A Formula for Regional War

The modern state of Israel has made a series of security blunders of enormous magnitude over the last two decades that have in large part resulted in the current nightmare in Northern Israel. Israel has initiated and pursued sophmoric & dangerous policy decisions that have created the ideal operating theatre for its genocidal enemies, both in terms of the military and political environment. Israel foolishly brought this war upon itself, fought a fool’s war, and is now making a fool’s peace. Make no mistake - this U.N. Resolution will neither bring peace or security to this region - but it will bring regional war within two to three years on the outside.

Our website is currently packed with expert opinions from all perspectives decrying this U.N. Resolution as nothing less than “an unmitigated disaster” (Caroline Glick). We concur - however what is truly perilous going forward is that the cease-fire “agreement” is a clear and definitive victory for Hizbullah on all counts. Anyone who lives in Israel will attest to the national obsession with “peace” as defined by “quiet”. Most certainly, Israelis just bought themselves a few months of peace and quiet at the future cost of a combined jihadist war against the state that will be unprecedented in force, ferocity, and peril. All I can do is repeat what we have been stating for the last 18 months on this website and in numerous media interviews - the modern state of Israel is in existential danger and not likely to survive the current decade as a sovereign state. Most regretably, every aspect of the Israeli reaction to this unparalleled terror attack from the North serves to reinforce our opinion.

The U.N. Resolution provides Israel with virtually none of its survival requirements:

(1) Hizbullah will not be disarmed of its missile arsenal. This can only be achieved by the Israeli army at great cost of life and with the proper motivation. The idea that a international and/or Lebanese force will disarm Hizbullah has “a probability of zero” (Newt Gingrich).

(2) Iran and Syria will not be sanctioned or even recognized for their funding, arming and orchestration of the attacks on Israel. Hizbullah is simply a forward army of Iran via Syria. Despite Iran violating the U.N. charter daily by threatening a member state with destruction (Israel) and Syria providing the military lifeline for Hizbullah, neither are held accountable for their complicity in this unilaterally-initiated terror war.

(3) The UN peacekeeper forces are a “laughing stock” from any military standpoint and clearly pro-Hizbullah from a motivational standpoint. Note that 2,000 UNIFIL troops have been stationed in southern Lebanon for the last 5 years and have not lifted a finger to prevent the installation of thousands of Katyusha rockets aimed at Israel. In fact, it appears that UNIFIL withheld video evidence in its possession (after denying the existence of the video) of the kidnapping of Israelis soldiers near the Lebanon border after the Israeli pull-out.

(4) After a total withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a UN acceptance of the international border between Israel and Lebanon, the Hizbullah propaganda machine generated a fiction of the Sheba’a Farms being disputed territory. In a remarkable and perilous appeasement, this strategic region adjacent to Mt. Hermon has been placed into dispute with Kofi Annan (U.N. chief and virulent anti-semite) required to render a ruling on the area within 30 days.

(5) Nisrallah and Hizbullah will remain in the Lebanese Cabinet and retain its political power within Lebanon, and will be afforded the time and opportunity to re-arm its missile arsenal under the less-than-watchful eye of the European and Arab “peace-keeper” forces.

(6) Remember our two soldiers who were violently kidnapped and have been held hostage for one month? Remember what started this war? The UN Resolution provides no concrete mechanism, timetable, or process for the release and return of the kidnapped IDF hostages. An agreement which will erode Israeli army morale even further and bring national deterrance down to uncharted territory.

One of the sagely pundits of Israeli politics, Prof. Paul Eidelberg, recently stated that if Israel doesn’t win this war - it may be the last. Well, we lost - and it maybe the last. As Shai Ben-Tekoa has remarked: every one of these missiles is a war crime in that its intention is to kill and wound “innocent civilians”. And what is the Israeli reaction to 3,700 war crimes in one month and over 150 dead? A national desire for “quiet”. Yes, the concept of a total and morally-justified military victory is as foreign to the Israeli ideology in these times as is a day without terrorism.

