June 21, 2005 Tuesday
SPEAKER: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT R. SIMMONS (R-CT), CHAIRMAN
LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY: SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT HOLDS A HEARING ON OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION SHARING
JUNE 21, 2005
SPEAKERS:
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROB SIMMONS (R-CT) CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CURT WELDON (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PETER KING (R-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MARK SOUDER (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DANIEL LUNGREN (R-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM GIBBONS (R-NV)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVE PEARCE (R-NM)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BOBBY JINDAL (R-LA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAVID REICHERT (R-WA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES DENT (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER COX (R-CA) EX OFFICIO
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ZOE LOFGREN (D-CA) RANKING MEMBER
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LORETTA SANCHEZ (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JANE HARMAN (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NITA M. LOWEY (D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE (D-TX)
* U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BOB ETHERIDGE (D-NC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES LANGEVIN (D-RI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE KENDRICK MEEK (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JIM TURNER (D-TX) EX OFFICIO
SIMMONS: The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.
WELDON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, a very important hearing. And thank each of you for testifying.
I want to walk my colleagues through a case study that I think is very appropriate for this hearing, and I want to take my colleagues back to 1999. I was then chairman of the Defense Research Subcommittee. We were standing up information dominance centers for each of the services, and the information dominant center of the Army, called the LIWA, the Land Information Warfare Assessment Center, was headquartered at Fort Belvoir. They were also linked with SOCOM down in Florida, which was doing amazing work and using the same model that the Army was using. They were bringing together disparate systems of classified data, including open-source data, which the CIA was not using at that time, to understand emerging transnational threats.
John Hamre was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I asked him to go down and look at this capability because I was increasing the funding for it and he did, and he said, "You're right, Congressman."
We put together a brief, a nine-page briefing, which I'd like to enter into the record.
SIMMONS: Without objection, so ordered.
WELDON: This brief in 1999 called for the creation of a national operations and analysis hub, the policymakers tool for acting against emerging transnational threats and dangers to U.S. national security. And the concept was to bring together 33 classified systems managed by 15 agencies, including open-source data to do massive data mining and using tools like Starlight and Spires and other cutting-edge software technologies to be able to give us the kind of information to understand emerging threats.
John Hamre said, "I agree with you, Congressman, and I'll pay the bill. The Defense Department will foot the bill for this, and I don't care where the administration wants to put it, at the White House, the NSC, wherever, but you've got to convince the FBI and the CIA because they have a large part of this data."
So at John Hamre's suggestion, on November 4 of 1999, almost two years before 9/11, we had a meeting with the deputy directors of all three agencies. I went over the brief, and the CIA said, "Well, Congressman, that's great, but we don't need that capability. We're doing something called CI-21, and we feel we have enough capability and we don't need that extra capability that you're talking about.
Well, at the time, the Army and SOCOM, passed by General Shelton and General Schoomaker, who was Commander of SOCOM, were doing a classified program called, "Able Danger," which has not yet been discussed in the open, and I don't know why the 9/11 Commission didn't go into it, because Able Danger was focused on Al Qaida. Able Danger was a classified project of SOCOM and our Army looking at the cells of Al Qaida worldwide so that we'd have actionable information to take out those cells.
What I didn't realize was that they had actually produced a chart until two weeks after 9/11. Now, Mike untold the chart. This chart was taken by me in a smaller form to Steve Hadley two weeks after 9/11. Now, it's difficult for my colleagues to see even though I've had it blown up, but hold it up, Mike.
This chart identifies the major Al Qaida cells, and if you look to the chart in the center to the left, there's the picture of Mohammad Atta. What the military did in 1999 and 2000 through the use of open-source data, and this is not classified what I'm showing you, they identified the Mohammad Atta cell in New York and identified two of the other three terrorists.
What I have since learned, and I have two -- Mr. Chairman, if we want to do a classified hearing on this, I have two military personnel who will come in and testify who were involved with this. But SOCOM made a recommendation to bring the FBI in and take out the Mohammad Atta cell. And the lawyers, I guess within SOCOM or within DOD, said, "You can't touch Mohammad Atta, because he's here on a green card, as are the other two suspected terrorists. And they were also concerned about the fallout from WACO.
So now we have obtained through an open-source capability that the CIA did not want to pursue, "We don't need that." When I took this chart to Steve Hadley and opened it up in the White House he said to me, "Congressman, where did you get this chart from?" I said I got it from the military, special forces command of that Army.
This is what I've been telling you we need to fuse together our classified systems. And Steve Hadley, the Deputy to the National Security Advisor, said, "I've got to show this to the man." I said, "The man?" He said, "The president of the United States." I said, "You mean don't have this kind of capability?" He said, "Absolutely not, Congressman."
So he took the chart and he gave it to the president of the United States.
In 2003, George Bush announced the TTIC, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. The TTIC is identical to what we proposed in 1999 but the CIA told us, "Trust us. We know better. We know how to do this kind of capability. We know how to do this emerging threat." They didn't produce that chart. It was done by military capabilities to the Army's Information Dominant Center and through special forces command, tasked by General Shelton and General Schoomaker.
Now, to add further insult to injury, bring out the next chart. This is the capability that's now available but I've been told it's not capable of being produced through the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center.
This is Al Qaida today worldwide. Every one of those little dots is a person or a cell, and every one of them are identified. This is a worldwide global depiction of where Al Qaida is today, the key cells that are threatening us, their linkages to other nations, their linkages to terrorist attacks. This information is all obtained through open-source information. I have been told by the military liaison to the NCTC that the NCTC could not produce this today.
Mr. Chairman, this is something that this subcommittee has to pursue is I've been told that at the NCTC we have three separate distinct entities and the stovepipes are still there. For the life of me I cannot understand why there is resistance among the people who are paid to do our intelligence to fuse together information to give us a better understanding of emerging threats. This comprehensive capability is now being pursued by naval intelligence under a new task force that I hope will be picked up by John Negroponte who I gave a brief to two weeks ago.
Open-source intelligence has been extremely valuable and can be extremely valuable. I'm not convinced yet that we're there.
SIMMONS: I thank the gentleman for his statement. I would request by unanimous consent that both charts be entered into the record of this hearing, and I would be happy to consult with the ranking members or members to have a follow-on discussion in closed session of this issue.
(snip)
SIMMONS: I thank you for your remarks and for bringing your talent and expertise to these important subjects.
I don't believe that any members want to do a second round and so I would be prepared to close, and I simply want to thank our panelists for beginning this very important discussion on open-source information and open-source intelligence.
I think this has been a tremendously educational two hours. I believe that there is a great opportunity to follow up on this, to bring in at some data, appropriate date, the Department of Homeland Security to see where they are in this area and as well to consider a closed session on the issues that Mr. Weldon raised.
Again, if there are no additional comments from my colleagues, I would like to thank the panelists for their participation, and we stand adjourned.
And for all those who may question Michael Savage from time to time, he's been ON FIRE the past two nights on this subject.
This story MUST NOT go away!