The recent China-Russia joint military exercises were clearly a symbol of China’s military objectives. Without doubt, the communist regime is in an arms race with the United States and is intent on overtaking the U.S. as the world’s superpower. Many observers also believe that China is preparing for war, knowing that the U.S. represents the only obstacle to its expansionist objectives. Peking recently indicated its seriousness by threatening to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. if it interferes with China’s plan to militarily conquer Taiwan.
How dangerous is this situation? What threat does China real pose and how must we deal with it? What do we do if China acts militarily against Taiwan?
To discuss these and other issues with us today, Frontpage Symposium has assembled a distinguished panel of experts. Our guests today are:
Al Santoli, the President of the Asia America Initiative in Washington, DC. He is editor of the China in Focus and Asia in Focus weekly e-publications. He also is director of the successful Development for Peace program in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines;
Gurmeet Kanwal, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies that is part of the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi;
Prof. Dan Goure, the Vice President with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. He is involved in a wide range of issues as part of the institute’s national security program. He was a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team and spent two years in the U.S. Government as the director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Patrick Devenny, a Henry M. Jackson National Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy with an expertise in international terrorism and Asian security affairs;
and
Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., an expert in bilateral and trilateral alliances and their impact upon U.S. national security. He has been published extensively on matters relating to China. His work has also appeared in In the National Interest and the Globalist and he is a frequent contributor to The American Thinker and Global Politician.
FP: Al Santoli, Gurmeet Kanwal, Prof. Dan Goure, Patrick Devenny and Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., welcome to Frontpage Symposium.
Mr. Santoli, let’s begin with you. Kindly give us a brief overview of the danger and threat that China poses to the U.S. and the West. Is it overrated or underrated?
Santoli: China is clearly undergoing a dramatic arms build-up, utilizing a number of modernized strategic and space-based weapons systems, as well as a blue water navy, that are offensive in their application. Chinese political and military officials have repeatedly stated that the United States is their "principal enemy." All Chinese modernization planning and development has been focused on how to defeat the United States for supremacy in the Asia Pacific region, and in other parts of the world where competition over strategic natural resources are becoming increasingly competitive.
In considering China's intentions externally, one must consider its repressive internal policies against open political and social organizations and against religious believers. We face the same type of repetition of history as in the early to mid-1930s when much of Europe and the United States ignored Germany's repressive policies and military modernization.
We must also consider the strategic "Multi-Polar" alliance between China, Russia and Iran which is military in nature and directed against the United States. Taiwan is more important to world peace than its geographical position as a strategic island in Southeast Asia. Taiwan is the first ethnic-Chinese government and society to have held peaceful democratic elections. Its system can be a model for mainland China. For war to be ultimately averted, there must be change inside of China, with those elements of social, political and religious reformers overcoming the repression of the 2% of the population Communist Party and there back-up in the military and paramilitary police. The solution cannot be imposed by the West, it must be Chinese in nature. But we can help the situation with a firm commitment to helping defend Taiwan's democracy.
FP: Mr. Kanwal, do you agree with Mr. Santoli’s assessment? And please help illuminate what a “firm commitment to helping defend Taiwan’s democracy” would entail.
Kanwal: China calls its ongoing quest for superpower status a “peaceful rise”. However, while its lips say one thing, its body language is different. China has not hesitated to use strong muscle power throughout the last 50 years to settle international disputes. It is the only major Asian country that has fought wars with all of its land neighbors and claims to have done so in self-defence.
It was involved in a vicious war in Korea in the 1950s. In 1962 China fought a border war with India that shattered illusions of peaceful co-existence for many decades to come. It fought with Russia over a disputed island in the Assuri River. It invaded Vietnam to teach it a lesson and then quite inexplicably withdrew.
China always speaks of the peaceful re-unification of Taiwan with the mainland but does not hesitate to issue dire threats at the smallest sign of Taiwan’s quest for self-determination. It has fired surface-to-surface missiles into the Taiwan Straits and regularly practices amphibious landings. China has taken physical possession of some of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea even though several other nations have much stronger claims. China was the world’s leading proliferator of nuclear weapons till recently when A Q Kahn’s antics propelled Pakistan to the top and it inherited that dubious distinction. Hence, China’s emerging military capabilities must be seen in the light of its likely intentions in future.
