Skip to comments.Document: Saddam Ordered Biological And Radiation Test on Presidential Sites Attacked by US in 1998
Posted on 06/21/2006 2:17:48 PM PDT by jveritas
click here to read article
Isn't that amazing? I thought I was mishearing when those talking points began their disbursement among the Dem pundits this evening. It's simply incredible how stupid that argument is.
Hannity intereviewed Whoopie tonight (heaven only knows why, and I turned it off quickly), and asked her about the WOT. She said that it's making her feel unhappy because we haven't found Bin Laden.
Hmmmm, let me get this straight; millions of people in two countries have been liberated from torturous dictators, they have a chance at a democratic country, our troops have been awesome, there is a new constitution and government in Iraq and their first election, we've found WMDs, kids are back in school and women are getting more rights, we've killed Al Zarqawi and many of the top terrorists, but Whoopy is unhappy because we have't yet got one guy.
The selfish witch is certainly hard to please
Hello and Good Work as always, JVeritas
I have downloaded time to time these Pentagon files and i noticed that one file is missing. It is really gone.
Procedures on How to Make Nitrostarch
Search Results for keyword (ISGZ-2004-600071-ELC.PDF) - 0 records
According to an old HTML-code it was there. I realize this file gives instructions for explosive but more powerful instructions can everybody find everywhere in english.
It would be nice to collect any hard-to-find files on one place, maybe someone downloaded it fast enough until it was gone?
By the way, bear with my english. And greetings from Finland!
Thanks very much for your work. Welcome aboard and thanks to you also, Finnish lurker.
Don't worry, I'm sure the National Archives will ensure that they are kept intact. I mean, it's not like someone could go in there and destroy documents!
President Clinton has also speculated that his bombings of Iraq destroyed Saddam's WMDs. Guess Saddam and co. thought that was a possibility at the time.
Thanks for the info.
Thanks for the info.
Thank you very much for all your support. I will try to find this document that posted.
PS: Your English is excellent :)
What do you expect from those hate filled traitors; that will be their normal reaction.
The FMSO website documents contain much more than 100 GB. I think if you to help downloading some of the documents; it will be a good idea if you download document that pertain to the following KEYORDS Iraqi Intelligence Service or IIS, Iraqi Military Industrialization Committee or MIC, AL Rashid Company, Special Security Organization or SSO, Republican Guard or RG. On the FMSO website you can enter a Keyord in the search box like Intelligence and you get almost every document pertaining to the Iraqi intelligence service. Please do not overwhelm yourself with the downloading, you may do it whenever you have free time. Thank you very much for all your help.
Thanks for the information regarding Depleted Uranium, this will clarify some issues here.
Do I remember a tunnel entrance to a lab being under a palace?
Do you remember which one if my recall is correct?
I will try to look it up. The Saddam Presidential Palaces were in the news a lot in 1997 and 1998 when Saddam just refused to have UN inspectors search it and he decided to be bombed and not let the UN inspectors search it!
Well before Operation Desert Storm or the U.N. inspections that followed it, Iraq had already begun to build chemical weapons. After launching a research effort in the 1970s, Iraq was able to use chemical weapons in its war against Iran and to kill large numbers of its own Kurdish population in the 1980s. During the first Gulf War, there were fears that Iraq would launch chemical-tipped missiles at its neighbors, particularly Israel, but Iraq refrained for fear of U.S. retaliation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition troops again feared they might be hit with chemical weapons, though this did not come to pass.
By 1991, the United Nations had established its Special Commission (UNSCOM) and charged it with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmless "all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
By the time UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998, it had eliminated a large portion of Iraq's chemical weapon potential. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction or incapacitation of more than 88,000 filled or unfilled chemical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized or bulk chemical agents, some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals, some 980 pieces of key production equipment, and some 300 pieces of analytical equipment. Notwithstanding these extraordinary achievements, there remained important uncertainties regarding Iraq's holdings of chemical weapons, their precursors, and munitions.
