SOUTH: FROM GUERRILLAS TO TERRORISTS-New face of violence (Thailand WOT)

The Nation ^ | Jan 09, 2006 | The Nation

[Tyche]

More Muslims than Buddhists being killed; battleground shifts from jungle to streets

While the nature of the insurgency has evolved from guerrilla tactics to urban warfare - in which militants are organised into small, independent cells - the authorities have failed to adapt. Instead they are continuing with the same security mandate and are treating the violence as, more or less, a conventional threat.

The previous generation of militants clashed with troops in remote hills and the jungle, but today’s violence is concentrated more on soft targets and religious sites. Yet the country’s policymakers and their security chiefs regard this shift as a “minor and insignificant difference”.

At a recent Chulalongkorn University seminar, an Army colonel from the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) dismissed outright any review of the security mandate and the tactics being used to tackle the violence.

To this particular colonel, the current generation of insurgents is carrying out the same guerrilla-style hit-and-run tactics and roadside bombings, followed by gunfights. So what is the big deal?

Maybe so. But a closer look at police data from the two years of incidents shows that most of the violence is occurring in towns and cities, which contrasts greatly to the activities of the previous generation of insurgents who clashed with government troops in remote hills and mountains.

Just as notably, and contrary to popular perception, most of the victims are local ethnic Malay Muslims, not Thai Buddhists. Ninth Police Region records show that more than half of the non-security personnel assassinated over the two years are Muslims. In Pattani, Muslim casualties number 330 against 141 Buddhists; in Yala it is 222 to 99; and in Narathiwat the figures are 1,406 to 237.

Officials say they believe many of the Muslim victims were either government informants or civil servants, and thus deemed acceptable targets to this generation of insurgents.

Conversely, most of the security officers killed in the line of duty, such as on patrol, were Buddhists - seeing as the forces assigned to the region come from all parts of the country.

According to the Fourth Army Region, between January 4, 2004 and January 4, 2006, a total of 1,076 people have died and 1,600 injured in the region. These deaths and injuries, inflicted by both government forces and the insurgents, were related to the separatist campaign.

Moreover, the collateral damage over the past two years has reached unprecedented proportions, as insurgents turn their guns more and more on non-security personnel.

Sydney Jones of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group has warned that if the conflict is perceived as one between Buddhists and Muslims it could drag foreign radical Islamic groups into what many perceive is a local issue.

Another disturbing point, warns Kumar Ramakrishna of the Singapore-based Institute of Defence and Security Studies, is that the Malay-speaking southern provinces may be heading along the dangerous path of religious conflict that will see Buddhists pitted against Muslims as more and more religious sites, temples and monks come under attack.

As he notes, the violence being directed against Thai Buddhist civilians today seems to be a departure from earlier methods in which the insurgents limited their attacks to security and government targets.

A tally of the incidents and the victims between January 2004 and November 2005 clearly indicates that the religious sector, both sites and people, are significant targets of today’s insurgents. The religious targets number eight in Pattani, 13 in Yala and 10 in Narathiwat, figures that are remarkably similar to those concerning attacks on police and security forces.

By comparison, the conventional separatist groups that emerged in the 1960s, who incorporated “ethno-nationalistic” ideology in their struggle, regarded Buddhist temples and shrines as being off-limits.

Today, it would seem that attacking religious sites and religious symbolism is the easiest way to shatter the fabric of society in the deep South.

Since the troubles began, four monks have been hacked to death and one has survived a machete attack. The first such attack was on January 22, 2004 and the latest at a temple on October 16 last year, when suspected militants slit the throat of a 76-year-old monk and killed two teenagers before torching the temple.

Shootings are the most popular means of inflicting violence. The highest number of attacks using guns is in Narathiwat with 1,586, followed by 465 in Pattani and 279 in Yala. The vast majority of shootings are of the “drive-by” type in which a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle fires several rounds at point blank range at the victim.

Bombing attacks are more common in Yala. While the previous generation of militants used time bombs, today’s tactics have evolved with technology in which mobile phones are being used to remotely set off explosives.

The government has now required all prepaid mobile-phone users to register their phones with the authorities. But this tactic may not produce the desired result as prepaid SIM cards can be easily purchased across the border in Malaysia.

Explosives are sometimes hidden in cars but officials are refraining from using the term “car bomb” for fear that it could evoke the kind of images seen in the activities of terrorist groups in other countries.

Twice, Yala city hall has been attacked with explosives hidden underneath vehicles, while on December 23, about 15 kilograms of explosives were detonated in the heart of Narathiwat, injuring at least seven people.

At the provincial level, Narathiwat is the hardest hit over this past two years with nearly 1,000 violent incidents of all sorts. But at the district level, Yala’s Muang has the most with 198 incidents, followed by Narathiwat’s Rangae district, according to police records seen by The Nation.

Eight districts in the three southernmost provinces that saw a significant number of attacks were Pattani’s Muang and Yarang, Yala’s Muang, Than To and Raman and Narathiwat’s Muang, Sungai Padi and Rangae. The central city areas of the three provinces are major hot spots indicating that urban areas have become the battlefield, rather than rural areas and the jungle.

In spite of the number of troops with heavy firepower and relaxed rules of engagement, little headway has been made in terms of intelligence, much less new and more innovative strategies to win the hearts and minds of the local residents.

Demographic work has produced no meaningful policy other than the “zoning areas” that would colour-code each village to reflect the level of intensity of violence.

Tactically, zoning might serve as a reminder for troops on the ground when entering so-called “red areas”. But as the statistics show, the chances of being killed or attacked in towns and cities are as high as a military patrol being ambushed.

This is the concluding report of a three-part series. The earlier reports were published on December 13 and January 5.

Supalak Ganjanakhundee,

Don Pathan

The Nation

[killjoy]

By comparison, the conventional separatist groups that emerged in the 1960s, who incorporated “ethno-nationalistic” ideology in their struggle, regarded Buddhist temples and shrines as being off-limits.

Today, it would seem that attacking religious sites and religious symbolism is the easiest way to shatter the fabric of society in the deep South.

I disagree. The communist did bring up religion as well as the Royal Family and that is one of the major reasons they did not succeed. The Royal Family was a very frequent target of both print and radio broadcasts. If it wasn't for this, the communists might have succeeded in taking over the country. (I should note that the King is considered the head of Buddhism in Thailand.) The same mistakes are being made again by the insurgents and this, amoung other things, will doom them to failure.