FP: Fair enough, so what will the U.S. have to do to confront these “likely intentions” and, as I asked earlier, what would a “firm commitment to helping defend Taiwan’s democracy” entail? Dr. Goure?
Goure: The consistent position of the U.S. government is that it will oppose any attempt to change Taiwan's status by force. The credibility of this position depends on a willingness and capability to use force to counter any Chinese aggression. China must know that it cannot win a war with the United States. Beijing could choose to escalate, but it could not win.
China is developing a military capability to deter or, if necessary, deny U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan. The necessary response is a U.S. military posture that defeats Chinese aims. This means, first, forces that can gain and hold the seas and air spaces in and around Taiwan, specifically, nuclear attack submarines and stealthy aircraft such as the F-22. Second, it requires theater and strategic missile defenses. Finally, this strategy necessitates the ability to hold at risk strategic targets throughout China. Capabilities such as the cruise missile firing SSGNs, long-range strategic bombers and global strike systems satisfy this requirement.
FP: So just a second, we are actually considering a real war between the U.S. and China and Dr. Goure is suggesting that China cannot win. Mr. Devenny what would a war between the U.S. and China look like and are we certain we would “win”? In a situation where a few nuclear bombs are exchanged doesn’t everyone lose? Or might this not necessarily be nuclear?
Devenny: Yes, nuclear war, even a limited exchange, would have a disastrous effect on both nations, particularly China, considering the marked superiority of the American nuclear arsenal. Luckily, such a possibility is fairly remote. No massive Chinese ICBM build up has been reported, and extensive financial investment overseas is hardly the modus operandi of a country actively planning for thermonuclear conflict. Dr. Goure is correct; the Chinese would invariably lose were a war to escalate to a true state-on-state level.
To avoid this outcome, the Chinese would hypothetically initiate a sharp, quick battle over Taiwan that they could, conceivably, “win”. Using submarines such as their recently procured Kilos, the PRC would attempt to close down the island’s shipping lanes, while concurrently achieving air dominance. Were they to be successful in this attempt, a U.S. President would be forced to weigh the desirability of fighting a war 7,000 miles away, over a battered island nation surrounded by modern warships and hundreds of fighter aircraft.
I would like to stress at this point however that the PRC buildup by no means suggests hostilities are inevitable, or even likely. After all, China reaps other benefits from its expanded military capabilities, namely additional leverage in Taiwan’s domestic political arena, an increased willingness of American politicians to rein in pro-independence forces on the island, and a certain marshal prestige that could siphon off some of their own population’s latent political dissatisfaction.
FP: Mr. Stackelbeck, can you expand on Mr. Devenny’s point about China reaping “other benefits” from its expanded military capabilities? Do you agree with his angle on this? Kindly expand on why this minimizes the chance of hostilities.
Stackelbeck: I agree with Mr. Devenny, specifically his point that hostilities between China and Taiwan are not inevitable. In addition to the three important benefits noted, expanded military capabilities have had several additional benefits for China.
First, not only have China's military capabilities forced Taiwan's domestic population to recognize the mainland's growing power, but it has dissuaded Taiwan's potential allies in Asia from coming to its aid more vigorously. In fact, China's military capabilities have fostered the creation of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other Asia-specific arrangements.
Second, strange as it may seem, China's expanded military capabilities have inadvertently increased economic integration between China and Taiwan. Both economies have become increasingly inter-connected on several distinct levels. Bilateral cooperation will only expand, as China's military capabilities begin to slowly influence economic policy decisions made by Taiwan's business and government leaders. The Taiwanese business sector, with an eye on investment in China, will try not to offend Beijing, realizing that any invasion would all but destroy the enormous gains already made and eliminate any chance for market competitiveness in the future.
Third, it is only logical for the Taiwanese military hierarchy to question whether it is better to join China in a great "Asian brotherhood" of nations, rather than to fight it in a war that will almost certainly destroy the island's delicate infrastructure. Taiwan's failure to reach a consensus on American military hardware sales proves once again that there is uncertainty at the highest levels of Taiwan's military and political leadership.
Taken collectively, all of these points minimize the chance of hostilities between China and Taiwan.
