Actually it's the reason why we have Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas and other great decisions. The Griswold decision meant that the SCOTUS decided that it had the power to nullify state laws, which are shocking to the consience, against "the concept of liberty" or simply invading "privacy", as understood by the members of the court.
Compare:
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479, (1965)
(Black, J. dissenting)
My Brother GOLDBERG has adopted the recent discovery that the Ninth Amendment as well as the Due Process Clause can be used by this Court as authority to strike down all state legislation which this Court thinks violates "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," or is contrary to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." He also states, without proof satisfactory to me, that in making decisions on this basis judges will not consider "their personal and private notions." One may ask how they can avoid considering them. Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the "[collective] conscience of our people."
with
ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation
ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring)
In 1963, this Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 , purported to sound the death knell for the doctrine of substantive due process, a doctrine under which many state laws had in the past been held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. As Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Skrupa put it: "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Id., at 730.
Barely two years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , the Court held a Connecticut birth control law unconstitutional. In view of what had been so recently said in Skrupa, the Court's opinion in Griswold understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision. Yet, the Connecticut law did not violate any provision of the Bill of Rights, nor any other specific provision of the Constitution. 2 So it was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line of pre-Skrupa cases decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.
The power to nullify state laws arose from Marbury.
Justice Stewart's dissent in Griswold virtually scoffs at the notion of substantive due process:
"... we are not asked in this case to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the United States Constitution. And that I cannot do."