Just a snapshot of what Puzzleman linked says it better than I have (thanks for the link.)A number of commentators have missed the shift in U.S. strategic priorities by drawing an analogy between the administration's policies on arms sales to Pakistan and India, and in the bestowing of "major non-NATO ally" status on Pakistan. And in the minds of others, the practice of strategy invalidates the commitment to democracy--Pakistan being something less than a fully free state. The New York Times and Los Angeles Times columnist Robert Scheer denounced the sale of F-16s to Pakistan as "A Con Job by Pakistan's Pal, George Bush." But, as so often, Bush-hatred blinds these sorts to the larger strategic picture.
It would be useful for them to listen to the new voices emerging in New Delhi; Indians see the importance of this change more than many Americans do. "The F-16s don't matter," Raja Menon writes in the March 30 Indian Express. "The March 25 Statement"--it's already taken on an almost-iconic status in India--is creating "opportunities like never before" for India. "If India has the boldness to dump the non-aligned rhetoric of the past," Menon argues, "the country stands to gain in many areas."
Militarily, Menon is quite right; the F-16s are almost a waste of money for Pakistan, whose primary security worries come from the Sunni Islamists inside its borders. A major conventional war with India would be suicidal for the Pakistanis, as, of course, would any nuclear exchange. The guerilla war in Kashmir is a ball and chain that Pakistan cannot seem to lose. Fretting about the F-16s is myopic; as Menon concludes, "If 24 F-16s make Pakistan feel secure, all the better."
Check out this article:
The most important part:
But many Indian strategists and former senior officials are not so sanguine. Some note that the US has essentially offered a tangible weapons system to Pakistan, while offering some nice-sounding promises to India, which may or may not develop into real gains. Noting that one of the items seemingly on offer was the sale of American nuclear power plants to India, one observer asked - "Will Ms [Condoleezza] Rice and her staff be willing to do the heavy lifting in Congress and within the numerous non-proliferation agencies within the American bureaucracy to get approval for this? I don't think so." India has energy needs now that cannot be fulfilled by mere talks, he added.
Some reports also suggest similar feelings in private in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The Hindu newspaper quoted unnamed MEA officials as saying, "It is possible that some of the promises may be transformed into reality. But at this point, one cannot give them the benefit of the doubt. Only tangible outcomes count, and that is the transfer of the [F-16] planes to Islamabad."
Indian and some Western strategic analysts have a different take on this point. One former senior Indian official noted to this correspondent that he did not agree with the American position that 30 to 40 F-16s were unlikely to upset India's military position vis-a-vis Pakistan. He said that such an argument missed the point: "When it comes to provoking a war with India, Pakistan has depended more on what it perceives it can get away with rather than what its war-fighting abilities really are." The argument here is that the F-16s need not arrive in Pakistan for Musharraf and other Pakistani military leaders to consider taking aggressive military actions in the disputed Kashmir region. Observers caution that Pakistani leaders are unlikely to interpret the F-16 deal in any manner other than as a reiteration of Pakistan's indispensability to Washington.
Another Western analyst, who has visited Pakistan many times, noted to this author that soon after Indian troops backed off war threats in 2002, Pakistani officials were thankful for the American role in diffusing the crisis without Pakistani loss of face. However, he was shocked that during a later meeting with senior Pakistani army officers he found that they had coaxed themselves into believing that it was India's "cowardice" that led to their pull-back. The analyst also noted with alarm that many senior Pakistani military strategists still subscribe to the theory that Pakistanis are a "superior martial race" as opposed to the largely Hindu Indian army, which they perceive to be innately weak in resolve. The expert noted that with such attitudes, all the Pakistanis need is a small fillip to their morale and a perception of their being indispensable to American interests in order to start another military adventure with India. "At the very least, major weapons sales could spur the Pakistanis to be more aggressive with the use of jihadi groups in Kashmir," the expert maintained.