FP: Fair enough, so what’s going on with China and Russia holding their first joint military exercises? Should we be worried?
Santoli: The goal of the Russia-China military exercises, as well as the numerous public and secret military and political deals signed between Putin and Hu, should raise serious concern. Pan-Asian political/military cooperation between Russia and China encompasses from the Silk Road energy routes in Central Asia across to Vladivistok on the Pacific, opposite Japan and Alaska.
In addition, Russia has enabled the Chinese People’s Liberation Armed Forces [PLA] with state-of-the-art Sukhoi 27 and Sukhoi 30 fighter bombers, and in-flight refueling capability. And Russia’s assistance to the People’s Liberation Navy’s quiet submarine force, combined with the miniaturization of warheads technology and MIRV’ing capability that China bought or stole from the US has substantially increased its nuclear strike capability against the United States. Equally significant are the hand-held lasers that Russia has helped provide the Chinese Army that can be used on a tactical battlefield to blind US forces, ship crews, pilots and miniature anti-satellite satellites can blind US Command and Control in the case of conflict.
Chinese leaders throughout the reign of the Communist Party have repeatedly shown that they are willing to launch political, economic and military campaigns that caused suffering and death of countless Chinese citizens. The US and our allies must be able to convince Beijing that they cannot militarily defeat the forces of freedom. That is getting increasingly more difficult, due to our sticky and expensive involvements in other areas of the world.
The current generation of “spoiled brat” Chinese Communist leaders have shown a ruthless tendency against internal religious believers and political dissenters. In order to hold on to their power, they may exploit nationalism and launch attacks in any given direction, not only toward Taiwan, with power-hungry military-industrial cadre in support. Potential social disruption in China, caused by the Communist Party’s corruption, mismanagement and callousness to the well being of their own citizens, could also be a factor leading to external war against a “common” enemy
Many of those Americans who currently say that the Chinese Communists value their economic integration more than lust for power, are forgetting the mistakes made by the best and brightest in the US and Western Europe in the 1930s who claimed a similar view of Nazi Germany before World War II. The competition over oil and other scarce natural resources are also vital flashpoints for conflict, more significant than the Taiwan political issue. Also, control of North Korea after the demise of Kim Jong-il will also pit the PRC, Russia, Japan and the US-South Korea in competition for influence in North Asia. In one of the bilateral security agreements between Russia and China since 2001, Moscow pledged to rush emergency military assistance to the PLA in the instance of a conflict over Taiwan. And the Russian sale of Sunburn anti-Aegis ship missiles to the PLA is part of a military strategy to destroy US aircraft carriers and Aegis radar destroyers in a Pacific conflict.
In addition, China and Russia are supporting anti-American despots such as Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez with weapons and training for insurgency forces that could bog us down in our own hemisphere. And the electronic spy and warfare bases operated by Russia and China in Cuba pose a threat to our vital defense, homeland security and economic communications.
Kanwal: Mr. Santoli’s formulation that there is a deep military nexus between China and Russia is questionable. In fact, it would be wrong to deduce that China is concentrating exclusively on enhancing its military power. Military power is now only one element of a nation’s ability to influence and shape the international environment. The Chinese leaders have for long propounded the concept of ‘comprehensive national power’. The Chinese are acutely conscious of the fact that they cannot hope to match the military muscle of the West for many more decades and they have been quick to realize that, in future, as the world becomes increasingly globalized, interdependent and wired, economic power will be the predominant determinant of a nation’s global status and its relative weight in the new world order. Hence, the Chinese are working assiduously towards becoming an economic superpower.
Simultaneously, China is modernizing its military forces to prepare for an option of the last resort, should Taiwan suddenly declare independence, and Russia is its foremost supplier of military hardware. The Chinese are unlikely to either invade Taiwan to secure its merger with the mainland or launch even missile and air strikes as such action will have huge economic repercussions. New FDI will almost certainly stop; projects in the pipeline will be put on hold; some MNCs may even pull out; and, the stock market will inevitably crash. However, as Mr. Devenny has said, a naval and air blockade of Taiwan, though it would be likely to invite UN sanctions, may appear attractive to the Chinese leadership. Cyber attacks, for which China has been preparing since the first Gulf War in 1991, are even more likely as these can completely disrupt the economy and provide inherent deniability.
