Lebanon politics: A brazen killing

The Economist Business Unit ^

[Alex Marko]

No one may ever know who killed Rafiq al-Hariri, Lebanon’s once and (possibly) future prime minister, but suspicion has inevitably turned to the one country with the motive, means and opportunity to eliminate Mr Hariri: Syria.

The government in Damascus has dominated the Lebanese political establishment for decades. After forcing Mr Hariri from power last year, Syria had no interest in seeing him return. Yet Mr Hariri was poised for a political comeback in the upcoming May election. His return, had it happened, would have been a political defeat for Syria’s allies in Lebanon, emboldening the opposition and possibly threatening Syria’s control of Lebanon itself. That threat has been removed with Mr Hariri’s death, but the risks to Lebanon’s political and economic stability have risen exponentially. Much will now depend on the reaction of Lebanon’s increasingly outspoken opposition, which is holding the Syrian and Lebanese governments responsible for the killing. The Syrian government, for its part, has denied any role in the killing.

Mr Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, had been a towering figure in Lebanon’s post-civil war period. A wealthy businessman who made his fortune in the construction business, he had served as prime minister for 10 of the last 14 years and was widely credited with restoring a measure of economic stability to the country. Well-connected internationally—he was a close friend of France’s president, Jacques Chirac—Mr Hariri had the confidence of international investors and was attracting foreign capital back to Beirut. But he had been in a power struggle for years with Lebanon’s president, the Syrian-backed Emile Lahoud. When the Syrian government in 2004 arm-twisted the Lebanese parliament into suddenly extending Mr Lahoud’s term as president, Mr Hariri suffered a serious setback. Although he never publicly criticised Syria, his resignation last September as prime minister was inevitable, and was a clear sign of his opposition to Syria’s meddling.

A previously unknown group, calling itself Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria, took responsibility for killing Mr Hariri and at least nine other people. But its claim, which appeared in a video on Al-Jazeera television, could not be authenticated. That will inevitably lead to suspicion that others were involved.

A campaign against the opposition

The death of Mr Hariri is striking for several reasons. First, it was carried out in broad daylight in the centre of Beirut, using a massive quantity of explosives that demolished much of Mr Hariri’s motorcade. Nothing about the attack was subtle, and it clearly was intended as a signal. Second, the killing was not the first move against Lebanon’s political opposition, to which Mr Hariri had aligned himself since his resignation as prime minister. Syria’s intervention to extend Mr Lahoud’s term as president was particularly brazen; it drew a sharp rebuke from the UN, led by the US and France, which made common cause against Syria. When one of Lebanon’s leading opposition figures, Walid Jumblatt, later protested Syria’s actions, a colleague and fellow opposition leader, Marwan Hamade, was targeted in an assassination attempt that killed his bodyguard. Mr Hariri himself had been warned by officials in the Lebanese government not to stand in the upcoming election, and to distance himself from the opposition, but he refused.

Much was at stake in the election. Under the power-sharing agreement that ended the civil war, the prime minister of Lebanon must be a Sunni Muslim, and the Sunni who wins the most votes in the general election is invited to be PM. By most accounts, Mr Hariri had been expected to do well in the voting. Had he won, Mr Lahoud and his Syrian backers would have faced a choice. They could ignore the results of the election and invite someone else to form a government, but that would have risked a revolt from the opposition and further international censure. If Mr Lahoud and the Syrians chose instead to accept Mr Hariri as prime minister—a man they helped force from office six months earlier—they would have suffered a major political defeat. Either way, the election was shaping up as a referendum on Syrian’s domineering presence in Lebanon.

It is difficult at this stage to predict what will happen next. Lebanon’s opposition, along with much of the world, was stunned by Mr Hariri’s murder. But after the long civil war, and with the country—at least until this week—recovering economically, the opposition would appear to have no stomach for armed revolt. Even so, opposition to Syria’s presence in Lebanon will only grow after this incident, and criticism of Syria from powerful Western nations will only intensify.

