Henry Kissinger: Some atomic arm-twisting

The Australian ^ | May 11, 2005 | Henry Kissinger

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IF George W. Bush's first term was dominated by the war against terrorism, the second will be preoccupied with the effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons.

This challenge is more complex than the first. Do we oppose proliferation because of the rogue quality of the two regimes - Iran and North Korea - furthest advanced on the road towards acquiring nuclear weapons? Or is our opposition generic; does it extend to fully democratic countries?

How far are we prepared to go in resisting proliferation? Is it possible for one country alone to become the sole custodian of the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons? And, if not alone, with what combination of powers should the US act?

Iran brings home the complexity of these issues with particular urgency. North Korea is an isolated country that makes no significant contribution to the economy of any other. Its neighbours agree that a nuclear North Korea presents a security risk.

By contrast, Iran is a large oil producer, with a growing and capable population and serious industrial potential. By 2050, its population is projected to exceed that of Russia. Several states have an interest in good relations with Iran for economic reasons; some are afraid of its terrorist potential and demonstrated ruthlessness. Its region contains countries that welcome the enhanced risk a nuclear Iran poses for other countries, especially for the US.

Optimism for progress on eliminating the nuclear capacity of North Korea can be based on possible pressures of neighbouring countries on which it depends. The case of Iran is more complex. As the tangled issue moves to the centre of international diplomacy, it is important to clarify the strategy on which policy is to be based.

During the Cold War, all of the principals who might have to decide on the issue of nuclear war faced the dilemma that such a decision could involve millions of casualties, yet a demonstrated willingness to run this risk was necessary if the world was not to be turned over to totalitarians.

All Cold War administrations navigated these shoals. Deterrence worked because there were only two main players in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils to them of the use of nuclear weapons.

But as nuclear weapons spread, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly ephemeral. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by what calculations.

Even if it is assumed that aspirant nuclear countries make the same calculus of survival as the established ones with respect to initiating hostilities, new nuclear weapons establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the US, to terrorist assaults on the international order.

Finally, the experience with the proliferation network demonstrates the consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear weapons even when the proliferating country does not meet the formal criteria of rogue state.

For these reasons, it is the fact, not the provenance, of further proliferation that needs to be resisted. The loathsomeness of a regime that undertakes proliferation compounds the problem and provides a sense of urgency, but in this analysis it is not the decisive factor. We should oppose nuclear proliferation even to a democratic Iran.

This reality is obscured by two considerations. Proliferating countries invariably present their efforts as goals to which they have every right to aspire, such as enhancing electricity generation. In Iran's case, this is a pretext. For an oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources. What Iran really seeks is a shield to discourage intervention by outsiders in its ideologically based foreign policy.

This is the main reason it will be difficult to fashion a package of incentives to spur denuclearisation of Iran. Most foreseeable incentives, in one way or another, increase Iran's dependence on the states against which the proliferation is really directed and probably increase Iran's capacity to threaten them by other means.

At the same time, several European allies treat Iran's nuclear ambitions as at least partially defensive. In their view, they spring from Iran's geographic position. They believe that Iran's nuclear impulse can be softened by conciliatory diplomacy.

Many of them see in talks with Iran a replay of the issue that they believe underlay the Iraq debate: the European approach to international relations via law and multilateral institutions v the alleged US propensity for pressure.

In fact, the alleged conflict between conciliation and pressure is as unreal as it is standard. Diplomacy is about demonstrating to the other side the consequences of its actions and the benefits of the alternatives.

One reason European negotiators have made the limited progress they have on the nuclear issue with Iran is the implied threat of actions the US may take in case of deadlock. The key issue between the US and Europe should not be over the necessity of pressure if diplomacy fails but the definition of it, the timing and precisely by what process that pressure is designed to lead to a non-nuclear Iran.

It is in that context that the proposition that regime change is the most reliable guarantee for Iran's denuclearisation must be evaluated. The possibility of pursuing regime change as a solution requires an answer to several questions.

What precise process of change does one foresee? What is the best estimate of the time scale for such an effort? If it is longer than the time by which Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may not be relevant to the solution of the issue. Is the time frame for regime change compatible with the imperatives of bringing about the denuclearisation of Iran?

The answers to these questions should not be left to impressionistic accounts but to analysis organised as a presentation of opposing views so that policy-makers are able to judge the available evidence.

If the US continues to pursue its declared policy of encouraging the European initiative, it will be driven to recognise that the process cannot go beyond a certain point without some kind of US participation. Progress will require a commitment by the Europeans to a range of pressures if negotiations fail and to the elaboration of criteria linked to a schedule by which progress can be measured.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has rightly pointed out aspects of Iranian policy that impede negotiations with the US, especially the support of groups relying on terror in Iraq. Tehran will have to show some readiness to modify these ventures before the US can participate in the negotiating process now conducted by three European nations.

A framework similar to the Beijing forum for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem would serve to make clear to Tehran, London, Paris and Berlin the range of options the US can support.

The US objective of regime change in Iran is not affected by such a tactical decision. During the Cold War, it was settled policy to use negotiations to explore the prospects for diplomatic progress but at the same time to lay down markers to explain the stage at which confrontation became inevitable and the reason for it. Almost simultaneously with calling the Soviet Union the evil empire, Ronald Reagan wrote to Leonid Brezhnev inviting him to a dialogue.

In the case of Iran, the chances for progress of the European diplomacy are slight. But they need to be explored. Such a course will also leave us in the best position to draw the consequences from failure of negotiations.

It is possible that Iran views its negotiations with the European countries as a way to gain time. Iran may well manoeuvre for a position from which there is only a short step to a weapons program, in the meantime encouraging as many incentives of usefulness to the Iranian economy and nuclear program as it can induce the Western negotiators to offer.

The Western purpose should be to use the process to achieve the effective and verifiable denuclearisation of Iran but, failing that, to mobilise a full range of pressures.

A non-proliferation policy must achieve clarity. How much time is available before Iran has a nuclear capability and what strategy can best stop an Iranian weapons program?

How do we prevent the diplomatic process from turning into a means to legitimise proliferation rather than avert it? We must never forget that failure will usher in a new set of nuclear perils dwarfing those that we have just surmounted.

Henry Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was US secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.