"Always fresh meat"
Posted on 06/08/2005 3:55:09 PM PDT by BringBackMyHUAC
The FSB: A Threat Within Russia
Igor Kotler and Maxim Safiullin
The FSB, heir and successor of the notorious KGB, is, with no doubt, one of the major institutions of Russia. The role of the agency has been vital for the Soviet and the modern Russian regimes. The presence of the FSB is felt everywhere in the country: the word in the news, conversations, rumors and whispers. This word, FSB, has almost the same horrifying meaning in Russia today as the KGB before the demise of the Soviet Union.
(Excerpt) Read more at humanrights-fsu.com ...
If anyone has more on this, any links would be most appreciated--HUAC
Woops...here's the link to the full article:
http://www.humanrights-fsu.com/
mark
And if you read history, among other tidbits you will find one Malyuta Skuratov, a particularly sadistic leader of not-so-secret state police ("oprichnina") of Ivan the Terrible. This chain of continuity goes very deep in the past, indeed.
Turns out, it's not possible to link directly to original article. Just click link and scroll down to the "FSB: A Threat Within Russia" link. Sorry for any inconvenience--HUAC
Can you give a little more detail on Skutatov and/or provide a few links? Thanks--HUAC
Ping
Ping.
In the last paragraph below link, note Russia's nuclear warheads.
"Russia said able to resume medium range missiles production at short notice"
http://www.cdi.org/russia/346-4.cfm
This should take you to an index of articles on a variety of subjects.
http://www.cdi.org/russia/
This word, FSB, has almost the same horrifying meaning in Russia today as the KGB before the demise of the Soviet Union.==
Bull..
Interesting 2000, reports, did not all print, the link will take you to the balance of the many reports in this one.
granny
This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.cdi.org/russia/feb2500.html as retrieved on May 30, 2005 12:50:15 GMT.
To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url:
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:rmcPK4pAVl4J:www.cdi.org/russia/feb2500.html+FSB+expands+power+and+control+over+Russian+Citizens&hl=en&start=2&ie=UTF-8&client=googlet
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Issue # 90
February 25, 2000
Edited by David Johnson
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social,
military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the
Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit
research and education organization. To receive a free subscription, e-mail
David Johnson at djohnson@cdi.org
Contents
1.Russian Security Council Chief in Security Concept
Itar-Tass
2.DEFENSE DOSSIER: Informing Network
Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer
3.DO RUSSIANS WANT DICTATORSHIP? A VTsIOM Survey Disclosed
Numerous Supporters of Authoritarian Regime in Society.
Segodnya: Alexei Makarkin
4.CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION REGISTERS 11 CANDIDATES
Moskovsky Komsomolets
5.Putin leads last respects to Sobchak at funeral.
AFP
6.Russia's powerhouses of dissent: mothers. The Soldiers' Mothers
Committee takes on the military in ways others can't.
Christian Science Monitor: Judith Matloff
7.Russia Expands Political and Military-Technical Ties with Iran.
Olga Kryazheva (Center for Defense Information)
8.INTRODUCING THE NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE
(Views of Col.-Gen. Valery MANILOV, First Deputy Chief of the Russian
Armed Forces' General Staff)
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
9.Putin's Military Vision.
The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts
10.Sino-Russian Strategic Alliance Slowed by Internal Issues.
STRATFOR.COM
11.Centre to Present Ideology of Reforms for next Decade
Itar-Tass
12.Yeltsin Praises Putin
Xinhua
#1
Russian Security Council Chief in Security Concept.
MOSCOW, February 24 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's national security concept is
"unique", Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov said. "It is sole in the
world in the sense that both internal and external threats are first combined
in it," he said in an interview with ORT's programme Here and Now on
Wednesday.
Ivanov said "if we take, for example, the concept of NATO, which in principle
resembles oor concept of national security, only external threats are
considered there," he said. He said Russia'ss military doctrine is a separate
document which had been reviewed by the Russian Security Council and
which will be finally adopted within a month or two.
"The national security concept proceeds not only and not so much from
military issues as from the threats which we see and can predict in the future.
First of all, we are of the opinion that 80 per cent of the document's text is
devoted to internal threats to security of Russia," Ivanov said.
