See Hamdan Convicted in Split Verdict at SCOTUSblog, and Hamdan found guilty by Guantanamo military commission jury at JURIST for more.
A July 25, 2008 LA Times story, Hamdan case is built on his own words, reports that Hamdan's boss (the head of Bin Laden's bodyguards) and an Al Qaeda errand boy arrested along with Hamdan were both captured and released by the US. I'm wondering why Hamdan's testimony wasn't good enough to convict at least the head of bin Laden's bodyguards, for providing material support.
The Hamdan case will go on through appeal, resulting in firming up the rules and parameters for trials under military commissions.
10 USC 950v - Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, which was approved Oct. 17, 2006.
One of the arguments Hamdan made in order to get his case into an Article III Court was that the law is ex post facto, or not properly a military commission matter. Those arguments are certain to be litigated further.
10 USC 950p recites:
(a) Purpose.â The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military commission.(b) Effect.â Because the provisions of this subchapter (including provisions that incorporate definitions in other provisions of law) are declarative of existing law, they do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date of the enactment of this chapter.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, SCOTUS did not accept that conspiracy was a crime traditionally triable by military commission. No matter for Hamdan, his was acquitted of the Conspiracy charge.
The Material Support charge is arguably on even weaker ground (as being properly under the aegis of a military commission) than the Conspiracy charge.
Just a point of comparison, David Hicks was returned to Australia after he pled guilty to a charge of material support. His sentence was nine months imprisonment, served in Australia, and a yearlong âgagâ order.
Count 1: ConspiracySpecification 1: conspiracy to commit a variety of offenses (attacks on civilians, etc.) - acquitted
Specification 2: conspiracy to commit murder in violation of the law of war by attacking US and coalition servicemen - acquitted (note that this specification was the subject of much news coverage yesterday, as it turned out that Judge Allred instructed the jury that the charge required proof that the conspiracy targeted "protected persons" (civilians or persons rendered hors de combat))
Count 2: Material Support
Specification 1: Providing himself as personnel to al Qaeda with knowledge or intent that this support would "be used for an act of terrorism" (a count analogous to 18 USC 2339A) - acquitted
Specification 2: Providing himself as personnel to al Qaeda, period (a count analogous to 18 USC 2339B, which unlike 2339A does not require any linkage to another offense) - CONVICTED
Specification 3: Providing al Qaeda with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in November 2001, knowing they would be used for an act of terrorism (again along the lines of 2339A) - acquitted
Specification 4: Providing al Qaeda with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles in November 2001, period (again along the lines of 2339B) - acquitted
Specification 5: Providing support to al Qaeda through his service as a driver, knowing this would facilitate communications and planning for terrorist acts - CONVICTED
Specification 6: similar to Specification 5 - CONVICTED
Specification 7: Providing support to al Qaeda through service as a bodyguard, knowing this would facilitate communications and planning for terrorist acts CONVICTED
Specification 8: similar to Specification 7 - CONVICTED