There’s a Dossier on Turkey on the Pope’s Table (Benedict XVI will go to Istanbul in November)

Here is an extensive extract from the article published in issue number 3738 of “La Civiltà Cattolica,” dated March 18, 2006:

Christians in the Ottoman Empire and in Modern Turkey

by Giovanni Sale, S.I.

The situation of Christians in majority Muslim countries saw significant improvement under the domination of the Seljuk Turks. [...] In the Ottoman empire, in the nineteenth century, the level of education in the Christian communities was far superior to that of the Muslim and even the Jewish community. [...] This relative well-being was also expressed in demographic terms: in 1914, the year when the great war broke out, the Christians were around 24 percent of the empire’s population, reaching 30 percent in the regions of modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. [...]

But after the end of the first world war [...] the Ottoman empire dissolved and [...] an entirely new situation for the resident Christian communities emerged, one less advantageous than the previous one. In Turkey, the process of building the national state, based on Turkish identity, led to the exclusion of Christians from the new state. [...] The ideology of the “Young Turks,” who were in power from 1908, was founded upon an intransigent nationalism, which, although it drew its inspiration from Western models of a liberal character, with the passing of time took on openly authoritarian traits. The new government quickly entered into conflict with some of the sectors of the Armenian political world, in particular those most sympathetic toward socialist ideas, which were asking for the independence or autonomy of regions inhabited by the Armenian majority. Now, while the separation of the Arab and Balkan area from the dissolved Ottoman empire could be tolerated because this area was not closely bound to the new political-institutional structure that was being created, the autonomy of a part of Anatolia with an Armenian majority would have meant an unbearable amputation from the already severely reduced national territory. This was all the more true in that the Armenian demands were supported by Russia, which was aiming at expanding its territory at Turkey’s expense. So the Armenian Christian community, which was traditionally considered faithful to the Sublime Gate, was perceived as a threat to the creation of a united Turkish state, a sort of fifth column at the service of the Russian enemy, the age-old antagonist of the Ottomans.

THE MASSACRE OF THE ARMENIAN CHRISTIANS

The chance to resolve the “Armenian menace” once and for all was offered to the nationalist government by the state of war into which Europe was plunged beginning in 1915. The repression against the Armenians was carried out both with regular troops and through the incitement of the Kurdish and Circassian tribes, the traditional enemies of the Christian communities, appealing to holy war, jihad, against the Christian infidels. The recourse to jihad and religious motivations on the part of the government of the Young Turks, which presented itself as secular and indifferent to questions of a religious nature, was purely instrumental and intended to foment the backlash of the Muslim populations against the Christians, now seen as the irreducible enemies of the new “pan-Turkish” order. Historians calculate that the uprising against the Armenians cost the lives of around one and a half million persons.

With the near indifference of the European chancelleries, which were preoccupied by the war underway and too overwhelmed to mend the system of alliances, one of the most tragic massacres of the twentieth century took place, which has long been ignored or downplayed. In Turkey, the process of constituting the national state was carried out through the dissolution of the old system of coexistence among the different religious and ethnic confessions that had characterized the long period of Ottoman domination. [...] A new state, purified from non-Turkish and non-Muslim elements, was created. [...] In addition to the Armenians, the Christians of the Greek Orthodox confession were also expelled. [...] After the end of the war between Greece and Turkey, in 1922, the Turkish government, having won the conflict, established within the peace treaties – with the agreement of the Western powers – that an exchange of populations take place. In this way, most of the Greek Orthodox had to leave Turkey, which they considered their land, and to move to Greek territory, where they did not even speak the language. It has been determined that 1,344,000 Greek Orthodox Christians were deported to Greek territory, and that 464,000 Greek Muslims were transferred to Turkey. [...]

THE SECULAR TURKEY OF KEMAL ATATÜRK

Modern Turkey defines itself as a secular republic, which sanctions in its constitution the equality of all citizens before the law “without distinction of opinion or religion,” and solemnly establishes “freedom of worship, religion, and thought.” Thus, observers affirm, Turkey is essentially different from the other Muslim states, in which the relationship between the political sphere and the religious sphere is so close that they become confused.

But in fact, Turkish secularism, in spite of the efforts made in the recent past to imitate the admired French model, has little in common with the liberal, Enlightenment-inspired doctrine of the so-called separation between Church and state in the public arena. In Islam, whether fundamentalist or radical or moderate, there is no distinction between the religious and the political arena; the two realities interpenetrate each other. [...] In the Christian world, on the contrary, there are two powers, that of God and that of Caesar; these can be associated or separate, they can be in harmony or in conflict, as has often been the case in history – but they are always two powers, distinct from each other and autonomous in their respective areas of competence.

For Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder of modern Turkey, secularizing the state did not mean distinguishing and separating the two powers’ areas of competence, according to the European model, but simply eliminating religion from the public realm and placing the organization of worship beneath state supervision. In fact, the ministry of religious affairs still directly administers 75,000 mosques in Turkey, employing 100,000 state functionaries and disposing of a budget larger than that of the ministry of industry. In short, the state of Turkey, like the other Muslim countries, has the last word in religious matters; it is, in fact, the government authority that limits and, sometimes, even represses some manifestations of a religious character that are held to be incompatible with state secularism: for example, by outlawing the headscarf for women who study in the universities or work in the public offices.

FROM ATATÜRK TO ERDOGAN: A MODEL OF MODERATE ISLAM

But Turkish Islam, expelled from the public sphere, survives and prospers in civil society: in the numerous Sufi confraternities and in the pro-Islamic political movements that have emerged in recent decades. This complex Islamic movement includes various tendencies within itself, both the fundamentalist tendency inspired by the radical movements present in almost all the Islamic countries that preach jihad against the “atheist and corrupt” West and want shari’a to be the law of the state, and the moderate tendency that is eager for dialogue with modernity and interested in forming friendly relationships with the Western world. [...]

The majority of the Turkish population claims the Sunni Muslim faith. In reality, the Alevis, who are a branch of the Alawi Shiites, comprise more than 20 percent of the population, and practice a moderate form of Islam, which some define as heretical and in any case is alien to the new fundamentalist tendencies. Their women are not veiled, they practice monogamy, they do not pray in mosques or go on pilgrimage to Mecca, do not observe the pious Muslim’s five daily periods of prayer, and for the fast of Ramadan they substitute the abstinence of Ashura. Politically, they are pro-Kemalist.

After the rigorous state secularism practiced by the Kemalist government, the years of the cold war saw a political climate more tolerant toward religion. In the face of the Kemalist government’s inability to confront communist and separatist Kurdish terrorism, after the coup d’etat in 1980 power was conferred, at the suggestion of the military and the United States, to a Sufi religious personage, Turgut Özal, who enjoyed a broad popular consensus. At that moment, the appeal to the common Sunni Muslim faith seemed the only way to keep Kurdish separatism under control. Özal’s premature death opened the way for a period of political and social instability, while the Refah party (whose name means “well-being“) was gaining support in the country. Refah was of Islamic inspiration, and was directed by Necmettin Erbakan. It ran in the political elections of 1995, obtaining a majority of the votes: it was the first time in Turkey that a party of strong religious inspiration won and was called to govern the country.

The new political approach followed by Erbakan – who was clearly anti-Kemalist in his internal policy and anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli in his foreign policy – did not have the favor of the country’s military élite. Also, great criticism was leveled against the new president’s support for the Arab fundamentalist movements, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood. The Kemalist soldiers reacted to Erbakan’s pro-Islamic politics with the “soft” coup d’etat of February 28, 1997. The head of government was forced against his own wishes to promulgate anti-religious laws, to outlaw his own party, and to issue repressive measures against opposition politicians. But the anti-religious campaign that followed the coup d’etat, like the arrest of the heads of the Islamic fundamentalist movements, did not have the support of the general Turkish population. Within the Islamic movements, meanwhile, two currents were making progress: that of the “old school” linked to Erbakan and connected to Arab fundamentalism, particularly Iranian, and that of the “young generation” headed by the charismatic mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been banned by the military-controlled judiciary under the accusation of wanting to subvert state secularism.

The Islamic movement, which enjoyed strong popular support, presented itself for the elections in 2002 with two parties, Erbakan’s party of Saadet (which means “happiness”) and Erdogan’s party of Kalkinma (which means “justice and development,” acronym AKP), which presented a political program in which shari’a was indicated, not as the direct source of state legislation – as the fundamentalists were asking – but simply as the exemplar of authentically Islamic and modern legislation. In foreign policy, the AKP supported the alliance with the United States, including in the fight against Islamic terrorism, and asked for the entry of Turkey into the European Union. Since its 34.2 percent of the votes had brought it a relative electoral majority, and an absolute majority of seats in parliament, it was called to govern the country. The AKP immediately set in motion a series of legislative reforms that permitted its leader, Erdogan, to return to political life and become the prime minister, in the very days when the parliament had to vote on the United States’ request for American troops to be authorized to pass over Turkish territory on the way to Iraq: a request that was rejected with a margin of only three votes. A few days later, Erdogan granted the Americans the use of airspace, though not for the passage of troops, and so began to patch up relations with Washington. From a Western point of view, the AKP constitutes an interesting experiment of a movement rooted in political Islam, a movement of Sufi inspiration, somewhat different from an Arab movement and also presenting itself as a democratic, pro-Western party. It is a party with which the Christian West, too often demonized by the Arab fundamentalists, can talk with in order to create, in the Islamic world, a common space of dialogue in the great topics of international politics.