I. Chemical Agents
CS and Mustard Gases
After a successful research effort in the 1970s, Iraq began producing tear gas and mustard gas in the early 1980s. Tear gas is not lethal; its chief use is riot control. It causes pain to the eyes and nose, and uncontrollable coughing. Iraq first produced several tons of CS tear gas at its Salman Pak site, and by the early 1980s began military-scale production at the al-Muthanna State Establishment.
Iraq also began to produce sulphur mustard blister gas (HD) in the early 1980s, and by 1983 was able to employ it in chemical munitions against Iran. The primary effect of mustard gas is skin and eye blistering and lung irritation. Heavy exposure to an aerosol of mustard gas causes the lungs to fill with fluid and "drown" the victim. Mustard gas has a low death rate; generally only 2 to 3 percent of its victims perish.
Iraq initially told UNSCOM that 3,080 tons of mustard gas had been produced, but in 1995 Iraq reduced this amount to 2,850 tons. UNSCOM found Iraq's mustard gas to be at least 80% pure and determined that it could be stored for long periods of time, both in bulk and in weaponized form. In its distilled form, mustard gas has a long life, and can be stockpiled for decades. It is relatively easy to produce and load into munitions. Iraq admits filling some 550 artillery shells with mustard gas but says it misplaced them shortly after the first Gulf War.
Nerve Gas: Sarin and Tabun
Iraq moved up to producing the nerve gases sarin (GB) and tabun (GA) in 1984. These gases are highly toxic compounds that can penetrate the body either through contact with skin or eyes, or by inhalation. Just a few droplets will kill within minutes if inhaled or within hours if absorbed through the skin. The initial effects depend on the amount of contact with the agent and are almost immediate. Chemical nerve agents tend to have little or no incubation or latent period in the body. These agents act by attacking the central nervous system, causing rapid paralysis, respiratory failure and death by asphyxiation.
According to Iraq, the sarin and tabun it first produced was of poor quality. It was unstable, and the effectiveness of the agents diminished quickly after production. Iraq claimed that its production methods were later changed to eliminate the stabilization problem. Iraq argued that the tabun it produced was of such poor quality that Iraq turned its research, development and production effort to prolonging the viability of sarin instead.
Iraq adopted the "binary" method of weaponization, in which the components of sarin gas are stored separately until use, when they are mixed. The components of sarin are DF 2 and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isoproponal. Iraq manufactured DF 2 with a purity of 95%, and imported alcohols of 100% purity, so the detonation of its munitions could be expected to yield relatively pure sarin.
At first, Iraq told UNSCOM that it had produced an estimated 250 tons of tabun and 812 tons of sarin. In 1995, Iraq changed its estimates and reported it had produced only 210 tons of tabun and 790 tons of sarin. Thus, it is still uncertain how much tabun and sarin Iraq actually manufactured.
Nerve Gas: VX
Iraq appears to have turned its research efforts toward VX nerve gas in 1985. VX is the most toxic of all known chemical warfare agents. Its effects on the body are similar to those of sarin and tabun, paralyzing the nervous system and causing convulsions and rapid death when contact occurs. A very small amount on the skin (10 milligrams) is enough to kill a man. VX is an oily liquid that may persist in the environment for weeks or longer, thereby posing a major skin absorption risk.