He touched on his recent meetings with U.S. President Bill Clinton and other
American leaders.
"The Americans are sufficienlty calm about our concept, the Americans are
pragmatists anyway. And they understand that what is written there (in the
concept) indeed meets our national interests and, judging by all
appearances, they understand that on in the nearest future, our leadership
will firmly uphold the principles laid out there," Ivanov said.
He commented on NATO's eastward expansion. "After what has happened in
Kosovo and not only in Kosovo, despite all the persuasion that NATO's
enlargement to the east does not carry any threat to Russia, it is, believe it,
very difficult, to agree with it; your are to have a richest imagination to take
these arguments at their face value," he said.
"Russia never said and is not saying now that it will be the first to use nuclear
weapons, but at the same time Russia is not saying that it will not use
nuclear weapons if it is exposed to a full-scale aggression which leads to an
immediate threat of a break-up and Russia's existence in general. This is a
brief thesis, so to speak,' Ivanov said.
"On the other hand, our entire military doctrine, the state and arms of the
army make clear to all now that Russia is not an aggressor and is not going
to be it. That is, the doctrine is sufficiently peaceful, and that I have said that
(Russia) will not be the first to use does not mean that it will not use at all,
and in this lies the dialectics of deterrence," Ivanov said.
Back to the top
#2
Moscow Times
February 24, 2000
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Informing Network Redux?
By Pavel Felgenhauer
This month acting President Vladimir Putin signed a decree enhancing the
powers of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, military counterintelligence
officers in the armed forces f members of the notorious osobiye otdely, or
"special departments." During World War II, these counterintelligence
departments were officially known in the Soviet Union as Smert shpionam
("Death to spies") or "Smersh" f immortalized in Ian Fleming's James Bond
saga.
In Soviet times, the military counterintelligence formed the KGB's Third Main
Directorate. While the KGB's Second Main Directorate f obshchaya
kontrrazvedka ("general counterintelligence") f encompassed all of Soviet
society with its surveillance network, the Third Main Directorate concentrated
its efforts on the armed forces and themilitary-industrial complex.
Russia's Communist leaders believed that the armed forces and defense
industry were the main targets of Western spying efforts and that special
counterintelligence measures were needed to fight this menace. Also,
Communist Party bosses feared the army, since there was no other organized
force in the Soviet Union that appeared capable of carrying out a successful
revolt.
The main thrust in Soviet KGB counterintelligence work was recruiting
informers. According to retired military counterintelligence officers, the Soviet
army was riddled with informers: 30 to 40 percent of the officers in each unit
secretly and regularly reported to the security service. Through this tight net
of informers, the KGB knew and controlled the activities of the Russian
professional military. Officers were recruited as young lieutenants or even
earlier, sometimes as cadets at the military academy.
One may assume that many of today's highly placed military commanders in
Russia have long-time connections with the KGB. In the Soviet era, the
Russian military was controlled not only by the osobiye otdely, but also by
the "commissars," the "political guidance" officers in each military unit.
Unlike the KGB military counterintelligence servicemen, the political officers
were legally part of the Defense Ministry structure, but in fact the commissars
had their own chain of command and reported to the Central Committee.
After the collapse of Communist rule in Russia in 1991, professional military
generals overtook the political branch of the armed forces. Former
commissars are still involved in the "political education" of solders. A year
ago, at the base of the Tamanskaya motor-rifle division near Moscow, I was
present when a "political education" officer spelled out to a classroom of
some 30 soldiers in what way "aggressive" NATO expansion threatened
Russia. But these political education officers have ceased to be watchdogs
nowadays; there is no Central Committee to report to, and former
commissars are simply part of the Russian Defense Ministry hierarchy.
Also following the demise of the Soviet Union, the professional Russian
military tried to take over military counterintelligence in the same way it
absorbed the Communist commissars. But former president Boris Yeltsin
never fully trusted the Russian military, so the Kremlin kept military
counterintelligence under the control of the KGB successor agencies. Putin is
very popular in the armed forces. But the Kremlin still distrusts the army. The
basic task and methods of military counterintelligence essentially have not
changed since the demise of the Soviet Union. However, recruiting military
officers as informers has become a problem for the FSB in recent years.