The Russia-China joint military exercises are politically important but not militarily significant. These are likely to be aimed at assessing inter-operability challenges for joint patrolling, preparing for joint search-and-rescue and future cooperation as part of multinational intervention forces. Despite the Chinese purchase of large quantities of Russian military hardware over several decades, there has been no major military and strategic cooperation between the two countries. The relationship is basically a patron-client, buyer-seller relationship with limited transfer of technology to manufacture under license. It will be recalled that the Chinese had debunked former Russian Prime Minister Primakov’s proposal of a China-Russia-India triangle.
FP: Mr. Devenny?
Devenny: I tend to side more with Mr. Kanwal concerning the limited nature of both the joint exercises and the overall relationship. While closer relations between Russia and China should be of some concern to Americans, they stem more from a temporary confluence of interests than any grand geo-strategic plan, as Mr. Santoli alludes to. Both nations - especially a declining Russia - fear the recent expansion of American influence into Central Asia, which has historically been within their sphere of influence. The anti-democratic leadership of the two nations also share a deep mistrust of Western political reforms and their "liberalizing" effects, as they are keenly aware that such ideas only serve to undermine their own domestic support structures.
These fears represent the adhesive that have kept the two powers together temporarily. However, the relationship is hampered by historical rivalries, as formal alliances have been perennial non-starters. Were China to accelerate its economic march into Central Asia, you would invariably see Russian cooperation with China decline. Additionally, were China to gain access to the European arms market, the fire sale on Russian weapons would wane considerably (probably the only positive result of such a development).
Stackelbeck: Although the China-Russia bilateral military relationship remains somewhat immature at this time, it would be dangerous to assume that the relationship could not become more intimate; giving the “Peace Mission 2005” joint military exercise a higher degree of relevance.
Recognizing the limitations of confronting the U.S. unilaterally, China and Russia are quietly calibrating their existing military relationship to allow for the pursuit of more ambitious endeavors in the future. This includes the continued sale of advanced Russian weaponry and equipment to China designed specifically to confront U.S. forces in the Pacific.
At any given moment, a regional or global confrontation, perhaps over oil and natural gas resources or Taiwan, could accelerate unfortunate changes in the dynamics of the China-Russia military arrangement making a military solution more feasible. Moreover, American or allied military action against rogue nuclear regimes in North Korea and Iran would only deepen the military relationship between China and Russia.
The development of formal, geostrategic entities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which China and Russia are key participants, magnifies the difficulties confronting the U.S. The active solicitation and recruitment of marginalized governments in Central Asia and the Middle East against perceived U.S. hegemony is reason for genuine concern and should prompt a coordinated diplomatic and intelligence response from Washington.
FP: Ok gentleman, we are going into our final round. Mr. Santoli, first, feel free to make a rejoinder to the debate that has broken out here about the temporary Chinese-Soviet military romance. Second, let us suppose that President Bush assembles all of you as an advisory panel on China and he asks you what to do first. What do you tell him?
Santoli: The Chinese are cognizant of the rise and fall of empires throughout their own history and realize that although economic power is key to developing and sustaining international political power, a nation state must have the ability to defend itself against or destroy powerful rivals. China's new generation of war planners fully appreciate the need to integrate economics, communications, aerospace and electronic and cyber dominance with the ability to project conventional and nuclear military
For the academics and economists who are unfamiliar with Chinese military writings and strategy, I would ask them to seek information on a term popular in the highest-level Chinese military circles -- "Assassin's Mace." This is used in reference to new weapons systems being developed to defeat the United States militarily, where "the weak can defeat the strong" using pin-point targeted surprise new weapons systems. Where some US analysts dismiss an "inferior" Russia, it would be foolish to underestimate the quality of their military-industrial scientists and engineers who are collaborating with some of the best and brightest technicians in China, whose performances have been respected in some of the most prestigious science and technology university programs throughout the West.
One would also be foolish to dismiss the political/military partnership between Russia and China. In many Chinese histories and famous novels, the Emperor or protagonist seeks to isolate and defeat its rivals, one at a time. This includes making temporary non-sentimental alliances with those one owes revenge, in order to first defeat the stronger rival before redressing vengeance on the erstwhile ally. Thus the current anti-US alliance that been began developing dating back to the Yeltsin era between Russia and China, when the initial weapons deals were made to target US strengths. The US success in the Balkans War brought the two Eurasian Powers together, this was further expanded by the eastern expansion of NATO, the role of US forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the Sino-Soviet relationship with both Saddam Hussein and Iran.