Iraq admitted that it had six or seven research teams working on VX, and production is known to have taken place in 1987-88 and possibly until 1990. A team of U.N. experts concluded that there was clear evidence that Iraq had the capability to produce the agent because the Muthanna State Establishment, as early as 1984, had done industrial scale organophosphorous synthesis, a process much more difficult than that required to produce VX. One plant, in Dhia'a, was reconfigured to produce necessary components for VX by 1988. Iraq also admitted producing and procuring vast amounts of precursor agents for VX, including 58 tons of the chemical choline, a key VX ingredient. Iraq claimed that nearly all of its precursors had been destroyed by aerial bombing during the first Gulf War, and that what remained was secretly destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNSCOM estimated that by 1991, Iraq could have produced between 50 and 100 tons of VX gas. By 1998, UNSCOM estimated that Iraq was capable of producing 200 tons. Iraq at first told UNSCOM that it had only produced 240 kilograms of VX, but in 1996 admitted that it had produced 3.9 tons. Iraq provided documents stating that 2.4 tons of VX were produced in 1988 and the remainder in 1990. Iraq explained this low volume by claiming that it had scaled-up all its chemical weapons processes at al-Muthanna except VX, a claim UNSCOM rejected as incompatible with Iraq's massive R&D efforts. Iraq also claimed that it later abandoned the VX project because the gas was of poor quality and was unstable. Iraq never backed up its claims with verifiable evidence, so the total quantity of VX that Iraq produced is not known.
Total Chemical Agent Produced
Iraq claimed that its chemical weapons program yielded a total of 3,859 tons of useable agents. Iraq insisted that it only weaponized 3,315 tons and consumed 80% of those weaponized agents during the war with Iran. The true extent of Iraq's production and holdings of chemical agents has never been fully verified.
Chemicals that serve as ingredients for making chemical weapon agents are known as "precursors." In the early stages of its chemical weapon program Iraq imported the necessary precursors. However, from 1986 to 1990, Iraq constructed and operated numerous plants and facilities (such as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3) for producing precursors on its own. Iraq told UNSCOM that during Iraq's entire chemical weapon program, which lasted from the mid-1970s through at least 1991, it produced and procured 20,150 tons of key precursor chemicals. Of that amount, Iraq claimed to have used 14,500 tons to produce chemical agents or other key precursor chemicals, leaving 5,650 tons of precursors unaccounted for. However, Iraq also claimed that only 3,915 tons of precursor agents remained inside the country as of January 1991, a noticeable discrepancy. Of that 3,915 tons, a total of 2,850 tons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and the rest was said by Iraq to have been destroyed during the first Gulf War or destroyed by Iraq unilaterally.
After a chemical warfare agent is produced, it is loaded into a munition so that it can be fired at an adversary. This step is called weaponization.
Tear Gas and Mustard Gas
Iraq admitted that it deployed CS tear gas in both RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades and in 82mm and 120mm mortar shells. CS was also used to fill 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs. In addition, Iraq admitted that it used both 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs for mustard gas deployment, as well as 155mm artillery shells. Documentary evidence was found showing that Iraq also filled DB-2 aerial bombs with mustard gas, although Iraq claims that it filled only a few bombs for testing purposes. UNSCOM managed to destroy 12,792 of the 13,000 155mm artillery shells filled with mustard gas that Iraq had declared as remaining after the first Gulf War ended; however, Iraq also declared that it had lost 550 of these shells. UNSCOM was never provided with any substantial evidence to corroborate this claim. A few such shells were destroyed by subsequent inspectors in 2002-2003, but many were still unaccounted for after the second Gulf War.
Iraq filled thousands of munitions with sarin or its binary components. These included 122mm rockets, DB-2 and R-400 aerial bombs, and thirty special warheads for the domestically produced Al-Hussein missile (a SCUD variant). The Al-Hussein warheads were discovered and subsequently destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq also claimed that it unilaterally destroyed 45 additional special warheads that were filled with chemical agents, including binary sarin components.
Iraq denied ever having weaponized VX. In June 1998, however, UNSCOM found evidence of VX contamination on fragments of missile warheads. Iraq never provided an adequate explanation for this evidence, insisting instead that weaponization never occurred. Iraq did admit filling three aerial bombs and one 122mm rocket warhead with VX, but claimed that this was only for storage and corrosion tests. Iraq said that the tests were failures due to the low purity and poor stability of the gas. U.N. experts concluded, however, that weaponization of VX presented no technical difficulty for Iraq and may have been done.