During the Soviet period, refusing a recruitment effort by the KGB meant the
end of one's future career in the military. Today, an officer's livelihood
depends largely on maintaining good relations with his military superior but
to a much lesser extent on the goodwill of an FSB counterintelligence officer.
A military commander can allow an officer time off to earn extra money on a
part-time job. And a commanding officer can employ an officer's wife as a
fake "contract" soldier and so on.
Putin's decree is an attempt to legalize some of the practices that the former
KGB employed de facto, including the right to recruit informers, thus giving
the Kremlin's last watchdog in the armed forces some additional muscle. But
to make the old Soviet system of total informing work again, Putin would
need to do more than simply sign a decree. For total informing to resume,
some semblance of the old Soviet totalitarian state would also need to be
restored.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.
Back to the top
#3
Segodnya
February 24, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
DO RUSSIANS WANT DICTATORSHIP?
A VTsIOM Survey Disclosed Numerous Supporters of
Authoritarian Regime in Society
By Alexei MAKARKIN
In a recent VTsIOM survey (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre), the
pollees were asked: "Intelligentsia warns society against the threat of
dictatorship. Recently, Vladimir Putin has brought forward the notion of
'dictatorship of law.' What do you think dictatorship is?" Results of the survey
show that society is divided into three practically equal groups. Some 35% of
the pollees said dictatorship was either a method of ruling the
state--probably as effective as democracy (16%); or simply "law, order,
discipline" (17%); or something else quite positive (2%). As many as 31% of
the pollees chose an abstract definition, saying that dictatorship meant
concentration of power in the hands of one person or a limited group of
people. At the same time, more than one third of the pollees displayed an
emotionally negative attitude towards dictatorship--in their opinion, it is: "a
method of governing implying state control over private life and no
democratic freedoms" (11%), "some social groups forcing their regime on
others" (8%), "repressions and persecution of dissenters" (7%), "misrule
and tyranny" (6%) and something else equally atrocious (5%).
What do these figures indicate? Perhaps they prove the old truth that Russia
is different from the West. In Western countries, children are taught at school
that dictatorship is bad and democracy is good and even bad democracy is
better than good dictatorship. That is why the number of dictatorship
supporters in any Western country is confined to just a few per cent of
marginals.
The situation in Russia is dramatically different. Until 1991, children were
taught in schools that dictatorship of the proletariat is good. In the
perestroika years, the cliche "dictatorship of conscience" emerged, which was
also a positive notion. Now, the acting president talks of the wholesomeness
of "dictatorship of law." This means that at least one-third of Russia's
population might see nothing wrong about dictatorship. Meanwhile, the fears
incited by the idea of numerous dictatorship supporters in society might as
well be exaggerated. Igor Bunin, general director of the Centre of Political
Technologies, noted in a Segodnya interview that, although in the nineties
Russian society did in fact cover the entire path from blind adoration of
democracy to a certain degree of disappointment, the real situation is not as
simple as it seems. Abstract sympathy for authoritarian ideas does not
actually mean support of infringement upon democracy. For example, when
sociologists ask about the expediency of cancelling elections, prohibiting free
departure from the country and restricting other human rights, the number of
those who support repressive measures sufficiently diminishes. The
politologist's explanation is consolatory, to some extent. Still, the threat
remains. Should Russians back up a supporter of dictatorship some day and
should he come to power, he will certainly be totally disinterested in the
public opinion about concrete human rights. He will simply annul them all as
a true dictator.
Back to the top
#4
Moskovsky Komsomolets
February 24, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION REGISTERS 11 CANDIDATES
As of today, 11 presidential candidates have registered with the Russian
Federation's Central Election Commission, possibly vying with one another
March 26. However, their ranks can be thinned, in case the Central Election
Commission finds out that some of them own undeclared apartments or else.
