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Simply and breifly--(a) To constitute perjury, the question wmust be material, deliberately false and before a competent tribunal. I have probelms with 2 out of 3 of these.

I assume then that you assert that Libby's statements are not material, and are not deliberately false.

Going for the "meaning of 'is'" defense? The indictment is clear on these points, and earlier posts discuss the political and personal motives for avoidance of being a known, legal leaker.

(b)To find obstruction, you must show that the defendant deliberately impeded a material line of inquiry. On this I find the indictment lacking two out of two

Not material, I assume on account of Plame not being covert. Good luck with that. Likewise good luck that Libby "accidentally" or "forgetfully" omitted noting his inquiry to the CIA. C'mon - if you know something FOR A FACT, do you forget that?

(c) If I am wrong, and the lines of inquiry are material and proper, I find it at least as likely that the reporters recollections are wrong as that Libby was deliberately lying ...

Demonstrating that you don't comprehend the point of my previous post. The contest is NOT between the memory of Libby and the memory of reporters.

Not material, I assume on account of Plame not being covert. Good luck with that.

I'm not a lawyer, but it does seem there's something fundamentally wrong and askew when an alleged perjury is charged by a prosecutor who also KNOWS FOR A FACT that he is investigating a crime that did not occur.

Fitzgerald knew from the very outset of his investigation whether Plame was or was not covert, and he knew it for a fact under color of the Identities Act, and from there he proceeded on what looks like an entrapment hunt.

I cannot believe that the law allows this sort of behavior, because it is just fundamentally wrong on its face.