The damage to Lebanon economically could be as great as the political cost. After the long civil war, tourists had begun returning to Lebanon, and Beirut was recapturing some of its pre-war appeal. The government’s efforts to promote tourism may now suffer a severe setback. The economy was estimated to have grown by 4% in 2004, and the Economist Intelligence Unit was forecasting GDP growth of 4.5% in 2005 and 2006, well ahead of recent years. Those forecasts are now at risk.

The country remains vulnerable for other reasons. Lebanon’s public debt is equal to 190% of gross domestic product, the highest ratio of any country in the world. The government relies on foreign capital to finance its deficits, and had been selling Eurobonds in Brussels. But successful bond sales require positive sentiment by investors, and much of that will have been shattered by the bombing.

[Alex Marko]

Lebonese Political Demographics:

Western-style party politics is unknown in Lebanon. Politicians stand as individuals, or form broad alliances under temporary labels such as “Dignity and Renewal”, offering no policy platform beyond a commitment to serve their constituents. Rather than showing allegiance to parties, therefore, individuals offer their support to the heads of political families from their own region and religious community.

Shia Muslims

Shia Muslims are the largest and fastest growing community in Lebanon, estimated at more than 1m people. Political allegiance is divided between the secular Amal (Hope) movement—dominated by its leader, the parliamentary speaker, Nabih Birri—and Hizbullah (Party of God), a devoutly religious movement with military and social wings, led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Hizbullah led the guerrilla war against Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon for almost two decades, and gained political capital from Israel’s withdrawal, as well as Iranian funding for social and health projects as well as weapons. Allegiance to Amal is based on its more secular approach and the patronage distributed by Mr Birri, who is the junior member of the ruling troika (Mr Lahoud and Mr Hariri are the other two, more powerful members). There has been a long-standing assumption that Hizbullah had displaced Amal as the most popular Shia party, but this has not been tested in national elections where Syria has insisted the two parties run joint slates to hold rivalry in check. In the May 2004 local elections, however, there was no joint list—a position that led to fiercely contested polls and strong gains for Hizbullah, much to Amal’s alarm.

Christians

The Maronite Christians, in effect, ran Lebanon before the civil war, but have since been moved to the margins, having lost the last phase of the war to Syria. The community divides its loyalty between rival leading families, each represented by a party: the Gemayels by the Phalange party; the Chamouns by the National Liberal party; and the Eddés by the National Block, for example. For the past decade the community has also been split between those who accept Syria’s dominant position—such as the powerful health minister (and presidential hopeful), Suleiman Franjiyeh, and Mr Lahoud—and those who reject the pro-Syrian system, and who are therefore excluded from political power. Key figures within the rejectionist front range from moderates such as Boutros Harb, a liberal MP, to more hardline leaders like Michel Aoun, a former wartime general.

Sunni Muslims

The Sunni community, though numerically strong, is less overtly political, with the heads of powerful families traditionally focusing more on commercial interests than politics. Sunni political parties barely exist, and the community’s most prominent politicians are first and foremost business leaders in their own right. These include Mr Hariri, and the current minister of transport and public works, Najib Miqati, who acquired his wealth in the telecommunications industry. Political allegiance is also less entrenched, leading to sharp swings in voter allegiance—for example, from Mr Hoss to Mr Hariri in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Druze

Based in the Chouf mountains, the Druze account for less than 10% of the population, but carry more substantial influence on the political stage as a result of the political skills of their leader, Walid Jumblatt. Mr Jumblatt has a high profile, and has demonstrated himself to be a sagacious reader of the political scene, accurately assessing emerging political trends and aligning himself with them. In 2000, for example, he was the first mainstream leader to join the anti-Syrian Christian movement. In 2002 he was also one of the first to switch back to Syria and Mr Lahoud, restoring his previously close relations with Damascus and rebuilding his political influence within the government.