Consequently, such violators would have to quit the race. In spite of the
apparently non-alternative election campaign, sociologists continue to assess
contenders' chances. VTsIOM, for one estimates that 59 percent of all
Russian voters would support Vladimir Putin at this stage. Gennady
Zyuganov and Grigory Yavlinsky have placed second and third, with 19
percent and four percent each. Kemerovo governor Aman Tuleyev occupies
fourth place with two percent. Meanwhile Stanislav Govorukhin and Samara
governor Konstantin Titov can, at best, hope to collect one percent of all
votes each. And the rest, namely democrat Ella Pamfilova, disgraced
prosecutor-general Yuri Skuratov, businessman Umar Dzhabrailov, former
Communist Alexei Podberezkin and former chief of Moscow's FSB (Federal
Security Service) division Yevgeny Savostyanov, won't collect more than one
percent of all votes.
A similar ROMIR opinion poll shows that Putin is currently supported by 61
percent of the entire Russian electorate. The break-down for Zyuganov,
Yavlinsky, Tuleyev, Titov and Goborukhin is 22 percent, 7.5 percent, 2.5
percent, 0.8 percent and 0.5 percent each. Skuratov and Dzhabrailov can
expect to receive less than 0.5 percent of all votes; still others will apparently
lack any support whatsoever.
Why have all these prospective outsiders decided to fight a losing battle?
Boris Makarenko, who serves as deputy director with the Center of Political
Technologies, believes that each outsider is guided by different
considerations. Some outsider politicians want to advertise themselves. For
instance, Ella Pamfilova can steal more than one percent of all votes because
there are no other openly democratic candidates. Meanwhile Dzhabrailov and
Skuratov, who are suspected of committing crimes, will only benefit from
their presidential-candidate status.
The list of politicians also includes Govorukhin, who virtually represents the
Fatherland-All Russia bloc at a time when its leaders have pointedly
discarded their presidential ambitions. However, one finds it pretty hard to
explain Yevgeny Savostyanov's nomination, all the more so as he had quit
politics a long time ago; besides, he doesn't play a very important role inside
various structures operating under the Moscow municipal government's
auspices. By all looks, Savostyanov has decided to run for president only
because he wants to advertise himself, just like Bryntsalov had done in 1996.
Governors Tuleyev and Titov have different roles to play. Tuleyev is supposed
to deprive those opposing the pro-government party of additional votes;
consequently, Russia's powers-that-be are now doing their best to woo
Tuleyev. At the same time, Titov has only one motivation, e.g. advertising his
own political image. Russia's democrats have some serious doubts about
Putin's candidacy; therefore Titov can collect several percent of all votes,
possibly even coming fourth, political-science expert Makarenko said in
conclusion.
Back to the top
#5
Putin leads last respects to Sobchak at funeral
SAINT PETERSBURG, Russia, Feb 24 (AFP) - Tens of thousands of Russians
led by acting President Vladimir Putin paid their last respects Thursday to
Anatoly Sobchak, a pioneer of Russian democracy, who died Sunday.
Political leaders filed through the Tavrichesky palace in the centre of Russia's
second city, where Sobchak was lying in state, as a teeming mass of
Petersburgers thronged outside in temperatures well below freezing to see off
their first democratically elected mayor.
Sobchak, who shot to prominence as a vocal opponent of the 1991 coup
attempt against then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, died of a heart attack
in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, aged 62.
"The death of Anatoly Sobchak is a loss, the result of all the troubles and
persecution he was subjected to," Putin told journalists after paying his last
respects to his former mentor. "He was a dreamer. He set tough goals for
society and for himself."
"He loved our city and did much for it at the start of the 1990s, when he
literally saved citizens from hunger," he added.
Putin, who was deputy mayor to Sobchak, and before that his erstwhile pupil
at Leningrad University, greeted and comforted Sobchak's widow, Lyudmila
Narusova after placing a wreath by the coffin and bowing his head in sorrow
for a few moments.
Security around Putin was tight, following reports that an assassination bid
against the favourite for next month's presidential election had been
prepared in Saint Petersburg.
Another of the city's most prominent political figures, former deputy prime
minister Anatoly Chubais, was also present, as was liberal ally Boris
Nemtsov, who put flowers on the coffin.
But it was the stream of ordinary folk who turned out to pay their last
respects to Sobchak, in memory of the halcyon days of 1991, which
demonstrated how highly this city regarded one of its finest sons. "He was a
great man," said Nadezhda Stepanova. "In his time, the entire world
recognised Saint Petersburg as a cultural centre for the world." Added
Natalya, a 40-year-old engineer: "He was our first democratic mayor and I
remember the first years of perestroika when we were full of hope and for us
he was our leader."