Russian motivation for this alliance is more than just a matter of "weapons sales". Throughout history, the lust for revenge can be blind. Around 5 years ago, while I still worked in Congress, I had a very pointed discussion with on of Putin's key US watchers [i.e. from the same organization of origin]. I asked him why Russians were risking their own future by arming the PLA. His response became very emotional: "We know we are Riding the Tiger. But I witnessed the delegations of US businessmen led by Ron Brown [Clinton Admin Commerce Secretary] who came to Russia and how they conspired with our billionaire tycoons to exploit the Russian people." It would be unwise to underestimate the Russian leaders' desire to reclaim empire and seek revenge against the US for the humiliation of losing the Cold War and the eastward expansion of NATO. It may also have something to do with the region's fear of a re-militarized Japan as an ally of the United States.
The scope of the August 18-25 Russo-Sino military exercise on Shandung peninsula -- opposite the two Koreas and Japan on the Yellow, north of Shanghai and very far away from Taiwan is historic and breath taking. The Reuters reports that 100,000 troops are involved including many paratroopers and naval infantry to practice landing exercises on a hostile foreign territory to "stabilize a country" outside their own territory... Strategic bombers, in-flight refuelling for state-or-the-art Sukhoi jet fighters, submarines, naval infantry landing craft, battalions of paratroopers from both armies and 100 battle tanks are being used. Could this exclusively mean an invasion of Taiwan? If you look at the geography of the exercise and instability and threat of potential conflict in North Korea with a potential US-Japan war against the nuclear armed "Hermit Kingdom," this exercise can be seen a totally different tactical and strategic light.
The issue of cyber and electronic warfare is being perfected by both China and Russia. For the past 6 years China has been conducting cyber war experiments across the Taiwan Strait, targeting banking systems, military communications and government offices. Most cyber attacks against the US Government have been traced back to China and Russia based sites. The CW and EW bases operated by China and Russia in Cuba in fact pose potential tragedy as
Recommendation: Although this may sound impolitique, it would be wise for the United States to send a clear message to China and Russia and all other adversaries that violation of the Monroe Doctrine will not be tolerated. A quiet but devastating US cyber strike against the Cuban-based CW and EW bases could eliminate them without threat of to innocent civilians or risking a highly publicized confrontation.
Kanwal: While Mr. Santoli’s arguments about the probability of a real convergence in the Chinese and Russian worldviews are unexceptionable, an overly pro-active US response will definitely ensure that the relationship graduates to a more meaningful strategic partnership, even if not a military alliance. Excessive US pressure will only drive the Chinese to up the ante a couple of notches in their rhetoric as well as their military preparations for the reunification of Taiwan.
Post-Cold War geopolitics is still in a state of flux. In the emerging poly-centric world order, great powers other than the US will continue to grope for some more time to find their place in the sun. Not all of these rumblings will be directly aimed at countering US economic and military predominance. In the interest of a stable world order and in its own larger interests, it will be prudent for the US to accommodate the new powers rather than confront them with an alliance that has already begun to fray at the edges, as witnessed in the declining support for the US in its Iraq venture.
At the same time, the US must not allow itself to be overwhelmed by the ongoing transition in power-politics and the emerging David-versus-Goliath type of military technologies that seek to exploit the strengths of asymmetric warfare as a means to counter a much superior military power. The US can and must continue to utilize its economic clout and military muscle to exercise a stabilising international influence for the common good while dealing firmly with the so-called rogue regimes that threaten world peace and stability through WMD proliferation and international terrorism.
The emerging economic powerhouses like China and India will inevitably rise to take their rightful place as global players. Analysts in the West tend to look at China’s self-professed ‘peaceful rise’ with suspicion and mistrust and recommend a closer strategic partnership with India as a way of hedging US bets to counter-balance China’s influence in Asia, in addition to the existing alliances with Japan and others in the region. China’s strong-arm tactics over the last half-century have led to such thinking. The best policy at present would be to continue to engage China as it integrates itself with the international economic order while keeping a close watch on its military ambitions and preparations. Speaking softly while carrying a big stick and keeping one’s powder dry is always a good long-term policy in international politics.
