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Unclassified report from CIA Iraq WMD Program as of June 2001
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to WMD ^ | 1 January Through 30 June 2001 | Director of Central Intelligence

Posted on 11/24/2005 2:55:33 PM PST by SBD1


Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,

 1 January Through 30 June 2001


Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687.  In spite of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow-on inspection regime comprising the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during this reporting period.  Moreover, the automated video monitoring systemsinstalled by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are still not operating.  Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.

Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used the intervening period to reconstitute prohibited programs.  We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate its CW programs within a few weeks to months.  Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program hascontinued.  Without an inspection-monitoring program, however, it is more difficult to determine the current status of these programs.

Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities.  Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use.  This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes.  Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased.  After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities.  In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities.  Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program.  For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad.  This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of FFCDs that were supposed to have revealed the full scope of its BW program.  According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies.  Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM has assessed that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time.  Iraq also has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities.  With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq’s growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.

Iraq has worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe.  In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots.  These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program.  A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.  Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy."   The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer-range systems.  Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program.  We believe that development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the 31 December 2000 Al Aqsa parade.  The solid-propellant missile development program may now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two such airframes and TELs were paraded on 31 December—and possibly longer range systems may be moving ahead rapidly.  If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs.  Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.

Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful enforcement of the UN arms embargo.  Baghdad has acquired smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft and air defense systems, primarily over porous land borders via a thriving gray arms market. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items through the Oil For Food program.  Iraq continues to aggressively seek ACW equipment and technology.

TOPICS: Foreign Affairs; Front Page News; Government; News/Current Events
KEYWORDS: beltwaywarzone; cia; cialeak; ciareport; ciawmd; d; iraq; plamegame; prewarintelligence; report; wmd
Next time you hear the Democrats say Bush hyped false WMD claims and the CIA tried to warn the administration, just point to this CIA report. The Democrats keep pointing to some magical date of February 2002 as the date the WMD information was hyped but the report above was as of June 2001, before 911.


1 posted on 11/24/2005 2:55:34 PM PST by SBD1
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To: SBD1

Thank you.

2 posted on 11/24/2005 2:58:57 PM PST by Carry_Okie (There are people in power who are truly evil.)
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To: SBD1

The democrats know the truth they just lie anyway. The lie gets front page, the truth might, possibly, perhaps be found on page 24.

3 posted on 11/24/2005 3:06:10 PM PST by BARLF
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I found this part of the document to be of interest. We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy." The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Those ex CIA "VIP" must not know how to read, not only does this report say that the CIA "believes that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program", but it goes on to point out that "The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program".
4 posted on 11/24/2005 3:15:21 PM PST by SBD1
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To: SBD1

The VIPS can read just fine. And they and many others in the CIA know how badly they have screwed up on intelligence over the last 20+ years. Their goal is to distract away from themselves and put the heat on others (i.e. Administrations that dare to challenge them). They have problems spying on our enemies, but they have no problems leaking select pieces of classified info that tries to make other look bad.

5 posted on 11/24/2005 3:27:15 PM PST by frankjr
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To: SBD1

I wonder how much serious consideration has been given to the Libyan contention that Libya and Iraq were involved in a joint nuclear program? Somebody in the intelligence establishment must have looked into it.

6 posted on 11/24/2005 3:29:17 PM PST by popdonnelly
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To: SBD1


7 posted on 11/24/2005 3:53:54 PM PST by F14 Pilot (Democracy is a process not a product)
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To: SBD1

1 January Through 30 June 2001

In 1988, Osama Bin Ladin stated that he considered acquiring weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty”, and recent press reports claim that Bin Ladin has nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against the United States. A government witness—Jamal Ahmad Fadl-- in the trial of four men recently convicted of supporting the al Qa’ida bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya testified last February that al Qa’ida had been trying to acquire fissile material since the early 1990s. More recently, we have uncovered rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons inside a suspected al Qa’ida safehouse in Kabul. These diagrams, while crude, describe essential components—uranium and high explosives—common to nuclear weapons.


