Posted on 05/14/2005 8:52:06 PM PDT by strategofr
The use of rewards in the war on terror has not worked as well as was expected, largely because of the difficulty in getting the word out, and fear of retaliation against potential informants. This has always been a problem with offering rewards for information. And this is why television programs like “America’s Most Wanted” have been so successful in bringing in useful tips. This demonstrates how many people out there could provide useful information, if properly informed about what was being sought. But the “America’s Most Wanted” criminals are usually fugitives, living among strangers that are not easy to intimidate. Iraq is a different situation. Only recently has the Iraqi mass media (at least that part of it the government has some influence over) been promoting the importance of letting the police know of people planning terrorist acts. Until recently, the police in the most dangerous areas didn’t really exist, and didn’t have the means to act on many tips. That has changed. There are police everywhere. The cops are often of very mixed quality, but there are over a dozen SWAT teams that can act on tips.
But that still leaves the retaliation factor, which is very real in the Sunni Arab areas where most of the violence originates, and usually takes place. In the United States, police informants are regarded as “confidential informants.” But in the Middle East, the culture lends itself to more of a “everyone knows everyone else’s business.” Thus confidentiality is difficult to maintain, and if an informer is identified, retribution often follows. This is why the anti-government forces spend so much time attacking the police. This eliminates those you can inform to, and those that can offer some protection to informants. Over the last year, the terrorists lost that effort. The police force continued to grow, because Iraqis kept joining the police force, even though terrorist attacks killed hundreds of cops a month.
The United States forces took advantage of the growing police presence to start, this past January, a program of cash rewards for tips. However, in three months, only $9,500 of the $60,000 available has been paid out. The program is not a failure, because most awards are only a few hundred dollars. The most common tip is the location of weapons and bomb making materials, or a roadside bomb rigged for use. Lots of Iraqis know where these roadside bombs are set up, because they stay out of the area until the damn thing is set off. This sudden lack of Iraqis along a road, however, has provided U.S. troops with a good sign that there is a bomb nearby. Troops are taught to suspect a bomb if, when going through a populated area, they suddenly see a stretch of road where the people that should be there, aren’t. Now the army is trying to get more Iraqis to report these bombs, rather than just walking away until after the explosion.
There have been informal, “paid informants” for the past two years. American troops would give cash or goods to informants. This was often brokered by translators (who were often the tipsters) or the special intelligence teams that worked among the Iraqis. Most of the cash came from money the American troops acquired during raids. You know you’ve nailed some terrorists, or successful kidnappers, when you find a bunch of guys with guns, and lots of cash (especially American currency).
But the new program hopes to be the start of a much larger informant effort. Many of the American reserve troops in Iraq have been policemen, including some detectives. They have made it clear to the American intelligence officers that, without lots of “CIs” (Confidential Informants), you’ll never be able to shut down the terrorists, much less the more troublesome (to the average Iraqi) criminal gangs. That message got through, and the number of casual (one time) informants is increasing daily. The CIs, in American police parlance, are regulars, who provide tips continually, or on demand when there is some kind of emergency.
Another option is to set up annonymous call lines (tip lines) to American forces. The only payout would be hurting the insurgients---but I suspect that might be enough---if the calllers were safe.
I suspect that a large part of the reason for this is that "our troops" mostly are unfamiliar with the local language, since most of them come from a public school background in which it is a minor miracle if they graduate with a working knowledge of English.
It's really quite simple. If you want lots of quality information, offer them money, but stipulate that some of those high value targets will get you American permanent alien resident status for the snitch and the imediate family. We pull them out of Iraq, a nice little bungalow in the burbs and voila! We would have a country full of snitches. Those hajjis would love to get out of that rathole. The ones that don't would never be snitches anyway. For many, their loyalty is strictly for sale. We just ain't offered the right bait.
Let's not be hasty about dragging Iraq back to the USA - the less Moslem crap we have to put up with here, the better. Moos improve nothing and no place.
Arab language speakers is a big problem, all right. I haven't heard an update about our efforts in that area for awhile, but I know efforts are being made.
Might work. But if you have a big piece of info and aren't sure if it will get you to the US or not, then getting a lot of $ instead won't do you any good.
Thanks for the post.
fyi
"fyi"
Roger that.
Thanks for post. The article appears to be no bullshit, and balanced. Mostly good points and few negatives. Sometimes a negative viewpoint is more honest/accurate, then a positive viewpoint. Duh on me. Getting weary.
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