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You just happen to not mention the programs themselves.

"From the evidence available through the actions and statements of a range of Iraqis, it seems clear that the guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so many years at such a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead time as possible—within the vital constraint that no action should threaten the prime objective of ending international sanctions and constraints. Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraq; believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution."
Charles Duelfer Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence Baghdad, September 2004

Emphasis was put to these words within the report itself to make them stand out.

Even more telling in this quote and other information within the report is the fact that as restrictions were lifted against Iraq through the O.F.F. program the more the programs began to flourish once again.

Kinda blows the "let the sanctions do their job" argument all to hell. A argument directly nullified in the report but allowed to continue because the media and the ignorant allow it to be.

A few more tidbits from ISG Report:

WMD concerns are not merely of historic interest. ISG chemical weapons (CW) and counterterrorism experts uncovered and tracked down an active insurgent group that had been using former Regime CW experts to attempt to create and use CW for use against the Coalition. This was dubbed the Al Abud network after the location of the first raid where insurgents were found attempting to acquire ricin. A very aggressive investigation by ISG and a series of raids have apparently been successful in containing this threat. This has been a major success, but will require sustained attention by both Coalition and IIG since terrorists have long demonstrated an intention to obtain WMD and use it. This could occur inside or outside Iraq.

While the future size and direction of the Iraq Survey Group are currently under review, the requirement remains to collect further information related to threats posed by residual elements of the former Regime’s WMD programs. There will also be new information from individuals and sources, which will come to light. Moreover, certain defined questions remain unanswered. For example, we cannot express a firm view on the possibility that WMD elements were relocated out of Iraq prior to the war. Reports of such actions exist, but we have not yet been able to investigate this possibility thoroughly. Likewise, there remains some uncertainty concerning reports of mobile BW capabilities—though we have conducted an extensive investigation and we have a paucity of confirmatory information, there is still some possibility that such a capability did exist.

I have glanced over the entire report before, and this information is from the Transmittle Sheet and a Scope Note of the ISG Report but the more you sift through this report the more you understand that President Bush had to act and why. This threat was never just going to go away. Add to this the fact that connects between Iraq and Al Quida can not be disproven it becomes even more apparent President Bush was right to invade Iraq and topple Saddam.

The funny thing is almost ALL of the evidence supports President Bush's reasoning and very little contradicts him.