Dictators Among Us

When considering some of the judicial decisions handed down recently, particularly from the federal bench, I am laboring to understand both why and how we have allowed the judicial branch of government to become our omnipotent dictators.

Much of this stems from the idea that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to “interpret” the Constitution. Well, I have read the Constitution several times, together with the Federalist as well as a host of available data from the framers and I am at a loss to find any reference to the Supreme Court being solely vested with the power to “interpret” the Constitution. [Please note that when I use the word “Constitution” I include both the original document and the amendments thereto as amendments once ratified become part of the document as though included in the original draft thereof.]

Perhaps we can begin with the word “interpret”. The term embodies such acts as explaining that which is unclear, generally foreign, in terms common to the listener. Am I to understand then that the Constitution was written in language so ambiguous, so foreign to the predominantly English-speaking American people that they should require a cadre of all-seeing, all-knowing wise men/women to “interpret” or translate it?

Unfortunately this term, as used in this case, is intended to mean that the Supreme Court is vested with the authority to “reinterpret” the Constitution in a manner more conducive to our times. This view places the Supreme Court, and in fact the whole of the judiciary, in the roll of dictator, rather than impartial arbiter. A dictator maintains power by being both unaccountable to the people and unimpeded in ambitions by the law, for the dictator can, whenever the laws stand in opposition to his goals, change the law by force of will. Clearly our judiciary in more ways than not, are unaccountable to the governed and whenever they find that the law, whether it be the Constitution or acts of legislators, is inconsistent with their views on “social justice” and desires for same, have the power and the consent of their Leftist enablers to reinterpret the law. We are no longer governed by the Rule of Law. We are now governed by the Rule of Lawmakers.

This development was feared by members of the original Constitutional Convention who raised objections to the “authority of the proposed Supreme Court”:

It is interesting to note that Alexander Hamilton dismissed these objections as “made up of false reasoning upon misconceived facts.” It is then to our advantage that Hamilton’s view did not carry. The Supreme Court was not vested with any power to construe the Constitution beyond the expressed letter of the law and when the desires of the people or the acts of legislators are at variance with the Constitution, the Constitution shall be the superior.

Were it the intention of the framers to place the Supreme Court in a superior position to the Constitution, there would have been no need for Article V which delineates the amendment process. They could simply have dispensed with the debates regarding the propriety of super majorities and simply made it possible to change this document with a mere vote of five.

The Constitution was not written to be an unalterable document covering every conceivable issue known or to come. Rather, it was intended to be the guide. The Framers understood that times would come when changes would be necessary and had the wisdom and the humility to include a procedure for accomplishing such changes. This procedure did not include any mention of the judiciary.

Just as the Renaissance led the people to understand that they had unwittingly surrendered their own innate common sense and sound judgment to men of the cloth, we must also take control of our lives and dispense with the idea that the Constitution is such a sacred and ambiguous document that it should only be read and can only be understood by lawyers in black robes.

I agree with Alan Keyes to a degree. I believe in the supremacy of the Rule of Law and therefore I have respect for the authority of the judiciary. Where I part company with the judiciary is the point at which they become activists. Mr. Keyes’ views on rejecting certain decisions of the court are interesting albeit wrought with its own set of dangers. What maybe the best way to explain my view is to look at the words of Abraham Lincoln from the Sixth Lincoln-Douglas Debate wherein he explain how the Republican could simultaneously support the constitutional authority of the court and at the same time oppose the Dred Scott decision:

“We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation fro spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.”

Now imagine that the this same debate addressed the issue of abortion, thus:

“We oppose the Roe v Wade decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when abortion has been decided to be legal by the court, we, as a mob, will decide it to be illegal. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be legal, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of privacy thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation fro spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.”

"Mr. Keyes’ views on rejecting certain decisions of the court are interesting albeit wrought with its own set of dangers."

That's true. I'm certain the executive branches are aware of those dangers as well, and no doubt account for their reluctance to follow the path of rejection at the hint of any impropriety imposed on the people by the courts. It does seem, however, that they have been reluctant to a fault, as there have been many legitimate occasions where they should have chosen to ignore the courts -- and the legislatures.

Particularly in the area of gun laws, Roe, and more currently, homosexual/lesbian 'marriage'. I'm sure there are other affronts to morals and abrogation of liberties which have been codified and enforced as well. I would have to include many 'sustainable development' laws passed by Congress which ignore private property rights.

We are all quick to jump on the float with our banners to kick out the UN, but our time and energies would best be utilized by influencing Congress to stop passing treaty laws to sustain something that can best sustain itself without the input of the international socialists who have no interest in the environment other than how they can use junk science to promote their devious usurpation and re-distribution agenda.

"What may be the best way to explain my view is to look at the words of Abraham Lincoln from the Sixth Lincoln-Douglas Debate wherein he explain how the Republican could simultaneously support the constitutional authority of the court and at the same time oppose the Dred Scott decision:"

“We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation fro spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.”

"Now imagine that the this same debate addressed the issue of abortion, thus:

“We oppose the Roe v Wade decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words. We do not propose that when abortion has been decided to be legal by the court, we, as a mob, will decide it to be illegal. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be legal, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of privacy thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation fro spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.”

Well put.

Referring to Lincoln, I read the interview between Keyes and Michael Medford posted on FR a few days ago from which I based my previous reply. I think the argument bears repeating, for clarification:

Quoting from the interview posted by EternalVigilance:

""KEYES: I had an opportunity to speak to him directly. I made this argument quite often with writing and otherwise, and I think it's an argument that I think generally holds true with respect to the judicial power in our system, where you have separation of powers, independent branches. You cannot say that simply because a judge says "x," the legislature and the executive are bound to obey what the judge says--because that would mean that the judiciary was the supreme branch. And that's not the case under our system.

MEDVED: And a very good example would be, thank God, we had courageous people in the United States who were not ready to accept the Dred Scott decision in 1858, which basically said that a people were property and nothing more, and that they were a constitutionally-guaranteed right to property, and states and leaders of states could do nothing to defy the court. Well, that wasn't the reaction of Abraham Lincoln and others, was it?

KEYES: And it hasn't been. It stretches all the way back to the famous statement Andrew Jackson made about a Supreme Court decision, when he said, "The judges have made their decision. Let them enforce it."

He was, in fact, pointing to a reality under our Constitution. Now you could say, "Doesn't that mean the executive can be lawless?" Well, no. What is in dispute here is the nature of fundamental law, and if the executive disagrees with the judge or the judicial branch over the nature of the fundamental law, the judge does not reign supreme, and the executive is not required to sacrifice his conscience and independent will to the executive. If he were, then he would not be an independent branch, he would be subordinate to the judiciary."

(End of quote)

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