According to the Islamic fundamentalists, the Turkish model constitutes the worst possible enemy. One gathers that this means that they want to choke it off, possibly by using bombings to create a climate of insecurity to induce to military to put an end to the experiment, as to others before it, with yet another coup d’etat. Erdogan’s model, in fact, risks making proselytes outside of Turkey, and for those who do not want dialogue between the Islamic world and the West, this is considered the worst evil. This goes to show that grouping every form of political Islam, from Erdogan to Bin Laden, in the same category of political interpretation is a mistaken approach, which in the end plays into the hands of the terrorists, those who work for the ill-starred “clash of civilizations.”

CATHOLICS IN TURKEY AND THE LACK OF RELGIOUS LIBERTY

Turkey asked to enter the European Community for the first time in 1987, declaring that it shared the values of the West, fully accepted the principles of political and economic liberalism, and wanted to become a bridge between the Islamic world and the Western world. In recent years, it has worked to adjust its internal legislation to the fundamental principles sanctioned by the international community in matters of human rights and the protection of minorities. Much has been done in this direction, but according to some observers much still remains to be done, considering that European culture and society today are very sensitive in these areas. In any case, since 2005 Turkey has been an official candidate – thanks to support from some states, Italy first among them – to enter the European Union. But this should happen a long time from now (a span of 10 years is spoken of) and after a series of demanding exams administered by states of the Union on the candidate state’s compliance with requests on various important fronts of a juridical, political, economic, and social character.

One of the most controversial aspects regards the protection of religious minorities, in particular of the Christians who live in the country, numbering around 150,000, who feel discriminated against and are discriminated against in terms of their rights, and are often threatened by the fanaticism of fundamentalists.

In fact, the killing of Italian priest Fr. Andrea Santoro, apparently for religious motives, by a young Turk on February 5, 2006, while Santoro was praying in his little church on the outskirts of Trabzon, and the death threats against some other Catholic priests who carry out their ministry in Turkey, pose in a dramatic manner the problem of the safeguarding of religious freedom in an Islamic country that claims to be pro-Western, to respect the fundamental rights of the person and, to intend to share all of Europe’s aspects of public life.

Even if Turkey recognizes religious liberty as one of the foundations of the secular state, in fact for the non-Muslim religious minorities the exercise of this liberty is placed under restrictions and conditions. On the basis of the July 24, 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, only the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish religious communities are recognized by the state as “permitted confessions” and, for this reason, enjoy a particular juridical status, while the other Christian confessions, including the Catholic one, are made the object of discrimination and subjected to weighty limitations in the exercise of public worship.

As for the Treaty, it must be said that its entire third section is dedicated to the “protection of minorities,” and that its dispositions were guaranteed not only by the signatory states, but also by the League of Nations. Articles 37 and 45, in particular, guarantee the full religious freedom of the members of the “non-Muslim minorities.” But the Turkish governments have always interpreted this article in a restrictive fashion; in effect, following the Treaty they recognize as religious minorities only the ones that were officially recognized as such at the time of the Ottoman empire, or the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox, and the Jews. So the Turkish republic considers the other religious minorities (Chaldean, Syrian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Latin, Protestant) as “foreign” and, therefore, not protected by the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. This interpretation has been strongly contested, not only by the representatives of the excluded religious communities, but also by international bodies such as the United Nations commission for human rights.

The Catholic Church in Turkey is composed of a small community of around 40,000 faithful, and the Latin rite has three ecclesiastical districts: the archdiocese of Smyrna (with around 1,350 faithful), the apostolic vicariate of Istanbul (with 15,000 faithful), and the apostolic vicariate of Anatolia (with 4,550 faithful). To these must be added the Eastern-rite communities: the archdiocese of Istanbul for the Armenian Catholics (with 3,670 faithful) and of Diarbekir for the Caldeans (with 5,993 faithful), and the apostolic vicariate of the Syrian Catholics (with 2,155 faithful). These are often dispersed communities spread out over a wide territory; understandably, this situation makes it difficult to establish a common pastoral strategy among the priests, religious, and bishops. This represents an element of weakness for the small, but vital, Turkish Catholic community. As a confession not recognized by the state, the Catholic Church is under limitations, especially in the exercise of pastoral ministry, and thus it is an object of discrimination. The Catholic structures – dioceses, parishes, religious institutes – do not enjoy full legal recognition, so its religious personnel are not counted among the ministers of worship, and those not of Turkish nationality must submit themselves to certain procedures in order to obtain a residency permit. Furthermore, the Catholics are not permitted to build new churches or structures for the formation of the clergy: this makes the pastors’ work for the care of souls difficult, and above all it penalizes the Turkish Catholic communities, which are frequently exposed to intolerance and violence from the Islamic fundamentalists, who consider them traitors and spies for the West. One certainly cannot speak of a persecution of the Catholics, but undoubtedly their situation is precarious, so much so that a growing number of Christians are forced to leave Turkey.

