Posted on 06/01/2005 4:47:29 PM PDT by BringBackMyHUAC
The Medical CIA Part I
(Published in drastically rewritten, condensed form as “AIDS: Words from the Front,” Spin Magazine, Dec. 1993)
“This is the epidemic of the century, and every qualified person should want to have a piece of the action.”
Donald Francis was not known for his subtlety. When he wanted something, he would make demands while pounding the table with his fist. This time he was giving a speech to his fellow officers of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Federal agency charged with handling public health issues. Speaking at CDC headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, he was revealing a hidden agenda — one that would shock an uninitiated visitor.
Francis saw the AIDS epidemic as a golden opportunity, a crisis that could force Congress to grant the CDC more money and expanded authority. “The United States needs to establish a separate line of public health authority,” he declared, and restructure the CDC to make it less accountable to the President and Congress. Having given the CDC a new mandate to manage the epidemic, the government would then guarantee medical coverage to all HIV-infected Americans, a program that would lure people in to be tested for the virus. Third, he proposed a program of “safe injection,” in which heroin and other drugs would be prescribed to addicts who might otherwise use drugs without government supervision. Fourth, the government would also begin taking over vaccine production, not only for AIDS but for all diseases. Then Francis turned to his ultimate objective. “CDC needs to reestablish its leadership role in HIV prevention,” he emphasized. “Prevention requires close coordination, training, and financial support of state and local health departments.” In other words, the CDC should seize control over all public health functions in the country.
This ambitious plan had originally begun as “Operation AIDS Control” in 1984. Francis had been asked to write the proposal because of his experience using heavy-handed measures in dealing with disease epidemics. Working for the CDC, he had spent years in such Third World countries as India, Bangladesh, and several African nations. He had responded to unexplained epidemics by quarantining the victims and suppressing local customs. Whenever such epidemics coincidentally disappeared, Francis would take full credit. Now he wanted to bring similar methods to bear against AIDS. According to the CDC’s own estimates, a constant one million Americans have been carrying HIV, the so-called “AIDS virus,” since 1985. Of those, only one-fifth have developed AIDS. All these people would fall under CDC control, sick or healthy.
Francis continued his speech by outlining his plan for managing AIDS, starting with techniques to find all the HIV-positives. “The concept of routine voluntary testing for everyone should be aggressively promulgated as the standard of medical practice,” he said. Then the CDC would trace all the sexual partners of these infected people, testing them as well. Having been registered in a database, the HIV-positives would be “linked to lifelong medical and preventive services” under CDC control. Any vaccine or drug favored by the agency could be distributed almost instantaneously to the helpless individuals.
According to Francis, the plan would become permanent. This “new system of public health” would reach far beyond AIDS, extending to issues ranging from the food we eat to accidental injuries, from population control to criminal violence. The CDC would have the power to force lifestyle changes on virtually everyone, guilty or innocent, all in the name of prevention.
This Orwellian-sounding scenario jars with the image most outsiders have of the CDC — a simple statistics-gathering operation that keeps track of diseases. If the agency were actually that harmless, Donald Francis’ notions would amount to personal opinions with no serious impact. But the truth is surprisingly different. The CDC has long aimed to become this nation’s centrally powerful public health agency, regulating every aspect of our individual lives. Francis himself belongs to a special group of insiders working to make this vision reality. Since 1971, he has been a member of a semi-secret, elite unit of the CDC known as the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS).
Often called the “medical CIA” by scientists who know of its existence, the EIS was the brainchild of public health VIP Alexander Langmuir. The CDC had been itching to expand beyond its mandate for malaria control, but needed some justification. In 1949 it tapped Langmuir from his teaching position at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health. Langmuir’s arrival was a coup for the CDC — he had a security clearance as one of the few scientific advisors to the Defense Department’s biological and chemical warfare program. The Cold War was raging at that time, and civil defense ranked high in government priorities. So officials of the Public Health Service listened to Langmuir when he proposed that the CDC build a comprehensive disease surveillance system to detect the earliest signs of a biological warfare attack. Besides, noted Langmuir, the same infrastructure could also be used to control any natural epidemic, using quarantine measures, mass immunizations, and other emergency techniques.
