Posted on 06/22/2005 10:38:34 AM PDT by robowombat
Gonna extort more monies from the US taxpayers.
Worth a read. Boy, Dr. K. really did think he was channeling Otto von B. sometimes.
sometimes you have to go back really far to make sure your resentment is justified.
Wait 'til my engineering teaching-assistant sees this!
During the overtly socialist era of India's past (from Nehru until the BJP won) there were certainly windows of opportunity where the US could have made inroads but chose to blindly continue on with backstabbing Pakistan. Our biggest opportunity was of course after that era, right after 9/11. This account is hardly surprising though. I have zero respect for Kissinger. I think he is the most overblown, over rated blow hard ever falsely elevated to stardom. His failure to deal effectively with South Asian geopolitics, his getting duped by the so called "China Card" and his miscalculations vis a vis the Vietnam War are all major rookie mistakes.
Bkmk to read later.
well it was a commie govt in India granted a Democratically elected one. India was allied with Russia at the time and Nixon was a virulent anticommunist
The more I read about Nixon, the more I realize just how much of a strange, twisted little man he was.
The State Department's Office of the Historian has just released (and published online) the Nixon/Ford papers dealing with India and Pakistan during that period. The historian is also sponsoring an academic conference a month or so from now to bat around the . . . history.
Might get interesting . . .if other Indian journalists take this writer's tact. Already interesting, and revealing, that Chowdhury devoted a whole paragraph to Susan Brownsmiller.
RE: By now India had completely given up on the US. In August 1971, it ended its non-aligned stance and signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union to safeguard itself against any American intervention.
So essentially, Nixon helped drive India further into the clutches of Moscow. [Smooth move Ex-lax!] You know, I do respect Nixon in many ways. But in some cases, he was just so lame!
We must admit it. Sometimes, some very bad people have been allowed into our ranks. I am very conflicted about Nixon. I loved his stance toward the hate America crowd, here at home. But internationally, he was a bad combo - a Sinophile with globalist tendencies. Not good - IMHO.
Nixon felt that way about the Jews as well. He had some pretty glaring weaknesses.
"This is really very interesting, but the question is why bring up ancient US-Indian enmities on the eve of the Indian PM's visit with Pres. Bush. "
Obvious.
I hate journalists.
Times change. That was decades ago and India was virulently anti-capitalist and anti-western back then and so was INdira Gandhi and Nehru.
I would stop short of using the word "sponsor."
But I do think that culturally, we Americans can often be incredibly naive about the mindsets of tin pot rulers. We often refuse to entertain the possibility that we are getting duped or taken. Nixon got duped big time by the PRC and Pakistan. In the big picture, he may have helped the forces of anti Westernism (inclusive of both radical Islam and Communism) more than he rolled them back.
Good reading. Goes to show you the problem with an open society is it is an open society. Who else chooses to show and tell so much about itself?
From your link:
According to Henry Kissinger, "When the Nixon administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda." As events developed in South Asia, that goal proved to be an increasingly difficult objective to achieve. A political crisis in Pakistan developed out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of the general election in December 1970. The subsequent crisis, which roiled the subcontinent in conflict from March to December 1971, led to warfare between India and Pakistan, and eventuated in the evolution of the east wing of Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh.
The United States, with Pakistan at the time as a conduit in conducting secret negotiations with China, sought to defuse the crisis and prevent fighting between India and Pakistan. When the fighting developed, the Nixon administration "tilted" toward Pakistan.
The tilt involved the dispatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to try to intimidate the Indian Government. It also involved encouraging China to make military moves to achieve the same end, and an assurance to China that if China menaced India and the Soviet Union moved against China in support of India, the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union. China chose not to menace India, and the crisis on the subcontinent ended without a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
For a brief period in December 1971, however, the record indicates that the crisis had a dangerous potential and that President Nixon and his National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger were prepared to accept serious risks to achieve their policy objectives.
And this bit:
On December 12, Nixon had to contemplate the implications of the assurance offered to the Chinese two days earlier. During the course of a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office about the need for a military move by China to reinforce the impact of the arrival of the U.S. carrier off East Pakistan, Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig entered with word that the Chinese wanted to have a meeting in New York. That was startling news. Kissinger said the Chinese had never initiated contact in New York. Suddenly it seemed likely that the China was going to move militarily against India. That raised the likelihood that the Soviet Union would be given an excuse to strike China. Kissinger said: "If the Soviets move against them and we don't do anything, we will be finished." Nixon asked: "So what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, is that what you mean?" Kissinger responded: "If the Soviets move against them in these conditions and succeed, that will be the final showdown...and if they succeed we will be finished." He added that "if the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis...we may be looking down the gun barrel." In the end, they concluded that the projected confrontation with the Soviet Union would not involve a nuclear exchange. Kissinger felt that to preserve credibility, the United States, if necessary, would have to support China with conventional forces: "We have to put forces in. We may have to give them bombing assistance." Kissinger saw the danger of war between the Soviet Union and China as a strong possibility, with the Soviets looking for "a pretext to wipe out China," but Nixon concluded at the end of the discussion that "Russia and China aren't going to go to war." (281)
Nixon's prediction was borne out when it developed that China had no intention of threatening military action against India. Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan on December 16 and India announced a cease-fire. (320) With a nudge from Ambassador Farland, President Yahya accepted the cease-fire. (323) Nixon and Kissinger felt that they had achieved their fundamental goal of preserving West Pakistan intact and congratulated each other on having "scared the pants off the Russians" and having come through the crisis "amazingly well." (324) India, however, had emerged from the crisis confirmed as the preeminent power on the subcontinent, and Soviet support for India during the crisis had enhanced Soviet influence in India. The United States would have to adjust to that reality.
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