Posted on 12/07/2005 5:42:08 AM PST by DarkSavant
I'm told that Etienne Gilson's _From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again_ quite admirably covers the philosophical difficulties. There are some notes of Gilson's points at this link. I have also found one philosophy of science professor who is engaging the problems an overly metaphysical kind of Darwinism poses for the essence or nature of a creature. See his weblog.
He touches a bit on nominalism, as well. One of the problems is that "species" is now an equivocal term having both an ontological and a biological sense. Curiosity seems to be using "species" in a biological sense, so I think trying to make it fit into its philosphical conception is a big bad category mistake.
Nominalism as a hard theory is definitely incoherent, but it seems to me that science has to proceed using some kind of pragmatically anti-realist or nominalist philosophy. Natural science is the attempt to build a model of nature, and that model must be both open to correction and amenable to scientific consensus. Practical nominalism, instead of "hard" nominalism, is a necessary practice to fit these requirements, so long as we don't get in the habit of being nominalistic everywhere else. (An old thread on Methodical realism might be relevant, or perhaps it contradicts me completely, I forget. Worth a read though.)
Biologically speaking, neo-Darwinism tends to be blind to the organism, generally treating it as an epiphenomenon generated as a byproduct of gene dispersal and duplication. This strikes me as an area with far more potential to attack, or simply to complement, Darwinian reductionism on biological grounds.
Well, then, you're using a definition that has no relevance to the question. Obviously, it is measurable physical properties (i.e. ability to interbreed) rather than philosophical abstractions that define a biological species.
So then new species arise very abruptly, as per the theory of punctuated equilibria?
I'm also curious to know how children can recognize various determinate species of animals when they know nothing of interbreeding, or even breeding.
The ID'ers recognize this, as far as I know. I'm not concerned that the theory can be reconciled with non-monotheistic belief, because it seems to be merely an extension of the natural law, which is known by all people.
I've forgotten whether Behe et al. think God created ex nihilo a new gene sequence or cellular structure for a given creature or simply directly tweaked the creature's pre-existing structures, but the very awkwardness of either option on both theological and scientific grounds makes me wary of their school of thought, no matter how much I like how it has shaken men from their slumbers.
I agree. At least this debate has served to point out the fact that we know very little regarding human origins with any degree of certainty, beyond that which has been defined by the Church.
BUMP
"What is it then that the modern biologist wishes to say by declaring that it is scientific to exclude final causality from the explanation of organized living beings?"
Curiously, few Darwinians retain their agnosticism regarding the final purposes of various body systems or organs when their bodily organs are malfunctioning. Most suddenly become aware of the body's... dare I say it... proper functioning.
Ditto bump.
IMHO, Aquinas summed up the entire Creationist vs Materialist mud fight we are having today to be nothing but two sets of zealots, both wildly overstating their cases.
Are you saying that Moses was an eyewitness to the events in Genesis?
"Are you saying that Moses was an eyewitness to the events in Genesis?"
No, Moses merely compiled the existing accounts. The toledoth phrases are the end of each section, and usually name the person who wrote it down or commissioned the writing.
"These are the generations of ..."
The first one is a bit of an oddball, and was probably written by God.
Genesis 2:4
"These [are] the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created"
Genesis 5:1
"This [is] the book of the generations of Adam."
Genesis 6:9
"These [are] the generations of Noah"
Genesis 10:1
"Now these [are] the generations of the sons of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth"
And so on. As is the custom in those days (according to archaeological evidence), clay tablets ended with a colophon phrase identifying the owner or author.
One does not have to resort to nominalism to resolve this problem. It is perfectly possible that the substance of red and orange exist, but it is impossible to determine, using empirical observation alone, where the precise boundary lies.
Likewise, "kinds" may exist as forms in the metaphysical, aristotelian sense, but physical measurement of the differences between groups of creatures cannot reveal the precisely where the boundary exists. Nevertheless, when the physical differences are large enough, we can can say with certainty that the kinds differ, much like we can say with certainty that certain wavelengths are red and not orange.
Similarly, the precise metaphysical boundaries of mankind cannot be known through biological observation. These boundaries may exist, but we simply cannot know them by merely measuring physical differences. Nevertheless, when we see that a population has no significant differences from the rest of humanity, then we can say with certainty that they are, indeed, our own kind.
This poses a problem in times where there exists a "borderline" homonid population. For instance, were Neanderthals human? They were extremely similar to us, but they also had a few significant differences. It's very difficult to say whether they were in fact true humans. I'm very glad I'm not living in the age where our kind coexisted with them, or even "archaic" homo sapiens for tha matter.
I suggested a probabalistic framework in which to analize it. Take the red-orange problem. The probability that a given wave of light is classified as red is a function of its length. Thus for wavelength a, the probability that it's red may be 1. Then as you move along the spectrum, that probability dereases and eventually reaches zero. Next, you move on to orange, then yellow, and so on.
You could estimate this function by showing different wavelengths of light to a large sample of people and asking whether it is red or orange.
What do you gentlemen think?
A few things:
1) the idea of kinds is not even necessarily forms or archetypes, but instead of historical distinction -- descendent from a common ancestor pool. Now, some have attempted to create analytic methods for determining created kinds (for an example see http://www.bryancore.org/bsg/opbsg/002.html ), but ultimately, it is a historical definition.