The CIA has known of this since 1988, they are a part of the enemy with-in.

8 posted on 11/24/2005 5:24:24 PM PST by ThreePuttinDude ()......Politically incorrect by Intelligent Design........()
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To: SBD1

Here's a January of 2003 (i.e. pre-war) news followup:

9 posted on 11/24/2005 5:34:12 PM PST by Southack (Media Bias means that Castro won't be punished for Cuban war crimes against Black Angolans in Africa)
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To: SBD1

So President Bush was Not Lying! Wonder how much WMD made it's way to Syria?

Pray for W and Our Freedom Fighters

10 posted on 11/24/2005 6:22:04 PM PST by bray (Free Libby)
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To: SBD1

WOW- nice find.

What I am beginning to learn is that way too many of our congressman and senators never bother to read these reports.

After all of the fuss and whining about getting the NIE report only three days before actually having to vote for or against the war- we are are beginning to see the hundreds of documents that the congress had access too, but never bothered to read. In fact, many of them never bothered to read the NIE report.

Every time I hear a politician complaining that they did not have the necessary information to vote on this war, I am reminded of the hundreds upon hundreds of these documents that they should have read.

The moment these politicians found out that there might be a vote that would help take their country to war, it probably would have been prudent for these politicians to send their staffers to look for this kind of information.

11 posted on 11/24/2005 7:59:38 PM PST by KCRW
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To: SBD1

We should start calling this the "Valerie Plame Report to Congress on Iraq WMD".

SHe is a senior expert on WMD and most likely had a lot of influence in its tone and content. She was obviously asked who to send to Niger to investigate Iraq connection to Yellow Cake and that recommendation was taken. She was the "go to" person in the CIA when it came to Iraq and WMD.

12 posted on 11/24/2005 9:51:18 PM PST by tbeatty (I didn't claw my way to the top of the food chain to eat salad.)
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To: All

What we do not know now about the Wilsons
By: John Batchelor · Section: Diaries

What we do not know now about the Wilsons.
1. Who at the CIA tasked Joe Wilson to go to Niger in February 2002? Was it Alan Foley, then head of the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Center? Was Wilson tasked in coordination with the State Department's African Affairs Bureau or Bureau of Intelligence and Research?

2. What did Wilson tell US Ambassador to Niger Owens-Kilpatrick about his trip when he was in Niger? What are the ambassador's notes from the conversations? Did Wilson speak of Mrs. Wilson to the ambassador? Has Wilson communicated with the ambassador since February 2002? Does the State Department have contemporary diaries or notes from Wilson's communications with the Ambassador?

3. Who in March 2003 at the CIA interviewed Joe Wilson upon his return from Niger, and where is the report? Why wasn't Wilson asked by the CIA interviewers to sign a confidentiality agreement about his report?

4. Prior to President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union Speech, who did Joe Wilson tell about his February, 2002 Niger trip? What journalists? What former members of government? What officials at the Democratic Party?

5. Did Joe Wilson discuss his 2002 Niger trip with the editors of the San Jose Mercury priory to publishing an October 2002 piece warning of Saddam Hussein's WMD threat if Iraq is invaded? What notes do the San Jose Mercury editors have of the conversations?

6. Following the President's State of the Union Speech January 2003, Wilson says that he telephoned a complaint about the speech to William Mark Bellamy at the State Department's African Affairs Bureau: did Bellamy know at the time of Mrs. Wilson's employment?

7. Mr. and Mrs. Wilson attended a Senate Democratic Party Committee meeting in early May, 2003: Who invited Joe Wilson to speak on Iraq? Who did Wilson speak with in addition to Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times?