Alexei, a 50-year-old doctor noted that Sobchak's health decline coincided
with his political fall from grace. "It really started to hurt him when everyone
started this corruption story against him," Alexei said. "I don't know if it is
true but for us he remained our first mayor."
Sobchak spent the last years of his life fending off corruption charges and
chronic heart problems, a depressing decline for a man who had once
embodied the hopes and aspirations of democracy in Russia's second city. An
outspoken advocate of change in the late Soviet period, Sobchak ran Russia's
second city for five years from 1991.
During this period, he was one of the best known "democrats" in Russia and
prominently resisted the abortive anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991. Later
he played a leading role in drafting a new constitution for Russia which was
adopted in December 1993.
But his clean, progressive image gradually became sullied during his term in
office. He was defeated in the mayoral elections by his former deputy,
Vladimir Yakovlev, and was investigated for corruption charges. In 1997, he
left for Paris, officially for heart treatment. His wife said he had received
death threats.
After being in voluntary exile for 19 months, he returned to Russia in July
1999, saying he had no fears about being prosecuted and promised to lead a
drive against corruption.
Back to the top
#6
Christian Science Monitor
24 February 2000
Russia's powerhouses of dissent: mothers
The Soldiers' Mothers Committee takes on the military in ways others can't
By Judith Matloff, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
For five months, five days a week, Yelena Makarova telephoned the Ministry
of Defense hotline seeking news of her nephew Andrei. She suspected the
boy was missing in action in Chechnya. Each time, the reply was polite, but
noncommittal. "We don't have any information," she was told.
Finally, Mrs. Makarova followed the path of thousands of Russian women
before her. She contacted the Soldiers' Mothers Committee, a national group
that boldly challenges, scolds, and cajoles Russia's male-dominated military
bureaucracy into helping families find information about sons or relatives.
True to form, within a few hours, a committee member had located the
youth. He was alive. And yes, he was in Chechnya.
With Russia well into its second campaign in the breakaway Muslim republic,
the decade-old committee has risen to new prominence here. At a time when
limits on free speech appear to be growing, the group is now a crucial source
of information on casualties and conditions in Chechnya. It's emerging as a
powerful nongovernmental organization, with 300 offices and an aura of
impunity that only the sanctity of motherhood could provide. The current war
effort, to reestablish control that Moscow lost in the disastrous 1994-96
Chechen conflict, remains popular with most Russians. But disillusionment is
growing, especially among those who have lost kin.
With seeming boundless energy - apparently fuelled by tea, poppyseed
bread, and moral conviction - committee members dispense tips on how to
get around Russia's tangled bureaucracy and to avoid the draft. A pregnant
wife, enrollment in university, or well-documented chronic illness are among
the possible exits cited.
As irritating as their work may be to the Defense Ministry, mothers committee
members say they have experienced little harassment by authorities other
than phone tapping - customary, according to human rights groups here -
and the odd fake organization set up as a rival.
"What motivates me? It's sort of mystical," says the organization's founder
and leader, Valentina Melnikova. "Practically all of us who work here have
[experienced] burn-out. At that point, many leave. Those who stay seem to
grow stronger."
Mrs. Melnikova stumbled upon her mission in 1989 at the end of the Soviet
Union's decade-long occupation of Afghanistan, where an estimated 15,000
Russian soldiers died. Melnikova, who had two draft-age sons, began to
study the law for loopholes and linked up with other women to build the
movement. Their work intensified during Russia's first military campaign in
Chechnya. The committee's profile has grown especially with the severe
restrictions imposed on media coverage of the current war. Since most
journalists cannot get to the scene of the fighting, the group serves as a vital
source of information.
The group, too, has emerged as a champion of the rights of the 100,000
Russian conscripts in the region, and countless others who fear being called
up for their two years of compulsory military service. Reports of hazing of
recruits are rampant. Suicide is also reported to be common. Compensation
in cases of injury or death can be delayed for years.
For families that cannot afford lawyers, or hefty bribes, to evade the draft or
discover the whereabouts of missing sons, there is nowhere else to turn.