Iraq declared to UNSCOM that at one time it held over 200,000 special munitions, either filled or unfilled, specifically designed for chemical or biological weapons. These included grenades, mortar shells, aerial bombs, artillery shells, rockets and missile warheads. Of those, Iraq claimed that it used or disposed of approximately 100,000 munitions filled with chemical weapons during the period of its war with Iran, which ended in 1988. With regard to its holdings as of January 1991, Iraq asserted that 127,941 filled and unfilled special munitions remained in the country. During the first Gulf War -- according to Iraq -- 41,998 munitions were destroyed by Allied bombing, and Iraq also said that it unilaterally destroyed 29,662 munitions after the first Gulf War. The remaining 56,281 special munitions were either destroyed or accounted for under UNSCOM supervision.
Iraq gained the ability to manufacture R-400 and DB-2 aerial bombs, chemical containers for 122mm rockets, and Al-Hussein missile warheads. Iraq had to import all other munition shells, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq also had the ability to empty conventional artillery shells and aerial bombs and refill them with chemical agents. Iraq had a wide array of munitions specially designed for chemical use, and some of them were used for more than one chemical agent.
Nose cone for chemical munitions
An Iraqi worker climbs into a chemical agent missile nose cone to open it for sample-taking
The role of the military in Iraq's chemical weapons program remained a secret. Iraq never disclosed any information to UNSCOM concerning deployment, military requirements, firing or bombing tables, field manuals on the use of chemical weapons, or the chain of command for chemical weapons. According to Iraq, there were never any field manuals specifically for chemical weapons, nor were any specific military units trained to use them. Iraq said responsibility for the planning of combat use for chemical weapons was handled at the Muthanna State Establishment by a special tactical group, but refused to provide any further information.
IV. Manufacturing Plants and Equipment
Although Iraq developed and produced chemical weapons at several secret locations, the main work was done at the Al-Muthanna State Establishment (MSE). It was the principal manufacturing site for both agents and munitions. It also served as a storehouse for precursor chemicals, filled chemical munitions and warfare agents in bulk. The MSE consisted of the Al Muthanna production facility, three precursor production sites at Al Fallujah, and munition stores at Muhammediyat. The Samarra site, also part of the MSE, was the prime production facility for Iraqi mustard gas and nerve agents.
Iraq also produced chemical munitions at a large complex known as Al Taji. UNSCOM found at Taji 6,000 empty canisters designed to be filled with chemical weapons for use in 122mm rockets.
In addition to its work on chemical agents and munitions, UNSCOM attempted to find and destroy hundreds of pieces of production equipment. Iraq admitted that 553 pieces of equipment located at 15 production plants had either made chemical precursors, agents or munitions or had been bought for that purpose. Nearly all of the equipment came from foreign companies. Most of it was at the MSE, including the facilities at Al-Fallujah. UNSCOM, in accounting for this equipment, reported that it was destroyed either as a result of the first Gulf War or under UNSCOM supervision. UNSCOM also destroyed an additional 197 pieces of glass production equipment that MSE had procured.
V. The Situation Prior to the Second Gulf War
After UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, U.S.-led forces bombed many sites believed to be chemical weapon plants. After the bombing, reports emerged that Iraq had rebuilt many of those sites, and that the sites appeared to be operating. It was inferred that Iraq had resumed its production of chemical weapons, and was adding new elements to the portion of its previous stockpile that had never been accounted for. No evidence confirming these inferences has emerged to date.
I've heard about that which you mentioned, regarding the DU dust itself being much more dangerous than the low levels of radiation it puts off.
However, it must be noted that DU is about 90% denser than lead, so even the dust settles very quickly and is not a threat unless it is stirred up.
But I agree with you...I would not want to be the guy on clean up duty!
To The Respected Mr. Health Minister
Following our leeter numbered (5372) on 18/12/1998 an agreement was obtained for the following:
1. Re- Test the sites after the removal of debris.
2. Limit a period of two weeks to a month to take Biological Samples from the sites and return to the periodic testing and in a normal fashion later on.
