"Martha Stewert. I could find others, I'm sure, with research."
Wrong. There was a crime committed. MS wasn't convicted, but her partner was. Her testimony was material.
For the nth time, Libby's testimony was not material. It was not necessary one way or the other, for Fitzgerald to learn there was no crime.
Whether Libby had or had not leaked her name--and whether he lied about it -- is all completely irrelevant as to whether a crime occurred.
No crime occurred because Plame's identity was not protected by any law. You even agree to this.
So you must perforce agree that Libby's crime was not material to any underlying crime. So it should not be prosecuted.
This is what Joe DiGenova says. This is what the Washington Times editorial has said.
I didn't realize the SEC complaint proper (against MS & Bacanovic) had been concluded. Agreed that the charge of false statement was valid, and she was convicted for that.
I suppose a better example would be Bill Clinton for his false statements under oath in the Paula Jones civil case, which was settled/dismissed.
For the nth time, Libby's testimony was not material. It was not necessary one way or the other, for Fitzgerald to learn there was no crime.
Your test of materiality is tempting, but incorrect. Your conclusion is based on the fact that Plame was not covert, therefore the entire investigation was bogus. That defense was raised, albeit too late in the game, by Miller & Cooper in the amicus brief arguing for rehearing en banc before the US Circuit Court of Appeals. The Courts have not addressed that argument.
Whether Libby had or had not leaked her name--and whether he lied about it -- is all completely irrelevant as to whether a crime occurred.
The test of materiality is not "whether or not a crime occurred." In the instant case, the independent counsel was charged with fining out exactly that, and we agree, would have concluded "no crime." That does not excuse lying to the investigators. In the alternative, a person called to testify could assert what you do here, in lieu of testifying.
This is what Joe DiGenova says.
He said otherwise regarding Bill Clinton's perjury.
On May 21, 2004, federal prosecutors charged a Secret Service special agent with perjury for allegedly lying in the trial of Martha Stewart and her broker, Peter Bacanovic.In this instance, the government witness, Larry Stewart, was accused of testifying falsely that he had personally examined Martha Stewart's broker's worksheet before he testified about the ink. Had he been convicted, Larry Stewart could have faced a maximum sentence under federal law on each perjury count of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine per criminal count. However, a federal jury in Manhattan found him not guilty on October 5, 2004.
http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/043/lying.html
To state that the chief law enforcement officer of the United States has obstructed justice or committed perjury is to define the seriousness of the crime. Such seriousness is not lost because it was a civil proceeding or later dismissed by the trial court.http://www.digenovatoensing.com/inthenews/robert_ray_0101.htm
The main policy in this case is that courts very much do not want people to tell deliberate lies on the witness stand and, in general, take the view that defects in the steps that may bring witnesses to the stand are not adequate reason for tolerating the lies and foregoing punishment. A number of Supreme Court decisions reflect this general policy.Thus, in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), convictions for filing false non-Communist affidavits were sustained, the Court holding that it did not matter whether the underlying statute that required them violated the First Amendment. Id. at 867; see also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969). Similarly, in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576, 584 (1976), and United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 176-78 (1977), the respective failures to give a grand jury witness a Miranda warning (in one case) or a warning as to the privilege against self-incrimination (in the other) were held not to excuse the subsequent perjury of the witness. Other cases are to the same effect.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=1st&navby=case&no=022276
This is what Joe DiGenova says.
Toensing and DiGenova assert that the entire investigation was bogus, because Plame obviously did not satisfy the "covert" requirement embodied in 50 USC 421. I agree with them in that regard, but given an ongoing investigation, a belief there was no crime does not create immunity from prosecution for false statements.
DiGenova says perhaps Libby's best defense will be the simplest defense, that he had no intention of lying.http://www.csmonitor.com/earlyed/early_usa102905b.htm
DIGENOVA: Well, first of all, I don't agree with some of these Republican folks who have been on television saying perjury is not sufficient here. If he can prove real perjury and an effort to mislead the grand jury, then he should bring indictments. And if that's all he brings, that's still legitimate and worthwhile and, in my opinion, would be worth bringing.If he uses the espionage statute, I will be extremely surprised. Because, as you know, that statute was passed in 1917. It's designed to deal with the disclosure of national defense information. And it was in existence in 1982, when the Congress enacted the Agent Identities Protection Act because the Justice Department said that the espionage act does not apply to the identity of a covert agent.
So, if he's using that act, that will be a somewhat dubious use of criminal law. But on the obstruction side, if anybody lied to the grand jury, no matter who they are, or misled people or purposely tried to influence other witnesses, they should be charged. And, of course, whether or not they're guilty will be determined by a trial.