTO and trade groupings, etc.
While it may seem odd lumping in WTO and trade groupings, bear in mind that the WTO like most trade organisations is increasingly able to compel countries to relinquish control of their own policy and their use of that is beginning to increase steadily.
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