Devenny: Were I advising the President on Chinese policy, I would first make it clear that China is, by far, the paramount issue in American foreign policy. The next century will largely be defined by the tone of Sino-American relations. The actions Mr. Santoli recommends are a good way to get the century off on a hostile note, and are not worth the cost. The Chinese could easily point out that their facilities in Cuba are more than matched by superior American electronics warfare facilities in Japan, Australia, and South Korea, not to mention the U.S. Navy’s off-shore capabilities.
Instead, I would recommend a series of steps that would ease China’s entry into the greater world economy, while also maintaining the forces necessary to deter them from any fool hardy aggression. This multi-faceted approach would allow the United States to be flexible in dealing with the rapidly changing and sometimes unpredictable Chinese political situation. On the second note, the drastic cuts to the U.S. Navy, especially the submarine fleet, have to stop. The Chinese have obviously decided on submarines as their main counter to American naval power, and the idea that we would drastically draw down our submarine forces at this time is inherently dangerous. Secondly, I would pursue a strong diplomatic effort in Asia, targeting especially Japan and the nations of central and southern Asia. We have much more to offer these nations than China –militarily and economically – and we should utilize these strengths in order to create a strong, if informal, regional alliance. Fiinally, I would prevail upon the Taiwanese government to upgrade their increasingly antiquated defense structure.
On the other side of the spectrum, I would recommend to the President that China is not irrevocably destined to be a hostile nation and future relations between the new superpower and the old can be extremely beneficial. One spot ripe for cooperation is North Korea, as China wants to avoid an aggressive nuclear-armed power on the Korean peninsula as much as the U.S. does. We should also pursue an economic policy specifically targeted at increasing integration between the Chinese economy and that of the U.S. and our Asian allies. While increased integration does not rule out conflict - hence my prior military recommendations – it does significantly lower the risks, as only a truly irrational Chinese government would undertake risky military operations in Asia that would adversely effect their massive investments in neighboring countries.
FP: Mr. Stackelbeck, last word goes to you.
Stackelbeck: The President must first recognize that China is taking deliberate, well-coordinated action on a global scale in a number of strategic areas which have national security implications for the U.S. Like Mr. Devenny, I too would make the President realize that China must be the focal point of any U.S. foreign policy moving forward. However, I would also inform the President that "Taiwan reunification" is not the major foreign policy goal of Beijing. Taiwan is merely a well-disguised diversion.
President Hu Jintao has made it very clear that China seeks power, influence and a return to greatness in the first half of 21st century. How will China achieve this objective? Invading Taiwan and risking the gains realized over the past fifteen to twenty years is not the answer. What would China gain by confronting the greatest naval power the world has ever known? Taiwan is important to China, but it does not support their long-term objectives.
China is exerting influence through its economic might which has allowed the country to expand and modernize its military, making it a potential threat to global security. And what does China’s economy rely upon most for its growth -- Oil. Therefore, an eventual land based invasion of the Middle East by a confederacy of states led by China, not an amphibious or airborne invasion of Taiwan, is the greatest threat to U.S. national security at the present time.
To confront this threat, I would recommend that our forces in the Middle East be strengthened immediately to let China know that we are aware of their true intentions. Second, we must get our European allies more involved in the defense of the Middle East. Like the U.S., the Europeans have become increasingly frustrated by the Iranian nuclear issue. They are also being affected by cheap Chinese goods that are flooding European markets putting thousands of people out of work. Third, our bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan and India must be strengthened. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines should be approached, as well. Finally, the American public should be told in very clear language that China presents a unique threat to U.S. national security.
At the end of the day, China values energy more than Taiwan. Moreover, there is a real possibility that Taiwan will be reunified with China without military action, since economic relations are increasing with each passing day. Mr. President, please don’t be fooled by public statements made by Beijing. Let us focus not on Taiwan, but on the Middle East where China is preparing to make its march.
FP: Al Santoli, Gurmeet Kanwal, Prof. Dan Goure, Patrick Devenny and Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium. We'll see you again soon.