Federal officials soon agreed, and gave Langmuir millions of dollars to create a special new division of the CDC. In July of 1951, he assembled some twenty-three young medical or public health graduates for the first class of the EIS. Langmuir put them through six weeks of intensive epidemiological training, and assigned the new EIS officers for two years to hospitals or to state and local health departments around the country. Upon completing their field experience, EIS alumni were free to pursue any career they desired. But they all understood the implicit agreement that they would function as a permanent reserve for the CDC. Their loyalties would remain with the agency for life, and they would act as its eyes and ears. The symbol of the EIS reflected its focus on activism instead of scientific research — a pair of shoe soles worn through with holes.
Every summer since 1951, a new class of carefully-chosen EIS recruits has been trained, some classes exceeding one hundred people. Until a few months ago, the EIS had released an annual directory of its membership, but now it has made the list secret after receiving several outside requests for copies. Members rarely advertise their affiliation, and the CDC has quietly placed nearly 2000 EIS trainees in key positions throughout this country and the world. Many work in the CDC itself, others in various agencies of the Federal government. One EIS graduate became a Surgeon General of the United States, and two others became assistant Surgeons General. Some have staffed the World Health Organization, including Jonathan Mann and Michael Merson, the past and present heads of its Global AIDS Program. Fellow agents can be found in the health departments of foreign nations. Several dozen have entered university public health programs as teachers and researchers. Roughly 150 have taken jobs in state or local health departments, closely watching every little outbreak of disease. Hundreds have become private practice doctors, dentists, or even veterinarians, while others work in hospitals. Some have joined biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies, or have even risen in the ranks of major insurance corporations. Some reside within tax-exempt foundations, helping direct the spending of trust funds on medical projects.
Several have even infiltrated prominent positions in the communications media. Lawrence Altman joined the New York Times as a medical journalist in 1969, since rising to become its head medical writer. Bruce Dan was hired by ABC News as its Chicago medical editor for six years beginning in 1984, the same year he became a senior editor of the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association, a position he still holds today. Marvin Turck has held the title of editor at the University of Washington’s Journal of Infectious Diseases since 1988. These three men were recruited into the EIS in 1963, 1979, and 1960, respectively — each one years before he entered the media.
Regardless of which career paths EIS alumni take, the vast majority retain their contacts with the CDC. Not only do they constitute an informal surveillance network, but they can even act as unrecognized advocates for the CDC viewpoint, whether as media journalists or as prominent physicians. And they serve as a reservoir of trained personnel for any CDC-defined “emergency.” As Langmuir himself described it in 1952, “One of the primary purposes of the Epidemic Intelligence Services of CDC is to recruit and train such a corps of epidemiologists.… As a result of their experience, many of these officers may well remain in full-time epidemiology or other public health pursuits at federal, state, or local levels. Some, no doubt, will return to civilian, academic, or clinical practice, but in the event of war they could be returned to active duty with the Public Health Service and assigned to strategic areas to fulfil the functions for which they were trained.”
Biological warfare, of course, never struck. Nor would it have been a disaster anyway, for even the deadliest germs can only kill a fraction of infected people, those who are least healthy. But the CDC did turn to declaring wars on natural diseases, which gave the agency plenty of material to work with. Most people do not know that this country alone experiences more than one thousand clustered outbreaks of disease each year — roughly one every eight hours — including colds, flus, hepatitis, and numerous noninfectious conditions, all running their course and disappearing often despite remaining unexplained by scientists. The EIS could detect most of those clusters as soon as they popped up, and in its military style, would treat selected outbreaks as emergencies on the assumption they were contagious.
The flu proved to be one of their perennial favorites for exploitation. At the end of World War I, a flu epidemic had swept through the nation as troops returned home from Europe, and had taken hundreds of thousands of lives. Because of healthier conditions, no flue has since been as deadly. The CDC, however, has always itched to revive that old flu scare.
Its first major opportunity surfaced in the spring of 1957 with news of a flu sweeping nations of the Far East. The CDC rang the alarm of an imminent and devastating epidemic heading for the United States, and Congress responded by providing money. Langmuir dipped into the new funds to expand the EIS, and the CDC crash-produced a vaccine that nevertheless arrived too late. But in the end, the mild flu disappeared quite spontaneously, leaving behind none of the predicted destruction. Some public health experts even questioned whether the hyped-up scare may have only stimulated vaccine sales.
The CDC tried again in 1976. By that time the EIS network had become so widespread that it could detect even the tiniest outbreaks. When five soldiers caught a flu that January, the alarm bells broke out again. This time the disease was nicknamed the “swine flu,” based on the speculation that pigs served as the reservoir for the virus. The CDC predicted another fatal pandemic like that of 1918. President Ford and Congress panicked, throwing vast new sums of money into another flu vaccine. Then came an unexpected wrinkle: the program stalled when insurers discovered that the vaccine itself had lethal side effects. This jeopardized the CDC’s mass immunization crusade.