3. Study the subject of AGM 186 missiles that contain ready round shrapnels and that is used for mass destruction through the targeting of human forces.
III. IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES
Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. For this reason, we have used the same shorthand in this paper. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.
All of Iraq's Scuds used kerosene as the fuel and some form of red fuming nitric acid, probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) as the oxidizer. Iraq told the United Nations Special Commission inspectors after the war that they had not experimented with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a more powerful (and toxic) fuel than kerosene, for their Scuds, which would require engine redesign. However, inspectors subsequently uncovered evidence that Iraq did experiment with UDMH, but this investigation found no evidence that Iraq switched to UDMH during the Gulf War.
To extend the Scud's range, Iraq cut Scud Bs apart and inserted airframe sections from these missiles into other Scud Bs to increase the capacities of the fuel and oxidizer tanks from about 8,700 pounds to about 11,000 pounds. Iraq also reduced warhead weight from 2,200 pounds to less than 1,100 pounds.
IV. SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The evidence clearly shows that Saddam Hussein eventually intended to field operational Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads, and he committed substantial resources to that end. However, did Iraq successfully achieve that goal by the time of Operation Desert Storm?
According to an intelligence source, the Al Hussein missile could carry either chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) warheads. Iraq could mount a biological agent warhead on the Al Abbas version of the Scud. This source reported Iraq planned to use cholera for biological warfare against targets in the Gulf region (but weaponization of cholera could not be verified later).
Intelligence agencies may have put less emphasis on Scuds as a biological threat, but they considered that threat real. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed:
We have no information to confirm that Iraq has developed or manufactured BW warheads for its ballistic missiles. However, Iraq has the ability to weaponize its BW agents'including anthrax spores'and we believe it is well within Iraq's technical capabilities to produce BW warheads for its Scud missiles'. It probably would take only one BW warhead to neutralize any one given target. Our analysis indicates that the Al Husayn [alternate spelling], carrying about 100 kilograms (KG) of dried anthrax spores, would theoretically produce a maximum area of lethal contamination of 1,600 square kilometers [579 square miles]. That would be a dispersion area about 90 KM long and 15 KM wide at the widest point [56 by 9 miles]. Other of Iraq's BW agents would be equally potent: Botulinus toxin would produce a maximum lethal area of contamination of about 21 square kilometers [8 square miles] and anthrax spores in solution would produce an area of about 110 square kilometers [42 square miles].' Iraq only needs a few BW-tipped missiles in its stockpile to cause significant casualties.
Another CIA document stated:
If Saddam concluded his personal position was becoming hopeless, this could convince him to use biological weapons to shock the Coalition into a cease-fire. In such a situation, the use of anthrax against a coalition military installation or a major Saudi oil facility might seem an attractive option.' Iraq is almost certain to use chemical weapons tactically to avoid serious battlefield defeats.
V. IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM
B. Total Scud Firing Incidents
At one of our veterans' outreach programs in 1998, a veteran questioned the number of Scud missiles fired against Coalition forces during the Gulf War. He based his opinions on an internal working document produced by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) and provided by that Department of Defense organization to some veterans. The listing had 179 incident entries totaling 344 missiles. A junior officer of the Center had compiled a list of Scud launch information from hundreds of operational reports, many with inconsistent data. Not knowing which accounts were correct, this officer included all versions of what happened. CURR designed the list to serve as a reference for responding to veterans' communications regarding Scud incidents at particular times. Our research and analysis confirmed that Iraq fired 46 Scuds into the KTO.
