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"I think the point is, SOMEONE wrote things that Berger didn't want others to see. IMHO."

Yes, that is the point, but not the point made by the article for this thread.

3 copies had notes that Berger took a risk to destroy, yet the article for this thread speculates only that President Clinton made margin notes...an implausible theory...to pretend that WJC himself marked up three different copies (the author for this article provided no other suspects for marking up the copies).

More likely, 5 different intel agents reviewed the Clarke Millenium Report; 3 of those agents added comments to their private copy (eyes only sort of thing) that Berger felt he needed to destroy. Not read. Not review. Not spin. Destroy.

Now, we know all 5 agents who reviewed that Clarke Report, so we know what Berger tried to permanently destroy. We know that 3 of those agents saw (or at least commented on) something unmentioned by the other 2 agents.

This *could* mean that we've clued in to one or two moles (or at least bad agents) in one or more of our intel agencies.

But what should stand out as obvious, yet unmentioned, is that Berger himself is a spy, by definition (i.e. "stealing classified documents"). Perhaps he's a spy only for himself for personal gain. Maybe. Or perhaps he's working for someone else. Hmmm...

But Berger is a spy. He's been busted, and "we" know something about what he tried to cover up, as well as that 2 reviewing intel agents didn't (perhaps honestly due to not having the right access) mention that thing that Berger tried to cover up. Hmmm, again. By hook, crook, or default, those other 2 agents somehow aided Berger's coverup. After all, they didn't mention that something that the other 3 noted.

Marginal notes busted Berger in the 9/11 report. Here's an article about that:
http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/getmailfiles.asp?Style=OliveXLib%3AArticleToMail&Type=text/html&Path=NYS/2004/07/23&ID=Ar01000

In June of 1999, another plan for action against Mr. bin Laden was on the table. The potential target was a Qaeda terrorist camp in Afghanistan known as Tarnak Farms. The commission report released yesterday cites Mr. Berger’s “handwritten notes on the meeting paper” referring to “the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60-65 casualties.”According to the Berger notes, “if he responds, we’re blamed.”

On December 4, 1999, the National Security Council’s counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: “In the margin next to Clarke’s suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, ‘no.’ ”

In August of 2000, Mr. Berger was presented with another possible plan for attacking Mr. bin Laden.This time, the plan would be based on aerial surveillance from a “Predator” drone. Reports the commission: “In the memo’s margin,Berger wrote that before considering action, ‘I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in place.’ ”