Now the EIS network sprang into action. Except for the five soldiers, no flu epidemic could be found, and the EIS was placed on full alert to detect any outbreak. Unless Congress could be convinced the danger was real, the vaccine program would end. As described by Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan-Witts in their book, Anatomy of an Epidemic, the large Auditorium A, located in CDC headquarters in Atlanta, became the command center — called the “War Room.” Set up especially for this occasion, it contained “banks of telephones, teleprinters, and computers, the hardware for an unprecedented monitoring system which, to work, also required a typing pool, photocopy machines, and doctors sitting at rows of desks in the center of the room.” Experts worked around the clock, week after week, chasing down every rumor of flu outbreaks.
A cluster of pneumonia cases suddenly appeared in Philadelphia, days after American Legion members had returned home from their July convention. On Monday morning, August 2nd, after receiving word of this outbreak, personnel in the CDC’s swine flu War Room established contact with Jim Beecham, a brand new EIS officer on assignment in the Philadelphia health department. The CDC could not directly intervene in the situation without an invitation, and Beecham helped arrange one immediately. Within hours three EIS officers flew down to Philadelphia. They were joined within days by a team of dozens of CDC experts.
When the CDC personnel arrived, pre-positioned EIS members such as Beecham and top health advisor Robert Sharrar stopped obeying local authorities and began following orders from the incoming CDC team. Local officials became helpless to stop the tide of events. The CDC seized the initiative, fomenting wild rumors that this “Legionnaire’s disease” was the beginning of the swine flu epidemic. The media proved cooperative; the New York Times assigned none other than Lawrence Altman, an EIS alumnus, to cover the story.
With nationwide hysteria rapidly developing, Congress suddenly changed its mind and approved the swine flu vaccine. Days later, the EIS team finally admitted the pneumonia was not related to swine flu, but the announcement deliberately came too late. Some 50 million Americans were inoculated with the dangerous vaccine, resulting in at least a thousand cases of severe nerve damage and paralysis, dozens of deaths, and nearly $100 million in damages. Swine flu, on the other hand, never showed up.
The swine flu fiasco nearly destroyed the CDC’s reputation, but the EIS performed some damage control by blaming Legionnaire’s disease on a newly isolated bacterium. In reality, the stricken legionnaires had been elderly men, often with kidney transplants, who had become extraordinarily drunk at the convention — all classical risk factors for pneumonia. Such minor disease outbreaks can be relatively common, though rarely falling into the public spotlight. But the CDC did succeed in scaring the nation about a harmless bacterium, one found in the plumbing of almost any building.
Still, the CDC needed another crisis epidemic to revive its heroic image and expand its mandate. Thus AIDS appeared not a moment too soon, in 1981. Naturally, the agency jumped at the opportunity and assumed AIDS to be infectious from the very start. Such EIS members as Donald Francis were poised to convince the biomedical establishment, and the public, that AIDS was caused by a virus.
The Medical CIA Part II
(Published in drastically rewritten, condensed form as “AIDS: Words from the Front,” Spin Magazine, Dec. 1993)
Membership by special approval only. Six-week training sessions. Two years of active duty. Assignments to health departments anywhere in the country. On call around the clock, bags packed for immediate travel. Covert disease surveillance. A secret emblem. Lifelong reserve status, permanently available for future actions.
Few people have ever heard of the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), yet its agents have infiltrated hospitals, universities, government agencies, health departments, corporations, foundations, and even the communications media. It has existed for more than forty years as a semi-secret, internal division of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), exerting its hidden influence on our society. It has magnified our fear of flu epidemics, scared us half to death about “Legionnaire’s disease,” and turned small clusters of mildly sick fast-food patrons into nationwide panics. It has revived the fear of contagious epidemics decades after heart disease and cancer displaced them as the major killers.
The CDC has developed a remarkable track record for weathering public relations disasters, even managing to come out ahead, and audaciously demanding expanded emergency powers. Its most potent weapon has been the EIS, born in the Cold War as a quasi-military unit designed to counter biological warfare. This clandestine wing of the CDC has proven its ability to detect and choose the most useful disease outbreaks for political purposes, blowing them out of proportion or manipulating public fear by falsely blaming such clusters on infectious germs.