2. Details on Selected Incidents
a. January 20th Attack on Dhahran (Event 1 in Table 3)
Shortly before 10 PM on January 20th, Iraq fired the first two Scuds at the Dhahran area. One report noted that Patriot units fired five missiles at three (rather than the actual two) Scuds and that M8 chemical agent alarms went off, but subsequent tests proved negative. A separate United States Air Force unit at Dhahran logged an entry at 9:50 PM noting multiple explosions. Checks revealed that none of that unit's chemical agent detectors had alarmed. A later entry reported a possible impact near a barracks and the United States Army Component United States Central Command headquarters as well as near a Saudi police camp and the port area. Subsequent investigation turned up no building damage, casualties, or unexploded ordnance. A witness to the January 20th attack remembered that a Patriot battery took out the Scuds near a pier in Dhahran and that everybody went to MOPP Level 4 (full chemical protection ' see glossary at Tab A) for about six or seven hours while tests and assessments were made. He did not know the test results, but an "all clear" was sounded permitting a termination of the chemical alert. A chemical company soldier remembered witnessing repeated M8A1 chemical agent alarms and positive M256 chemical detection kit tests the first night of Scud attacks in the Dhahran area and recalls remaining in MOPP Level 4 for seven hours. He believed no one had chemical agent symptoms.
b. January 22nd Attack on Dhahran (Event 4 in Table 3)
Shortly after 7:00 AM on January 22nd, Iraq fired three Scuds toward Dhahran. The first two flew outside of the Patriots' defended area with at least one landing in the desert about 50 miles west of town. The other reportedly went down in Gulf waters north of Qatar. Most unclassified sources credit Patriots with intercepting the third Scud. Debris reportedly struck on a Dhahran Air Base runway just as an aircraft took off to the south, but the aircraft apparently escaped damage. Most pieces of debris were described as small (less than 3 inches), but something falling out of the sky caused a crater 23 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep on the air base. All but one field test indicated no presence of chemical warfare agent. In that one positive chemical warfare agent test, a chemical agent monitor registered a very low concentration on the nerve agent scale. Subsequent testing at that location proved negative. A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle (see glossary at Tab A) took samples from the crater area for additional testing, but we found no specific results of any Fox tests.
Alternative reporting included a fourth Scud that appeared in some chronologies at this time as a target for two Patriot launches. However, this track represented a false target (radar interference ' see Section VI.B). One summary suggested that Patriot units fired two missiles at each of three Scuds.
c. February 16th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3)
Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16th. The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud. The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile's impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier. Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.
Figure 4. Map of Jubayl harbor Scud impact
One witness recalls hearing a loud explosion and seeing white-hot objects falling. The Scud caused no casualties or damage, but it exuded a blue, green, and yellow substance and bubbled a strong-smelling gas for some time (probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid ' see Section VII). United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialists eventually recovered the missile in parts using divers, flotation bags, and a crane. Test results performed on this Scud determined that it did not have a chemical or biological warhead. Figure 5 shows the recovered high explosive warhead.
Figure 5. Recovered Scud warhead
d. February 25th Attack on Dhahran (Event 10 in Table 3)
Iraq launched one Scud toward Dhahran early in the evening of February 25th. One Patriot battery on Dhahran airfield was not operational and another nearby did not track the Scud, apparently because of a software problem. The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The strong explosion and resulting fire killed 28 United States soldiers from the 475th Quartermaster Group (a United States Army Reserve unit) and injured 100, about half of them seriously. According to one source, most of the injured suffered burns. Initially, some 40 soldiers were believed missing. Most of the soldiers in the warehouse had just arrived and had not completely processed into their units. This, plus the presence of their personnel files and computer records in the same devastated warehouse, played havoc with the ability to account for people. Helicopters eventually evacuated 70 to 100 soldiers to six hospitals including five Saudi facilities. This single incident caused more combat casualties than any other in Operation Desert Storm.
Some documentation includes alternative details to this horrific event. One message stated that this incident involved three confirmed launches (one against Dhahran, one against nearby King Fahd Airport and one against Qatar). A press briefing attributed the lack of Patriot engagement to a combination of the warehouse location (housing) and debris trajectory from a disintegrating Scud. The media quoted another senior officer as explaining that "because it [the Scud] had gone into a tumble ' it wasn't within the parameters of where it would be attacked by our missile defense system."