"This was my last hope, my last resort," says one of the tired women waiting
her turn in the drafty corridor outside the committee's Moscow office. "If they
can't help me, no one can."
One reason for their success, one sociologist speculates, is that these tough
middle-aged matrons can instill respect in Army men as only mother figures
can.
"The organization uses the symbolism of sacred motherhood very
effectively," says Yelena Zdravomyslova, a researcher in St. Petersburg with
the Russian Independent Social and National Issues Institute. "Theirs was a
clever choice, to appeal to the notion of uncorruptible mothers defending
their children."
While some of their 300 offices are manned by a single woman in an isolate
village, the committee ranks appear to be growing. Men also now work for
the organization. Due to a scarcity of charity funding in Russia, the group
relies on foreign financing, including money from a foundation set up by
Hungarian philanthropist George Soros.
Often working without pay, committee members take down the testimonies of
soldiers who have been beaten. They make lists of dutiful letter-writing sons
whose correspondence stopped abruptly and without explanation. They
counsel deserters and potential draft dodgers about their legal rights. And
they tirelessly go through hospital and military records to calculate a true
estimate of casualties.
Melnikova now figures the death toll in Chechnya at more than 3,500 and the
injured at more than 6,000 - double the official government figures. "These
numbers are not just important for the public record. We're talking about
people's lives," she says. "Their families cannot ask for compensation from
the state until the state acknowledges they died in action. The fact that the
Defense Ministry wants to hide facts means that it doesn't want to accept
responsibility for this war."
Melnikova rises from her chair to meet several women entering her office
with hopeful faces. She turns with a final remark: "Our 'war' is endless here.
The heaviest thing is that we face the same situation time and again."
Back to the top
#7
Russia Expands Political and Military-Technical Ties with Iran
February 24, 2000
By Olga Kryazheva (okryazhe@cdi.org)
Research Assistant, Center for Defense Information
Washington DC
Russia will continue to provide Iran with military aid and will massively
expand political and military-technical ties. Russia assists in building Iranian
military power because its own military-industrial complex is in deep crisis.
With the collapse of the military budget, the Russian defense industry
survives almost exclusively on arms exports. Although Russian military
officials decline to give the costs of weapons and technologies they sell to
Iran, Russia is suspected of selling them for bargain-basement prices in order
to earn hard currency.
Last month, Iran began to produce the Russian-developed 9M13 Konkurs
anti-tank missile on a large scale. This missile can be launched from the
ground as well as from many types of vehicles. The Konkurs missile is
wire-guided with a range of 75 meters to 4 kilometers in the daytime and up
to 2.5 kilometers at night. The first Russian-made MI-171 transport
helicopter was recently delivered to the Iranian Navy. According to the
Russo-Iranian agreement, Russia plans to deliver four more helicopters by
the end of March, 2000.
According to Itar-Tass, Russian news agency, CIA officials suspect that
Russia also continues to sell missile technology to Iran, despite U. S.
protests. Iran imports missiles components and nuclear technologies from the
Russian state agency Rossvooruzheniye, an arms trading company; NPO
Trud, a rocket engine manufacturer; the Russian Space Agency, and private
firms. US officials predict that by 2001, if such nuclear cooperation continues,
Iran could produce missiles carrying nuclear warheads that are capable of
hitting targets in the Middle East and Europe.
The CIA has recently reported to the White House that it is no longer able to
effectively monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons production, and that Iran has
made considerable progress in building a bomb. However, the Russian
government states that although Iran is building a nuclear power plant with
Russian help, it is not seeking to build a nuclear bomb or other weapons of
mass destruction. On February 9, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny
(continued on top of page link)
Interesting reading here, take your choice.....
search for: FSB expands power and control over Russian Citizens
http://www.google.com/search?client=googlet&q=FSB%20expands%20power%20and%20control%20over%20Russian%20Citizens
I'm assuming you live in Russia, but let me ask...do you live in Russia?
The last paragraph tells the 'why'.
Russian GRU expelled from Germany for buying plans, Dec. 2004
http://www.agentura.ru/english/Right?id=20050418222500
http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/shmidt-eenboom/
Interesting read on German/Russia spy and research by a
journalist.
http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/shmidt-eenboom/
There are several articles on the homepage.
Yes I live in Russia.
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