8. Wilson breakfasted with Nicholas Kristof of the NYT on May 3, 2003: Did Mrs. Wilson attend the breakfast? Did Mrs. Kristof attend the breakfast? Any other attendees? What was discussed? Where are Kristof's notes from the breakfast? Was this the first occasion Wilson and Kristof had discussed WMD, Niger, Iraq? If Mrs. Kristof was present, where are her notes? If Mrs. Wilson was present, did she discuss her employment at the CIA since 1985?

9. A year earlier, in Nicholas Kristof's May 14, 2002 column, he mentions mother-daughter day at the CIA and small African countries in the same light-hearted paragraph. Did Nicholas Kristof or his wife, the New York Times journalist Sheryl Wu Dunn, speak with either Mr. or Mrs. Wilson before May 2003?

10. At the May 3, 2003 breakfast, if Mrs. Wilson was not present, was her employment discussed? What did Wilson tell the Kristof(s) was the reason for his trip to Niger? Did Mrs. Kristof (a WMD reporter along with co-author Judy Miller for the New York Times in 1998) ever meet or communicate with Mrs. Wilson subsequent to Mr. Kristof breakfasting with Joe Wilson? Were there subsequent meetings or communications between May 3 and May 6, 2003? If so, where are Kristof's notes?

11. Prior to Nicholas Kristof's June 13, 2003 column about forged Niger documents, did Joe Wilson convey to Mr. or Mrs. Kristof evidence of his February 2002 Niger trip that support the column's since unproved conclusion that Wilson exposed the forgeries during his February 2002 Niger trip?

12. Wilson told the same falsehoods about discovering the forged documents in Niger (documents that did not come into CIA hands until October 16, 2002) not only to Kristoff, but also to Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, who published on June 12, 2003, and John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman of the New Republic, who published June 30, 2003. Did Pincus, Judis or Ackerman speak to Wilson about his connection to the CIA, about his wife's employment? Did they research background on Wilson to substantiate his later proved false statements that the Vice President's office had sent him to Niger, that he had discovered the forgeries, that he knew the Vice President was deceiving the public about Niger and uranium?

13. Wilson appeared on Meet the Press on the day of his New York Times op-ed, July 6, 2003 in order to repeat falsehoods about his Niger trip: did host Andrea Mitchell know of Wilson's wife's employment at the time?

14. What editor handled Wilson for his op-ed at the New York Times for his July 6, 2003 article? Where are the editor's notes of communications before publication? Did the editor challenge the ambiguous suggestion in the piece that Wilson's February 2002 Niger trip exposed the forged Niger documents? Did Wilson communicate with Mr. or Mrs. Kristof prior to the publication of his op-ed? Did Wilson communicate with State or CIA prior to publication

15. What did CIA determine Mrs. Wilson status to be in February 2002, in May 2003, in June 2003, in July 2003?

16. Wilson has remarked that he has French mining and investment interest in Africa as playing clients of his consultations. Mrs. Wilson has said that Joe Wilson has French clients? What clients? Has Joe Wilson ever worked for or consulted for the French uranium mining firm Cogema? Do Wilson's present or past clients have interest in the two uranium mine locations in Niger? Wilson has mentioned he has had gold mining clients in Niger: what clients, what connection to other mining interests in Niger? What fees have these clients paid Joe Wilson coterminous with his 1998, 1999, 2002 visits to Niger?

17. Has Joe Wilson been under oath for the Fitzgerald investigators? Has he been questioned by the FBI investigators for Fitzgerald? Did he name the neighbors that the FBI questioned about Mrs. Wilson in October 2005? What neighbors?

18. The day of the Novak column, July 14, 2003, did Wilson communicate with State? With CIA? With French mining interests?

19. Has Mrs. Wilson been under oath about her contacts on the day of the first Novak column, July 14, 2003? Does she have a contemporary diary of events such as February and March 2002, such as the Kristoff breakfast on May 3, 2003? Or on May 6, 2003? Or on the day of the David Corn Nation blog mention, July 16, 2003?