Let me share a secret with you: there is only one solution to terrorism - overwhelming, unremitting, and disproportional military force. It worked in World War II and it would work today - but between America’s nation-building and Israel’s peace-making - no one has been willing to do it the old-fashioned and tried way. As General George Patton said: “War is not about dying for your country, but about making the other bastard die for his”.

But don’t tell that to the unholy trinity of Olmert/Peretz/Peres - they are too busy planning the next eviction of 100,000 Jews from their homes in central Israel. Who will care about Hizbullah when the local terrorists can shoot missiles from the highlands within 10 kilometers of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion Airport? Israel is driving 100 mph off the cliff - at some point, even a “change of direction” will be too little, too late.

Hysteric hyperbole and nonsense meets willing to believe audience.

Here is the military power compared for this "regional war" match up. Our enemies are not stupid. That is why they wage proxy wars instead of facting us straight up.

Modern war is as much about Economics and Logistic might as numbers. HERE are some numbers that show why no one will be able to face the US on the battlefield and win in our life time.

Hypothetical Military Match Up. USA vrs the China/Iran/Syrian Axis. I will even add China as a potential Axis member.

Even if you multiply the CIA facts by a factor of the 5 on the absurd notion that they are successfully "hiding" their real military from us, the Iran/Syria Axis comes NO where near the US ALONE in Military power.

I am not even going to bother putting Israel, Japan, South Korea, India and the NATO countries on our side. The scale all ready tips so heavily to the US there is no reason to pile on.

This is JUST a comparison between the US and the Iran/Syrian Axis. For fun I will include Egypt and the Saudis as part of the Iran/Syrian Axis to show how absurd the "It's World War Three" babbling is.

http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/united_states/united_states_military.html

USA.

Military branches: Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard; note - Coast Guard administered in peacetime by the Department of Homeland Security, but in wartime reports to the Department of the Navy

Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age; 17 years of age with written parental consent (2006)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 67,742,879 females age 18-49: 67,070,144 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 54,609,050 females age 18-49: 54,696,706 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 2,143,873 females age 18-49: 2,036,201 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $518.1 billion (FY04 est.) (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 4.06% (FY03 est.) (2005 est.)

***Snip***

http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/iran/iran_military.html

Iran.

Iran Military - 2006

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force (includes Air Defense); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Force (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (2004)

Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; soldiers as young as 9 were recruited extensively during the Iran-Iraq War; conscript service obligation - 18 months (2004)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 18,319,545 females age 18-49: 17,541,037 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 15,665,725 females age 18-49: 15,005,597 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 862,056 females age 18-49: 808,044 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $4.3 billion (2003 est.)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 3.3% (2003 est.)

****Snip*****

http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/syria/syria_military.html

Syria

Military branches: Syrian Armed Forces: Syrian Arab Army, Syrian Arab Navy, Syrian Arab Air and Air Defense Force (includes Air Defense Command) (2005)

Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for compulsory military service; conscript service obligation - 30 months (18 months in the Syrian Arab Navy); women are not conscripted but may volunteer to serve (2004)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 4,356,413 females age 18-49: 4,123,339 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 3,453,888 females age 18-49: 3,421,558 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 225,113 females age 18-49: 211,829 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $858 million (FY00 est.); note - based on official budget data that may understate actual spending

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 5.9% (FY00)

***Snip*****

http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/egypt/egypt_military.html

Egypt

Military branches: Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Command

Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age for conscript military service; three-year service obligation (2001)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 18,347,560 females age 18-49: 17,683,904 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 15,540,234 females age 18-49: 14,939,378 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 802,920 females age 18-49: 764,176 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $2.44 billion (2003)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 3.4% (2004)

******Snip****

http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/saudi_arabia/saudi_arabia_military.html

Saudi Arabia

Military branches: Land Forces (Army), Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force, National Guard, Ministry of Interior Forces (paramilitary)

Military service age and obligation: 18 years of age (est.); no conscription (2004)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 7,648,999 females age 18-49: 5,417,922 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 6,592,709 females age 18-49: 4,659,347 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 247,334 females age 18-49: 234,500 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $18 billion (2002)