The EIS certainly had its work cut out after the CDC’s swine flu disaster in 1976-77 — no flu epidemic had ever appeared, while the CDC’s vaccine did take dozens of lives and injured thousands more. Only a brand new epidemic, particularly a contagious one, could justify new public health control measures.
Opportunity struck in April, 1981. EIS officer Wayne Shandera, on active assignment in the Los Angeles health department, received a call from Michael Gottlieb, a young immunologist at the UCLA Medical Center. Four patients had Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and serious immune deficiencies. Shandera had already heard a report of a fifth such case. One or two cases usually meant nothing; five seemed more plausible as an outbreak. And all five men were young, male homosexuals, which could be interpreted to fit the hypothesis of a sexually-transmitted infectious agent. These five cases were the official start of what later came to be known as the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic.
Shandera excitedly forwarded the data to his unofficial bosses at the CDC. According to Randy Shilts, in his book And the Band Played On, the CDC official who saw the report, James Curran, wrote “Hot Stuff. Hot Stuff” across the top and rushed it into publication. New reports were trickling in of dying male homosexuals, most of whom also suffered the blood vessel cancer known as Kaposi’s sarcoma. CDC leaders decided there was no time to waste, and formed the Kaposi’s Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infections (KSOI) Task Force to manage the investigation. Loaded with such EIS members as Harold Jaffe and Mary Guinan, the Task Force set about in a frenzy to prove the new epidemic infectious.
Virtually all of the first fifty cases admitted using poppers, the liquid nitrite drug wildly popular among homosexual men for its aphrodisiac properties. Scientists had not studied the long-term effects of this inhaled drug, but its chemical structure was known for its severe toxicity and ability to cause cancer. The CDC was not interested, of course, in a toxin-induced disease. So the Task Force loaded the deck by offering two possible explanations: Either the syndrome was caused by a single bad batch of poppers, or it was infectious. Never did they seriously consider the possibility that years of popper use might itself cause immune deficiency. It would be something like looking for a batch of “bad cigarettes” to blame for lung cancer. Failing to find such a bad lot of poppers, the Task Force threw out the drug hypothesis altogether.
To make AIDS seem convincingly infectious, the Task Force mobilized the EIS network to define sexually-linked clusters of cases, and to prove the syndrome had “spread” beyond homosexual men. Clusters were not hard to find, since the AIDS cases were extremely promiscuous men with hundreds or thousands of sexual contacts each; odds were that each man was connected through a chain of sexual encounters with one or more other AIDS cases. EIS officers such as David Auerbach, assigned to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, interviewed these men and confirmed the prediction. Meanwhile, following the model of hepatitis B transmission, EIS agents hunted down every heroin addict and blood transfusion recipient, including hemophiliacs, who might have conditions vaguely resembling the immune deficiencies in homosexuals. EIS personnel scoured hospitals and monitored local health departments for patients, and within months found a small handful of heroin users with opportunistic infections. EIS members Bruce Evatt and Dale Lawrence tracked down a hemophiliac in Colorado, dying primarily of internal bleeding, who also happened to have a pneumonia. EIS agent Harry Haverkos traveled to Florida and Haiti to find impoverished Haitians with opportunistic tuberculosis. Instantly the heroin addicts, the hemophiliac, and the Haitians were all relabeled as AIDS cases, and the CDC trumpeted the news that AIDS had “spread” outside of the homosexual community.
The biomedical research establishment bought the line, and scrambled to find a virus. Scientists first turned to their familiar microbes. Epstein-Barr virus and cytomegalovirus, both known for many years through herpes virus research, were each blamed by different factions.
But the fate of AIDS research was sealed almost from the beginning. Donald Francis, the EIS member since 1971 who had gained notoriety for his heavy-handed public health tactics, had by 1981 risen to a high position within the CDC’s Hepatitis Laboratories Division. He had also earned a graduate degree studying feline retroviruses, a type of virus known for being harmless to its host. This background, however, biased Francis in favor of blaming a retrovirus for AIDS. Within just eleven days after the first report of AIDS cases appeared in June, 1981, Francis placed a telephone call to Myron (“Max”) Essex, his former research supervisor. On the basis of no evidence whatsoever, Francis insisted that the new syndrome must be caused by a retrovirus — with a long latent period between infection and disease. Only five patients officially existed, yet Francis had already mapped out the entire future of AIDS.