20. Was CIA permission required to photograph the Wilsons for January 2004 Vanity Fair?

21. Who are Joe Wilson's paying clients since 2001? Any uranium mining interests in Gabon, Namibia, Canada, Russia, as well as Niger? And does Fitzgerald have the list? And has Wilson ever been in contact with clients who represent any of the following states looking to purchase yellowcake: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, PRC, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, especially with regard Niger or Gabon uranium mines?

Nov 25th, 2005: 01:58:25

13 posted on 11/25/2005 7:51:18 AM PST by AliVeritas (''I'd rather have Jihadis in front of me than Democrats behind me.'' Go GOP!)
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To: SBD1


14 posted on 11/25/2005 7:56:29 AM PST by The Coopster
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To: SBD1; Howlin; Miss Marple; Peach; kcvl; MJY1288; prairiebreeze


15 posted on 11/25/2005 7:57:05 AM PST by Mo1 (Message to Democrats .... We do not surrender and run from a fight !!)
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To: Mo1

Bump, thanks for the ping.

16 posted on 11/25/2005 8:15:06 AM PST by prairiebreeze (Take the high road. You'll never have to meet a Democrat.)
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To: bray

The prayers are constantly INCOMING. America will survive because of President Bush CIC and our people in country. God Bless Them All.

17 posted on 11/25/2005 8:24:19 AM PST by JOE43270 (JOE43270 America voted and said we are One Nation Under God with Liberty and Justice for All.)
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To: JOE43270

Thank you Joe and it is something the Dems never do.

Pray for W and Our Freedom Fighters

18 posted on 11/25/2005 8:30:45 AM PST by bray (Free Libby)
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To: bray
Wonder how much WMD made it's way to Syria?

When one wonders this question, can't help but wonder about Rocketfellers trip to Syria in Jan 2002. His own words do seem to give clues. Further I have heard Rocketfeller make the claim more than once that 'he' was the pusher of the investigation of the supposed "leak" of Val.
19 posted on 11/25/2005 10:09:03 AM PST by Just mythoughts
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To: SBD1
1990s ABC News Report (VIDEO) - BOOKMARK!

Video Montage of Democrats on Iraq, 1998 - 2003

20 posted on 11/25/2005 10:24:25 AM PST by Republican Wildcat
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To: tbeatty

That is indeed an interesting question - did she have a hand in crafting this report or any other like it? Hmm...

21 posted on 11/25/2005 10:25:19 AM PST by Republican Wildcat
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To: SBD1; NormsRevenge; Grampa Dave; SierraWasp; Marine_Uncle; doug from upland

Very good find!

22 posted on 11/25/2005 12:16:53 PM PST by Ernest_at_the_Beach (History is soon Forgotten,)
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To: All
From the same report:


Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism[2]

The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials appears to be rising—particularly since the 11 September attacks.  Several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other non-state actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN—although terrorists probably will continue to favor proven conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings.


Among CBRN materials, terrorist groups are most interested in chemicals such as cyanide salts to contaminate food and water supplies or to assassinate individuals.  Terrorist groups also have expressed interest in many other toxic industrial chemicals—most of which are relatively easy to acquire and handle—and traditional chemical agents, including chlorine and phosgene and some groups have discussed nerve agents.

In 1988, Osama Bin Ladin stated that he considered acquiring weapons of mass destruction a “religious duty”, and recent press reports claim that Bin Ladin has nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against the United States.   A government witness—Jamal Ahmad Fadl-- in the trial of four men recently convicted of supporting the al Qa’ida bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya testified last February that al Qa’ida had been trying to acquire fissile material since the early 1990s.  More recently, we have uncovered rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons inside a suspected al Qa’ida safehouse in Kabul.  These diagrams, while crude, describe essential components—uranium and high explosives—common to nuclear weapons.