****Snip******

href="http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/China/China_military.html">http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/China/China_military.html

China

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 10% (2002)

Military branches:

People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines and naval aviation), Air Force (includes Airborne Forces), and II Artillery Corps (strategic missile force); People's Armed Police (PAP); Reserve and Militia Forces (2006)

Military service age and obligation: 18-22 years of age for compulsory military service, with 24-month service obligation; no minimum age for voluntary service (all officers are volunteers); 17 years of age for women who meet requirements for specific military jobs (2004)

Manpower available for military service: males age 18-49: 342,956,265 females age 18-49: 324,701,244 (2005 est.)

Manpower fit for military service: males age 18-49: 281,240,272 females age 18-49: 269,025,517 (2005 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually: males age 18-49: 13,186,433 females age 18-49: 12,298,149 (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $81.48 billion (2005 est.)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 4.3% (2005 est.)

The Principles of War

U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, 1994 (Unclassified)

The nine principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. ... Today's force-projection Army recognizes the following nine principles of war. ...

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and will to fight. The ultimate objectives of operations other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, they too must be clear from the beginning. The linkage, therefore, between objectives at all levels of war is crucial; each operation must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. ...

Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war. ...

Mass

Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.

Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with fingers of an open hand. Mass must also be sustained so the effects have staying power. Thus, mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him. This results from the proper combination of combat power with the proper application of other principles of war. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy rife. ...

Economy of Force

Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

Economy of force is the judicious empioyment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. When the time comes for action, all parts must act. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. ...

Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat. ...

Unity of Command

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort.

At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose. ...

Security

Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures. Risk is inherent in war; however, commanders must not be overly cautious. To be successful, commanders must take necessary , calculated risks to preserve the force and defeat the enemy. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power. ...

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.

Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Rapid advances in surveillance technology and mass communication make it increasingly difficult to mask or cloak large-scale marshaling or movement of personnel and equipment. The enemy need not be taken completely by surprise but only become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, effective intelligence, deception, application of unexpected combat power, operations security (OPSEC), and variations in tactics and methods of operation. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise. ...

Simplicity

Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity is especially valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and troop leading at all echelons and permits branches and sequels to be more easily understood and executed. ... A personal note:

The specific principles of war, as outlined above, were probably based on J.F.C. Fuller's eight principles, which he worked out between 1912 and 1924 (based on the theories and discussions by Jomini and Clausewitz, which began during the late 18th century).

His principles were: Objective, Offensive Action, Surprise, Concentration, Economy of Force, Security, Mobility and Cooperation.

The British have two additional principles of war:
Maintenance of Morale and Administration. U.S. military doctrine also recognizes these principles, of course, but they're not explicitly listed because they're more or less implied by the other principles.

The Russian doctrine includes Annihilation as well.

War: A Matter of Principles recommends the following principles - relevant to warfare in the 90's (and the 21st century) - based on its evaluation of the principles of war as adopted by the armed forces of Great Britain and the U.S. (Royal Navy, British Army, Royal Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force):

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim (or Objective)
Morale
Offensive Action
Security
Surprise
Concentration of Combat Power
Economy of Effort
Flexibility
Unity of Command
Administration and Logistics
Simplicity

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Digital Attic v2.0 ©1999-2005 Mads Brevik

All of your statistical data is no doubt accurate. In state vs. state maneuver, hostile confrontation the data you cite would be determinative of battles and the ultimate outcome. Traditional warfare with a linear forward line of troops (FLOT) has become a virtual military anachronism. Except for the previous wars engaged in by Israel with its neighbors, the last incident of maneuver warfare was Korea.