See Link for more details on other scud incidents.
VII. SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS
As Israeli officials pointed out to us, when reentering Scuds were intercepted or broke up on their own, they sometimes released a yellow-to-reddish-to-brownish cloud of the Scud's residual propellant oxidizer. People on the ground observing these clouds voiced concerns that the airborne releases involved chemical warfare agent. Incoming Al Hussein missiles contained about 300 pounds of residual oxidizer and 100 pounds of fuel. The oxidizer and accompanying oxides of nitrogen were dangerous in their own right and caused a range of symptoms in people exposed on the ground.
Iraq's Scud oxidizer, inhibited red nitric acid (IRFNA), can cause deep and painful burns on the skin or in the lungs. When inhaled, the oxidizer and its nitrogen oxide decomposition products can produce immediate or delayed symptoms including throat dryness, cough, headache, dizziness, anxiety, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, labored breathing, inflammation of the lungs, choking, fluid build-up in the lungs, and suffocation, depending on the extent of exposure. In interviews with our investigators, or during testimony before government panels, Gulf War veterans reported a variety of symptoms consistent with oxidizer exposure. Extracted from their accounts, these symptoms included tearing eyes, runny noses, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sleeplessness, headaches, and blurred vision. Kerosene, the fuel component of Scud propellants also escaped during breakups. Kerosene is not particularly toxic, even after acute exposure, and is used, for example, as barbecue lighter fluid and in jet fuels.
Readers wanting additional information on Scud oxidizer should consult our information paper on IRFNA.
IX. THE RESIDUAL THREAT
The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised. However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:
In 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that Iraq retained "perhaps hundreds" of missiles, and his successor estimated the residual force at 100-200 missiles.
Israeli sources indicated Iraq may have as many as 100 Scuds of all versions.
In 1995, Iraq eventually admitted to the United Nations Special Commission that in 1987 it had begun a full-scale program to indigenously manufacture Al Hussein Scuds largely from scratch and had established specialized factories for this purpose. Iraq planned eventually to produce 1,000 missiles, but it claimed that by January 1991 they had failed to produce a single operational missile.
In mid-1996, a general officer defector from Iraq said that he believed Saddam Hussein had retained some 40 Scud-type missiles.
By 1996, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-like missiles indigenously that inspectors could not locate. After UNSCOM unwillingly withdrew from Iraq in 1998, some estimated that Iraq could resume production of Al Hussein missiles within one year.
According to a United States government white paper in 1998, Iraq maintained a small force of Scud-type missiles and may have pieced together Scuds by integrating original guidance and control systems it concealed from UNSCOM with parts produced in Iraq.
X. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS
The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:
During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, almost all of them Al Hussein models, with 46 striking in the KTO and 42 in or near Israel. Several more firings probably resulted in early in-flight failures within Iraq.
An internal working paper produced and released to veterans by the Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) included 179 entries appearing to involve approximately 344 missiles. In it, CURR listed each variation in attack detail, however minor, as a separate Scud attack entry. For example, if separate reports covered an attack, one using coordinated universal (Z) time and the other using local time in the KTO (C time - three hours difference) the CURR report generated two entries, one for each time, even if all the other details coincided. The officer that prepared the compilation knew the entries involved duplications, but CURR released the list before they could scrub it to consolidate different reports of the same incident. Our analysis of CURR's incident record revealed massively redundant counting based on various second-hand accounts of individual attacks and included false alarms where Iraq launched no Scuds. When we subtracted these duplications and false alarms, the total number of attacking Scuds very closely matched the counts published by other expert sources. See an accounting of the CURR list at Tab D.
Iraq worked to develop extended-range Scud variants capable of delivering both chemical and biological warfare agents. As of early 1991, they had produced and filled such warheads on Scuds. However, the evidence suggests that they could not carry out an effective attack with these weapons because of fusing and flight stability problems.