Key Suppliers:


Despite improvements in Russia’s economy, the state-run defense, biotechnology, and nuclear industries remain strapped for funds, even as Moscow looks to them for badly needed foreign exchange through exports.  We remain very concerned about the proliferation implications of such sales in several areas.  Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority. 

Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya.  Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian assistance likely supports Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production. 

Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project.  With respect to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran’s ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort, even though the ostensible purpose of most of this assistance is for civilian applications.  Despite Iran’s NPT status, the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.  The Intelligence Community will be closely monitoring Tehran’s nuclear cooperation with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a nuclear weapons program.

In January 2000, Moscow approved a draft cooperative program with Syria that included civil use of nuclear power.  Broader access to Russian scientists and Russia’s large nuclear infrastructure could provide opportunities to solicit fissile material production expertise and other nuclear-related assistance if Syria decided to pursue nuclear weapons.  In addition, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program during this reporting period.

President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow the export in exceptional cases of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards.  The move could clear the way for expanding nuclear exports to certain countries that do not have full-scope safeguards, such as India.

During the first half of 2001, Russian entities remained a significant source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran.  Russia’s biological and chemical expertise makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent production processes.

Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms.  Following Moscow’s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November 2000, Russian officials stated that they see Iran to be a significant source of potential revenue from arms sales, and believe Tehran can become Russia’s third largest conventional arms customer after China and India.  In early 2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India. 

Russia continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs.  In addition, Russia has discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.

The Russian Government’s commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain.  The export control bureaucracy was reorganized again as part of President Putin’s broader government reorganization in May 2000.  The Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) was abolished and its functions assumed by a new department in the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.  VEK was tasked with drafting the implementing decrees for Russia’s July 1999 export control law; by the end of the reporting period, seven of these decrees had been approved, and four—including two control lists—were still awaiting presidential signature.  However, the enacted legislation will have little impact on several of the export control system’s key shortfalls, including weak enforcement and insufficient penalties for violations. 

Export enforcement continues to need improvement.  In February 2000, Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, said that during 1998-99 the government had obtained convictions for unauthorized technology transfers in three cases.  The Russian press has reported on cases where advanced equipment is simply described as something else in the export documentation and is exported.  Enterprises sometimes falsely declare goods to avoid government taxes.

North Korea

Throughout the first half of 2001, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile–related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.  P’yongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology.  Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.


During this reporting period, Beijing continued to take a very narrow interpretation of its bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the United States.  In the case of missile-related transfers, Beijing has on several occasions pledged not to sell Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems but has not recognized the regime’s key technology annex.  China is not a member of the MTCR.

In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and to enact at an early date a comprehensive missile-related export control system.

During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided Pakistan with missile-related technical assistance.  Pakistan has been moving toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with Chinese help.  Pakistan also needs continued Chinese assistance to support development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM.  In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. 

In the nuclear area, China has made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons.  For example, in May 1996 Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

With respect to Pakistan, Chinese entities in the past provided extensive support to unsafeguarded as well as safeguarded nuclear facilities, which enhanced substantially Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability.  We cannot rule out some continued contacts between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program subsequent to Beijing’s 1996 pledge and during this reporting period.

In October 1997, China gave the United States assurances regarding its nuclear cooperation with Iran.  China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supply of a uranium conversion facility and undertake no new cooperation with Iran after completion of two existing projects—a zero-power reactor and a zirconium production plant.  The Chinese appear to have lived up to their UCF pledge, but we are aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised questions about its “no new nuclear cooperation” pledge.  According to the State Department, the Administration is seeking to address these questions with appropriate Chinese authorities.

            Prior to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran.  The US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW program remain in effect.  Evidence during the current reporting period shows Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities.

China is a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran, among others.  Beijing and Islamabad also have negotiated the sale of an additional 40 F-7 fighters for delivery to Pakistan.