There was never anything in Vietnam that could properly described as a FLOT or front line. It, like every conflict since, is best characterized as a 360 degree conflict where even depth did not provide battle staff, logistical or support function security. The ''old days'' of a rear area has ceased to exist. The same is currently true in Iraq and Israel has confronted it first battle test of such a conflict. Whether they won, lost or fought to a draw is irrelevant. The reality is that their Order of Battle (the nature of , strength and logistical doctrine) was wrong for the war it fought; that must undergo a fundamental change in doctrine. Troops advancing after artillery and bombing behind tanks no longer is a viable method of conducting an offensive operation. We learned that in ''Operation Junction City'' in Vietnam. Israel must also by this time have come to the realization that tactical aerial bombing has its severe limitations. Fast fighters are primarily a tool of air superiority and interdiction vis-a-vis close support (CAS) of scattered ground troops. They performed well in the inderdiction role of denying passage of materiel' and supplies from the north and Syria and from the sea. Without a strategic or air supremacy mission, their air force looks great but lacks effective or applied CAS power

We should undertake to re-educate the IDF general staff and especially mid-level field grade officers who will lead the inevitable next go-'round with the same enemy, and probably Syria as well. The IAF should acquire an entire wing of A-10s from the U.S. that will provide a killing ground in CAS and tank busting capability.

The U.S. should plan and supervise the gaming of this conflict to demonstrate what's known as ''lessons learned'' from our military as objective observers.

This war may very well have been the next-to-the-last-war Israel will fight. The next one may find them with the sea at their collective back issuing an urgent call for assistance from the U.S. & U.K. for intervention or, alternatively, the employment of weapons once unthinkable, but applicable in only the most dire of situations. The latter will indeed generate a wider conflict that likely would spread beyond the region.

Either we stem the tide of the Islamic sense of hubris now and in the Middle East or we will find ourselves engaged in situations not of our choosing and to our detriment.

Hysteric hyperbole and nonsense meets willing to believe audience.
Here is the military power compared for this "regional war" match up. Our enemies are not stupid. That is why they wage proxy wars instead of facting us straight up.

Modern war is as much about Economics and Logistic might as numbers. HERE are some numbers that show why no one will be able to face the US on the battlefield and win in our life time.

Thanks very much for all of the interesting stats - it is quite sobering to see that China has far more men of military age than our entire population.

However, I take issue with your thesis, namely that the West is an automatic winner. Sure, we'd be easy winners if we actually concluded that there's a war, and that we view the other side as an enemy who must be confronted and vanquished. The operative word there is "IF," as in "IF your grandmother had b@lls, she'd be your grandfather."

The entire problem is that Western nations generally have a very short attention span, little knowledge of history and less inclination to care about it and its lessons. As a civilization, we are fat and happy, and can't be bothered with such nasty things as threats from smelly dark people on the other side of the planet. I am reminded very much of the scene from the pilot episode of the original Battlestar Galactica series when the naive McGovern-like President of the Federation (or whatever) is at some party with a bunch of like-minded, peace-at-any-price morons congratulating each other on how brilliant they are...just in time for the Cylons to execute a galactic Pearl Harbor.

All the capability in the world is meaningless if you don't have the willingness to use it. That willingness depends upon attitude more than anything else - your attitude about being vigilant, about developing, paying for and stockpiling the tools necessary to hold off and prevail against external threats and about the willingness to use those tools and put your fellow countrymen at risk to defend your culture, your civilization. A perfect example is France prior to WW2 - here was a nation with "the best army in the world" which had no pride in its culture, no clue that there was a threat, and no willingness to send in the infantry to disarm Hitler...and they could've utterly crushed Germany up to about 1937 or 1938 (especially in combination with England). But France was defeated before the first shot was fired, by itself.

Here there is a far greater difference in strength, as you pointed out - which lulls us that much deeper to sleep. Except now there are two things different than in 1939. First, the other side either has, or shortly will have, the ability to destroy several cities at one time, without warning. Second, the other side says and acts very much like it doesn't care about survival, only about hurting/killing its enemies. Nuking one or more of our cities might result in retaliation the likes of which has never been seen, but such an event would throw all of the world into utter chaos and would virtually destroy the world economy for years to come, likely embroiling the entire world in a massive war. In such a scenario, our enemy wins (in its mind) even if we kill 95% of them, just so long as we are hurt badly in the process. They don't care about life, and we do - which is a great moral strength, but a very bad thing in a fight to the death.

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