2) Neanderthal's were definitely human. A quick look at the artifacts confirms this. They were artists and craftsman. In addition, they had the same mutational hotspots as humans. The following article on Homo Flores (the hobbit skeleton) contains a lot of the ideas that creationists use when looking at hominid skeletons: http://www.bryancore.org/bsg/opbsg/006.html
I think the "problem" begs the question as to how we apprehend the colors "red" and "orange" to begin with. In fact, the act of posing the question/problem/solution assumes that the terms "red" and "orange" will be recognized by most (all?) people. In fact, children have no difficulty recognizing red, orange, and "reddish-orangish."
Am I addressing your question?
I think that this is a false dilemma, since there exists a continuum of color from red to orange, and a color may be designated 80% red and 20% orange, for example. So a color that's 50% red and 50% orange doesn't have to be classified as "red" or "orange."
Likewise, "kinds" may exist as forms in the metaphysical, aristotelian sense, but physical measurement of the differences between groups of creatures cannot reveal the precisely where the boundary exists.
Agreed.
Nevertheless, when the physical differences are large enough, we can can say with certainty that the kinds differ, much like we can say with certainty that certain wavelengths are red and not orange.
I think I know what you're driving at. But consider this. How is it that my little children instantly recognized their aunt's little "fru-fru" dog as a dog, and not a cat, even though the fru-fru dog looks more like a cat than most dogs (like labs) that they're experienced with?
Similarly, the precise metaphysical boundaries of mankind cannot be known through biological observation. These boundaries may exist, but we simply cannot know them by merely measuring physical differences.
I agree.
Nevertheless, when we see that a population has no significant differences from the rest of humanity, then we can say with certainty that they are, indeed, our own kind.
But what of dwarfs, midgets and pygmys, that have "significant differences from the rest of humanity." Are they human? How can we say that they are by this criteria?
This poses a problem in times where there exists a "borderline" homonid population. For instance, were Neanderthals human? They were extremely similar to us, but they also had a few significant differences. It's very difficult to say whether they were in fact true humans.
If "Neanderthal man" can be categorized as a proto-human despite the fact that "they were extremely similar to us," what prevents us from categorizing dwarfs, midgets, and pygmys similarly?
_____________________________________________________________ A great link on sense cognition for anyone interested: Sense Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas
I think I understand your point after having read the links, but it seems to me that scientists must necessarily, at bottom, assume a realist philosophy in all discussions regarding creatures. It seems to me that, in fact, a biologist, when he is writing of "dolphins" in an essay on "dolphin evolution," assumes that the reader will undertand by the term "dolphin" the same thing that the author intends.
Can you give me an example of a case where "pragmatic nominalism" would serve a useful purpose?
The ability to interbreed (or lack thereof) is not the definition of species. It is one of a list of criteria.
Defenders of "special creation" and of "irreducible complexities" in nature think that divine agency will show up in such gaps of nature. But "gaps" of nature are the provenance of the specialized empirical sciences.
How does the author know this with any degree of certainty? Are miraculous phenomena like miraculous medical cures "gaps of nature"?
In fact, both currents of thought have been represented by the great Church Doctors, perhaps reflecting the two accounts of Creation in Genesis. Augustine saw in the creation of the earth, for example, the potential to bring forth various kinds of life, whereas Aquinas saw the "days" of creation more in terms of defined periods of divine activity (I'm generalizing here).
Providentially, I have been reading through Aquinas' account of Creation recently, and he mentions the various opinions of the Church Fathers throughout his arguments. See The Six Days (Matter).
Divine agency, rather, ought to be seen in the fundamental teleology of all natural things, in the need for a First Mover, and in the complete dependence of all things on God as the source of their existence.
Why must divine agency be reduced to this? I see no obvious reason why, since God regularly performs miracles and creates new souls every day. The author seems to have a pre-disposition towards semi-deism.
To my mind, the use of theoretical models "widely agreed upon by experts" is nominalistic because of the reliance upon "wide agreement" and the acknowledgment that the model doesn't match reality. Of course the incongruence between model and reality can be worked into the Thomistic/realist principle of analogy, but I think it might be an awkward fit.
Or perhaps I've forgotten what nominalism is. I haven't touched the nominalists in years.
I assume this is "human" in the ontological sense? As I understand it, realism claims that the nature of a given thing can be recognized(though never fully understood) by perceiving the whole being. We can't make any claims about the "whole" of an ancient species by looking at the skeleton, or very pretty and very misleading artists' conceptions of the fleshed-out creature.
I asked brought up the following point on another thread months ago, but you wiggled out of it. Darwinism presupposes that biological species are in flux. We are simply another transitional form between our distant ancestors and our distant descendants. Our distant descendants might be similar to us, as certain creatures are the same as very ancient ones. But it is also possible in evolutionary theory that mankind can evolve into a superrational state in which we have sense organs to perceive stuff we can't even imagine now or mental faculties inconceivable by our little minds(this has been absorbed into many flaky new age philosophies). Likewise, it's possible for humanity to evolve into a subrational state(imagine us evolving in symbiosis with a computer system that does all our thinking for us).
Given that man is an incredibly contingent and unstable concept when seen "from the perspective of the Darwinian universe," how can the statement "God became man" be coherent?
I think the author is overstating Aquinas' position here. Certainly, Aquinas' commentaries on the biblical six "days" of creation is not a literal one. Nevertheless, Aquinas does explain the six "days" as six distinct periods of creation, as far as I can tell. In the Summa, Aquinas calls attention to the fact that Augustine's interpretation of the six "days" places a heavier emphasis on the creation of "potencies" in each "day."
Consider, for an example, Aquinas' commentary on the "second day."
Whether the firmament was made on the second day?On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:6): "God said: let there be a firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning were the second day."
I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.
We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).
According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist.
But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental.
Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time.
Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.
If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.
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