THE REQUESTS OF THE HOLY SEE

In recent years the Holy See has repeatedly lodged protests with the Turkish government, condemning the acts of discrimination against Catholics and other Christian minorities and asking for the full implementation of the principle of religious freedom, as sanctioned in international conventions. The foreign minister, for example, has stated that in Turkey all the religious communities enjoy the same rights under the law, and that the Holy See cannot ask for special treatment for Catholics. The best reply to such assertions is contained in the final report for the year 2005, presented last November to the European Commission (which repeats what is contained in the report presented the previous year), where it is clearly stated that in Turkey “the non-Muslim religious communities lack any sort of legal personhood,” suffer from restrictions in the area of private property, undergo interference in the administration of their foundations, and are prevented from forming their own clergy locally.

Unfortunately, the reforms put in motion, or simply announced, in view of Turkey’s entry to the European Union do not mention the full implementation of the principle of freedom of religion – as if there were nothing worthy of notice on this point – but limit themselves to simply recognizing the right of all religious confessions to administer their own foundations. One gets the impression that, in its negotiations with the government of Ankara, Europe has been too hesitant, for political reasons, in the area of religious freedom and minority rights. But if Turkey intends to enter with full rights and recognition into Europe, it must give the international community serious guarantees of reliability on this delicate point for dialogue and respect among different cultures and religious faiths, because, as both remote and recent history demonstrate, it is by the yardstick of tolerance, religious liberty, and respect for minorities that a country’s effective democracy is measured, and all the more so when Turkey asserts publicly that it wants to act as a bridge between the Islamic world, which has seen a widespread religious renewal in these years, and the Western world, whose roots, whatever the secularists may say, are profoundly Christian.

As for the Catholic Church, this does not ask the Turkish government for any particular privilege, but simply for the recognition of its rights, in order to carry out its ministry on behalf of Turkish Catholics. In this regard, let’s remember the words that John Paul II addressed to the Turkish ambassador on December 17, 2001: “Catholics are a small minority in Turkey. They see no contradiction between being Catholic and being Turkish, and await [...] the recognition of the Church’s legal status. They trust that in their homeland they will continue to find that respect for minorities that constitutes ‘the cornerstone of social harmony and the touchstone of the civil maturity attained by a country and its institutions.’ Turkey can also act as a bridge, clearly demonstrating that its legitimate concerns for national unity are not in conflict with respect for the rights of individuals and minorities.” These enlightened words still retain all of their timeliness and all of their value today.

__________

One footnote explains the Vatican’s protests with the Turkish government as follows:

“The points brought up by the Holy See include the following:

a) the dioceses, parishes, and religious institutions of the Catholic minority do not enjoy legal recognition on the part of the state;

b) their leaders – bishops, parish priests, religious superiors – and their religious personnel are not recognized as ministers of worship;

c) their rights of property ownership – churches, convents, schools, hospitals – are not recognized as such, but are only registered as private property or private foundations, so that when the persons or foundations that own them pass away, having no successors, the property is confiscated by the public treasury;

d) the unrecognized minorities cannot build new places of worship, and cannot found confessional schools or seminaries for the formation of the clergy;

e) foreign religious personnel are subjected to particular procedures in order to obtain a residency permit, which is valid for only one year, when on the contrary the other residents coming from European countries receive a residency permit for three to five years.”

__________

As for the reforms already introduced by the Turkish government in order to be admitted into the European Union, another footnote in the article says:

“The adoption of important legislative reforms on the part of the Turkish parliament, which are likely to favor greater respect for human rights in the near future, has brought great satisfaction to many of the partners of the European Union. The abolition of the death penalty, the expansion of freedom of opinion, expression, and association, and the use of the traditional language are measures that cannot help but bring joy to all those who have at heart the good of the human person and the harmonious coexistence of all within society. But some, and the Holy See in particular, have not failed to note the lack of references to religious liberty, a freedom recognized by all as a fundamental right of the human person.”