Western Countries

Western countries continue to be a less important source of WMD- and missile-related goods and materials.  Iran and Libya continued to approach entities in Western Europe to provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs.  Increasingly rigorous end effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led the other foreign WMD and missile programs to look elsewhere for many controlled items.  However, proliferators and associated networks continue to seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals.  In addition, several Western countries announced their willingness to negotiate ACW sales to Libya.


The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to change in ways that make it more difficult to monitor and control, increasing the risk of substantial surprise.  Countries determined to maintain WMD capabilities and the systems to deliver them are demonstrating greater proficiency in the use of denial and deception efforts. 

As in previous reports, proliferators have been placing significant emphasis on increased self-sufficiency.  In bolstering their domestic production capabilities, and thereby reducing their dependence on others, they are better able to insulate their programs against interdiction and disruption.  Although these indigenous capabilities may not always be a good substitute for foreign imports—particularly for more advanced technologies—in many cases they may prove to be adequate.

   In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise to other proliferators.  We are increasingly concerned about the growth  of “secondary proliferation” from maturing state-sponsored programs, such as those in India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.  These countries and others are not members of supplier groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime and do not adhere to their export constraints.  In addition, private companies, scientists, and engineers from countries such as Russia, China, and India may be increasing their involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of technology.

Some countries of proliferation concern are continuing efforts to develop indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and expand production capabilities, although most of these programs usually rely heavily on foreign technical assistance.  Many of these countries—unable to obtain newer or more advanced arms—are pursuing upgrade programs for existing inventories.

23 posted on 11/25/2005 12:42:21 PM PST by Ernest_at_the_Beach (History is soon Forgotten,)
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To: Ernest_at_the_Beach
"Very good find!"
Sure does re-iterate some of the questions the intel community had for a long time prior to the Iraqi invasion. Anyone in their right mind who understands Iraq was working on nuclear capabilites during the late seventies onward would be a bit foolish to think he just stopped pursuing the goal.
24 posted on 11/25/2005 2:00:59 PM PST by Marine_Uncle (Honor must be earned)
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To: StarFan; Dutchy; alisasny; BobFromNJ; BUNNY2003; Cacique; Clemenza; Coleus; cyborg; DKNY; ...
ping! (#13 is pretty interesting also)

Please FReepmail me if you want on or off my ‘miscellaneous’ ping list.

25 posted on 11/25/2005 7:49:15 PM PST by nutmeg ("We're going to take things away from you on behalf of the common good." - Hillary Clinton 6/28/04)
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To: SBD1

"Next time you hear the Democrats say Bush hyped false WMD claims and the CIA tried to warn the administration, just point to this CIA report."

This is a better reason.  It doesn't involve a CIA report that Senators/Congressmen may/may not have read, may or may not have contained information different than the President saw. It is eight very clear reasons the President gave for invading Iraq and they are described below: These reasons were laid out at the United Nations, in front of live cameras and broadcast to the world. Anyone that didn't hear or read them has no standing to complain in the first place. None of these reasons have a damn thing to do with Joe Wilson, Valerie Plame, yellow cake or Niger.  They were spoken September 12th, 2002, before the State of the Union was given in January 2003 with the infamous sixteen words.

The President:

"Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself."

Reason Number 1: "In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored. Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state. "

Reason Number 2:  "In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them."

Reason Number 3: "In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq."

Reason Number 4: "In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge."

Reason Number 5: "From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons. And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons. "

Reason Number 6:  "Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region. "

Reason Number 7:  "In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens."

Reason Number 8: "In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again. As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy."

"We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take."

"Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming."

"The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"

Below is a list of recommended demands from the President to the Iraqi regime found in this speech. None of them seem unreasonable even today.

  1. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

  2. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

  3. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

  4. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

  5. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

  6. If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

  7. The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.


26 posted on 11/26/2005 8:24:43 AM PST by HawaiianGecko (Facts are neither debatable nor open to "I have a right to this opinion" nonsense.)
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