For as soon as Francis had made his decision, he transformed himself into a relentless champion of the retrovirus-AIDS hypothesis. He doggedly pushed this view whenever anyone would lend him an ear, and even when no one would. Within a year, KSOI Task Force head James Curran was echoing the Francis hypothesis, as were other key CDC staffers. Working with Essex, Francis lobbied their close colleague Robert Gallo, a well-funded retrovirus scientist at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to search for an AIDS virus. Robert Biggar, another EIS member at the NIH, helped mobilize the huge Federal institute behind the retrovirus hunt.
After many months of arm-twisting, Gallo finally joined the new crusade. First he tried to offer another retrovirus he had already discovered, HTLV-I, which he previously blamed for causing leukemia. But other scientists did not wish to lose their favorite “leukemia virus” to AIDS, and Gallo had to search further. In 1983, the French scientist Luc Montagnier found a new retrovirus, since named the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), and Gallo claimed “co-discovery” one year later. When Gallo held a media press conference to announce the virus, the event set the HIV hypothesis in stone as official Federal dogma. Donald Francis and his fellow EIS agents had triumphed, though remaining out of the spotlight.
With the EIS network operating behind the scenes, the CDC has been able to manipulate public opinion, either to provoke hysteria over an imminent AIDS pandemic or to cover up embarrassing scientific data. AIDS alarmism has been promoted by such highly-placed officials as EIS member Jonathan Mann, former head of the World Health Organization’s Global AIDS Program, who predicted 100 million HIV infections by the year 2000. HIV, however, has not spread with time; roughly 12 million people worldwide are infected today, the numbers remaining constant wherever widespread testing is performed. Thus the current head of the WHO AIDS program, EIS member Michael Merson, was forced to revise the prediction to a smaller, but still frightening, 40 million HIV infections by the end of the decade. Both men continue to paint AIDS as an imminent crisis.
One of the biggest publicity coups for the CDC’s war on AIDS was in the myth of the Florida woman who supposedly caught AIDS from her dentist. The story began in late 1986 with David Acer, a Florida dentist who discovered he was HIV-positive. He apparently frequented the homosexual bathhouse scene, including the poppers and other drugs so pervasive in that environment. Within another year, Acer had developed Kaposi’s sarcoma, his health slowly degenerating.
Meanwhile, Acer had pulled two teeth from college student Kimberly Bergalis, a business major. By 1989, more than a year later, Bergalis developed a mild yeast infection, a condition common to many women. A few months later she contracted a brief pneumonia, in the wake of emotional stress in studying for the state actuarial exam. Neither of these symptoms was serious or permanent, and both affect large numbers of people. But Bergalis was nevertheless tested for HIV, and turned out to be positive.
She denied any intravenous drug use or blood transfusions, and insisted she was a virgin. Because she seemed not to have caught HIV through any of the standard risks, her case attracted CDC attention within three months. The EIS network may have played a role, since several of its members worked in the Florida health department. Eager to find an excuse for imposing strict new regulations on the medical profession, the CDC sent in a team of investigators to find a plausible source of her infection. They soon came across David Acer, her dentist. Although Acer appeared to be conscientious and no route of HIV transmission could be found, the CDC investigators jumped to the conclusion that Bergalis must have caught the virus from the dentist. To reinforce this idea, a group of CDC researchers that included EIS members Harold Jaffe, Ruth Berkelman, and Carol Ciesielski compared the genetic sequences of HIV from dentist and patient, pronouncing them the same. The CDC experts even tested over a thousand of Acer’s clients, finding four others with HIV but no obvious risk factors.
The insurance company saw things differently, insisting that its own analysis showed that Bergalis received HIV from some other source. But the CDC ignored this evidence, rushing to publicize its own conclusions. The news leapt straight to the front pages and prime time television news broadcasts, terrifying the nation and swinging public opinion behind Congressional legislation to impose new CDC controls on medical workers. Ultimately the bill failed, though only after intense pressure from the medical profession.
In the meantime, an independent study out of Florida State University has concluded that Bergalis did not get HIV from her dentist after all. Other scientists have now pointed out that among Acer’s patients, five HIV positives add up to the same percentage as HIV positives in the general population — implying that these patients also caught the virus elsewhere. Where could Bergalis have contracted HIV? Apparently her mother has never been tested, opening the possibility that Kimberly may have carried the virus from birth — for twenty-three years — before she died.