__________

A link to the magazine of the Rome Jesuits in which the article was printed:

> “La Civiltà Cattolica”

Dennis Prager has an American woman on right now who lives in Turkey.

Blessed Are the Meek: The Life and Martyrdom of a Priest on Mission in Turkey

Catholic Ping - Please freepmail me if you want on/off this list

I am not a Catholic but I do fear for the mans' safety.

Nothing in there about returning the Hagia Sofia...

Can you possibly summarize their comments once the conversation is ended? Thank you so much!

Religious freedom for christians, it would seem, carries more weight than the Hagia Sofia.

I sure hope he rules that turkey is OK during Lent!

What did she have to say?

That was my thought too.

Nothing in there about returning the Hagia Sofia...

Are you sure we'd want it back? I've been there several times. It would need a lot of work. In its present status as a museum, it's open to Christians, and does not function as a mosque. On one of my visits, the touring party included a husband and wife from Saudi Arabia (I think she was a woman; it was hard to tell given the tent she was wearing). The Saudi man asked the guide if it would be possible for him to pray there. The guide told him no, he should wait until we reached the Blue Mosque.

I doubt a return to either the Latin or one of the Orthodox rites would be a real improvement from the Christian standpoint.

Even if the Hagia Sophia (Church of the Holy Wisdom) were nothing more than a pile of rocks, we Orthodox would alwyas want it back, no matter the expense to fix it. It was after all the largest Christian church in the world for a thousand year, and we will want it back from now until the end of the world!

PS. The Orthodox would have had it returned to function as our church -- and all the evils of World War I, Communism, Nazism, World War II, and everything attendant to those woudl have been avoided -- if the British Empire hadn't threatened war against the Christian empire of Russia in 1878, when Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, etc was on the verge of enabling the Greeks to truiumph over the Turks, the Islamic terrorists of those times.

Since its 34.2 percent of the votes had brought it a relative electoral majority, and an absolute majority of seats in parliament, it was called to govern the country.

What? What kind of electoral system gives a party with 1/3 of the vote more than 50% of the seats in the legislature?

I would hope if the Pope visits Turkey in November that he has a dialog with the leaders about opening up the area where the ARK is buried in ice. No exploration of the mountain has been authorized by Turkish authorities. I think it will really be a savoring moment when the Ark is revealed and atheists will have to question their beliefs.

"What? What kind of electoral system gives a party with 1/3 of the vote more than 50% of the seats in the legislature?"

Probably a system like our electoral college.

Even if the Hagia Sophia (Church of the Holy Wisdom) were nothing more than a pile of rocks, we Orthodox would alwyas want it back.

So would the Byzantines.

The Brits weren't about to let the Russians control the Straits and the Russians were crazy if they thought that was going to happen without war. Threat to Britain's trade routes to India, don't you know. The Russians brought it on themselves by not thinking ahead.
As to all the troubles of the Twentieth Century being avoided, you don't know that, and, considering humankind's ability to make messes, you can be sure that there would have been entirely new messes to replace any that were avoided.
Have you considered sending missionaries to Turkey to convert them to Christianity? Success in that would restore all of Turkey to Christianity, not just one church.
Wars of conquest are just so 19th Century.

I would hope if the Pope visits Turkey in November that he has a dialog with the leaders about opening up the area where the ARK is buried in ice

Thanks for mentioning that. In my attempt to be flippant, I did not even think of that. And what an important item it is! That is one of my most oft-repeated prayers: finding the Ark. The other is chariot parts on the bottom of the Red Sea. Again, thanks.

I can't recall her name, nor the name of her book as I was rather late to the hour myself, and then I was in and out. She's quite young...19 or 20. But there seemed a range of agreement between the two relative to the deterioration of Christianity and political aimlessness in Europe, yet some hope for Islam from those relative moderates in Turkey itself and those striving for democracy in Iraq.

Sorry I couldn't have been more useful and accomodating.

What? What kind of electoral system gives a party with 1/3 of the vote more than 50% of the seats in the legislature?<.i>

The Turks have a "proportional representation" system. Instead of a single candidate from each party in an electoral district, each party puts up a ranked slate of candidates equal to the number to be elected from that district. Suppose a party gets 30% of the vote. They the top 30% of their slate (appropriately rounded) is elected to Parliament. Parties that don't get enough votes to elect even one candidate from their slate are out of luck. The end result is that parties that get lots of votes get more than their "share" of members of Parliament, while parties at the bottom drop out.

One of the ill effects of this system is that the members of Parliament owe their loyalty to the party bosses who put them on the slate, not to the people in their district.