We uncovered no convincing evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological agent warheads at Coalition forces or Israel. Technical problems, threats of retaliation, and risk-benefit considerations may have affected Iraq's decision not to employ them.
A substantial proportion of the Al Hussein Scud models spontaneously broke up on reentry, probably due to faulty design and unstable flight characteristics.
During disintegration on reentry or impact, some Scuds released a yellow, red, or brown cloud containing corrosive inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Observers sometimes mistakenly believed these releases of oxidizer were releases of chemical warfare agents. While not nearly as toxic as chemical warfare agents, IRFNA and accompanying nitrogen oxide decomposition products can cause, as described previously, distressing symptoms in exposed people.
The extended-range Scuds fired by Iraq demonstrated even poorer accuracy than the original Soviet design but had modest success as a terror weapon against large population concentrations. As the Scud attacks progressed and it became apparent that Iraq had used no chemical or biological agent warheads, the missiles became less effective as a terror weapon.
Iraq probably retains some Scud-type missiles and may be able to produce more.
That report says there are still docs classified. I bet between the classified docs and the ones JV is translating....The UN wasn't just incompetent, but involved.
Watch Those Goal Posts Move!
Go to: http://18.104.22.168/
And ask: jveritas; eyespysomething what is the best way to go about this.
I know you mean this as a dig/slam, so thanks. I guess you don't understand people might actually have a good idea that they don't have time to execute.
I haven't seen anyone else propose this idea, have you? But hey, thanks for the slam, without knowing a dang thing about me.
But guess what dude, I'm an ideas person, extremely busy with a dozen other things I'm over-committed on, and I wouldn't be useful on this because (a) I don't have any storage space, (b) I don't have time to manage the divvying up of documents in an organized manner, and (c) I don't have time to download anything even if I had the storage space.
So no, don't reply to me directly because it would waste YOUR time and not accomplish the task at hand. But YES, I am an ideas person and I often need people to run with my ideas. If I had time to follow through effectively on all of my ideas, I'd be as wealthy as Bill Gates. Unfortunately, I spend most of my time on charitable stuff, so I haven't had time to follow through on various lucrative inventions, etc. And I don't have time or resources to follow through on this idea either. But it's still a good idea.
Thanks again for the unhelpful slam.
Oh get lost and get back to your useless dribble
Oh - and yes, it obvious you are a very important person
But I don't see any long list there of untranslated stuff, rather just the short list of translated and well published stuff.
There is a total of 2180 documents listed on these 48 pages. The documents have the various suffixes, as shown below, with the number of documents of each suffix:
Suffix Count 1542 wmv 276 mp3 228 avi 58 doc 36 txt 23 wma 11 RTF 5 mpg 1
Nice. You really are weak. I just love drive-by commentators like you. You add so much value to a thread.
Well as I said, I don't know enough to direct or manage any of this. And ask: jveritas; eyespysomething what is the best way to go about this.
But have you tried the link on the left side of that page that says "All Files" ?
Also jveritas said you can search for specific documents... look on the rest of this thread for posts by jveritas and see what he directs people to do, then coordinate with the person he responded to to be sure you don't duplicate each other's efforts.
That's what I would suggest. And thanks for your offer to help.
I thought you were too busy and important?
My hotlink in 69 seems to have fallen off. Sorry:
Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles
Released July 25, 2000
Excellent. I'm glad you found some documents. jveritas said there were tons of documents, so it doesn't seem like 48 pages of links would cover the thousands of boxes of documents that are supposedly available online. So we must be missing something. Maybe he can give some direction?
Thank you for welcoming me.
"Any suggestions on how to accomplish B ??"
The how to accomplish B could be done by someone downloads the files for a month, or 2 or a quarter, then someone else does it for the same period of time.
I think if we go document by document, that would get confusing. Periods of time make more sense.