Bergalis, moreover, did not die of HIV infection. She and her dentist suffered radically different diseases; he had Kaposi’s sarcoma, a cancer, while she first had a temporary yeast infection. Then Bergalis was prescribed the toxic and controversial AIDS drug AZT, a failed cancer chemotherapy that causes anemia, bone marrow loss, muscle wasting — and destruction of the immune system. Months of AZT treatment ravaged her body, leaving her open to opportunistic infections and forcing her into a wheelchair until her death.
But to this day, the CDC propaganda story formulated by EIS agents remains popular myth, keeping alive the fear of AIDS as a supposedly infectious disease.
The CDC has also learned how to squelch embarrassing news stories before much damage is done, with help from EIS agents in the media. In July of 1992, during the Eighth International AIDS Conference in Amsterdam, Newsweek suddenly published an article by reporter Geoffrey Cowley on several HIV-negative AIDS cases. Researchers at the AIDS conference interpreted the article as a political green light, and began pouring forth dozens of reports of previously unmentioned AIDS patients without HIV, from both the United States and Europe. The situation began reeling out of control, re-opening the question of whether HIV is the true cause of AIDS. Anthony Fauci, director of AIDS research at the National Institutes of Health, and James Curran of the CDC raced to Amsterdam on Air Force Two to take charge. The best they could do on the spot was to listen to the reports, promising to resolve the situation. In reality, they had decided to suppress the whole matter.
Three weeks later, the CDC sponsored a special meeting at its Atlanta headquarters. The scientists reporting HIV-free AIDS cases were invited, as was Cowley, the Newsweek reporter. The unexplained AIDS cases were relabeled with an unmemorable mouthful of a name — Idiopathic CD4+ Lymphocytopenia, or ICL — so as to break any connection between these cases and AIDS. The ICL cases were airily dismissed, and Cowley was persuaded to cooperate more closely with the CDC in the future. His next article toed the official AIDS line perfectly, containing little news. The issue had died, and so had the media coverage.
The media had known of these same HIV-free AIDS cases long before the public episode, but had continually censored the story. Lawrence Altman, the EIS member who had become the head medical writer for the New York Times, admitted to Science magazine that “he knew of cases for several months but did not break the story because he didn’t think it was his paper’s place to announce something the CDC was not confident enough of to publish.” The Times, of course, has long cultivated an image of publishing “all the news that’s fit to print.”
The era of infectious disease, the age when most people died of tuberculosis, malaria, yellow fever, or polio, ended long ago in the industrial world. But the Epidemic Intelligence Service, a relic of the past, grows ever larger in its membership and influence. Its clandestine methods and near-invisibility allow the CDC virtually to manufacture epidemics, and to make the whole process appear spontaneous. Cloaked in science, the hidden agenda aims at expanding public health controls over private beliefs and lifestyles. Healthy suggestions are one thing; exploiting hysteria to impose emergency powers is quite another.
EIS agent Donald Francis certainly knew what he meant in speaking of “the opportunity that the HIV epidemic provides for public health.” The time has come for outsiders to understand as well.
.....And I respect your right to make that choice, but then why even respond to the thread?......
I meant you.
.......clandestine methods and near-invisibility allow the CDC virtually to manufacture epidemics, and to make the whole process appear spontaneous. Cloaked in science, the hidden agenda aims at expanding public health controls over private beliefs and lifestyles..........
Kinda whackjob if you ask me.
Here's a great website for those that believe everything they read online:
"Some conspiracy theories are correct".
~Triple
Save us the trouble and follow Applewhite's instructions.
it'll help you to stop seeing stuff like this:
If you follow dr michael through the forum, you will see that he is likely a 'Blue Lodge' mason. You know, the guys that are there to pay the bills, and be duped into thinking that what they know is all there is to know. They never go any higher, because they've reached their limit; they're gophers. He's here to attempt to modulate the debate by attacking those who provide facts as fringe kooks. Kind of like Trent Lott, or John McCain, etc.
Never heard of a Blue Lodge Mason. But if your discription is accurate, it fits dr michael to a "T."
The lower degrees of masonry are known as the blue lodges. Those individuals have not yet proven themselves as trustworthy, and are used to perform the unglamorous day to day tasks.
bump for weekend
Actually, he's much worse than that. He's a alien inflitrator, and a prominent member of the Illuminati, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Group, the Trilateral Commission, the Rosicrucians, Opus Dei, the Orange Order, and the Jewish Defense League (or was that the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation?). We own and control all of them.
Now drink your milk and go back to sleep, earthlings. Ignore the black helicopters. The pain will soon be gone.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.