"They'd have nothing to do with it."
Oh honestly. While the representation that DP World will be 100% in control of security is nonsense, the representation that they will have no responsibility for security is equal nonsense.
The issue is the role that DP World will in fact play in security, which cannot be dismissed as either non-existent or negligible.
Terminal operator cooperation is integral to effective port security. While US Customs clearly has primary responsibility for container and general cargo inspection, that responsibility can realistically be carried out only on a spot-check basis (at present, physical inspections cover about 10% of total cargo). Compliance by trustworthy operators with container content, verification, seal, and re-seal reporting is crucial, and constitutes a kind of "first-line" defense that customs must necessarily rely upon.
This is the point behind the Canadian PIP program (don't forget, DP World will have terminal operations in Vancouver as well), the US Customs CIS program, the proposed Container Seal Verification Regime (CSVR), and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), which are just a few of the security regimes that require operator initiative, cooperation, and reporting.
Heck, even DP World stated explicitly that "We intend to maintain and, where appropriate, enhance current security arrangements," (very reassuring, eh?) making the general claim that DP World will have no responsibility for security a truly odd little piece of spin.
And as stated in a recent article:
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If the deal between DP World and P&O sticks, five key U.S. container ports will be operated by a United Arab Emirates-controlled company. This may or may not be a good investment decision, but that's not the real issue. The bigger question is how secure the ports really are and whether the U.S. government funding for this security is adequate.
The answer: Not by a long shot.
Security at U.S. ports is a shared responsibility. The port operator has, in the past, hired all the security and longshore personnel on its docks. Washington, through the U.S. Coast Guard and, more recently, the Department of Homeland Security, is seeking a greater role in the security of people and goods, both at the ports, and on the water. But the Bush administration hasn't coughed up the dough, even though it made port security a priority after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. And container traffic at U.S. ports has only expanded since then.
Take the U.S. container ports now operated by Peninsula & Oriental Steam Navigation: Miami, Philadelphia, New York/New Jersey, New Orleans and Baltimore. (P&O also operates the cruise port of New York.) As of 2004, these ports processed nearly 6.5 million containers, and their volume has been growing by at least 10% annually since then. The Port of Los Angeles, America's largest, handled 7.3 million containers in 2004, while Long Beach, Calif. saw nearly 5.8 million. More than $1.3 billion worth of goods come into U.S. ports each day, or 2 billion tons of goods. That latter figure is expected to double by 2020.
Ports In A Storm
Containers processed by P&O ports in the U.S.
Port Containers Processed
New York/New Jersey 4,478,480
Miami 1,009,500
Baltimore 557,858
New Orleans 258,468
Philadelphia 178,046
Total 6,481,352
Source: American Association of Port Authorities, 2004
How short is Washington's funding? According to the ports industry, federal budget funding since 9/11 has amounted to only one-sixth of what seaports identified as being needed.
"The federal share of the seaport facility security funding needs to be increased, not reprogrammed and diluted," says Kurt Nagle, president and chief executive of the American Association of Port Authorities.
According to the AAPA, the U.S. needs to spend $400 million yearly to come close to the $5.4 billion suggested by the U.S. Coast Guard, and spend it for the next ten years. The normal allocations have ranged from $93 million to $175 million. There is no way that full container security can be reached with the present level of investment.
Part of the problem, according to Aaron E. Ellis, the communications director for AAPA, is that there is a struggle between where money should be spent given the greatly increased trade that the ports are now experiencing and will continue to experience. Where, he asks, do you use your money to prevent U.S. ports processing from eroding? Is security to be played against infrastructure or cargo handling? And at which port?
That last question has been raised by wise folks such as Robert F. Sappio, the senior vice president of transpacific trade for APL, the U.S.-based container shipping company of Singapore's Neptune Orient Lines. Sappio suggests that the real security problem is at the outbound port. The security of U.S. ports is at best barely adequate but the security at ports in Asia and elsewhere where the goods are loaded for the U.S. is just not there.
The majority of the containers coming into the U.S. at the five ports in question (and generally with all U.S. ports) are not fully monitored and very few are checked to any depth by human operators (it costs too much). The opportunity for disaster even without further risk in port operation is already too wide open. If the U.S. secures with one hand and unlocks with the other it will only have itself to thank in the event of a problem.
http://www.forbes.com/home_europe/logistics/2006/02/22/dubai-port-merger-cx_rm_0222dubai.html
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Punching more holes in a leaky boat is generally not considered the height of prudence.
Granted, but they really don't have any choice about cooperating. It's not like they can refuse Customs access to containers.
While US Customs clearly has primary responsibility for container and general cargo inspection, that responsibility can realistically be carried out only on a spot-check basis (at present, physical inspections cover about 10% of total cargo).
Okay....that's an argument to increase the number of inspections, but has nothing to do with a terminal operator.
Compliance by trustworthy operators with container content, verification, seal, and re-seal reporting is crucial, and constitutes a kind of "first-line" defense that customs must necessarily rely upon.
Wait a minute. Are you saying that terminal operators at the receiving terminal open all containers, verify the contents, and then re-seal them after they've been received?