Here are some more summaries from today's report:
. 62: Research suggests prewar judgment remains valid that Iraq had links to terrorism. Few indications of relationship between AQ and Saddam before 9/11/01.
p. 63: The DIA has examined/translated 34 million pages recovered in Iraq and the lead DIA analyst believes there was no partnership between the two organization. Ties between Saddam and OBL appear like those between rival intel services, each trying to exploit the other
p 64: Iraq's interaction with AQ is impelled by mutual antipathy toward the US and the Saudi royal family and by OBL's interest in unconventional weapons and relocations sites (Relocation Sites???). Discussion that there's no evidence that AQ and Iraq participate din join terrorism ventures.
p 67: According to debriefings with Saddam and other captured Iraqi prisoners, Saddam didn't trust AQ and didn't want to cooperative with them.
The FBI provided 2 summary statements made by Saddam regarding his regime's relationship with AQ. The summary said there was clear evidence that the Iraqi government had previously met with OBL and Saddam confirmed that but said he didn't cooperate with OBL.
p 68: Abid Hamid Mahmoud al-Kattab al-Tikriti admitted the existence of a weak connection between Iraqi Intelligence Service and Al Qaeda for the purpose of the IIS collecting intelligence on AQ. Our intel community analyzed reports of meetings and contacts between AQ and Hussein's regime; reports of contacts began in the early 90's and continued throughout the decade.
p 70: At least 8 direct meetings took place between Iraqi officials and top AQ operatives. Dozens of additional meetings are reported by less reliable clandestine sources.
p 71: Ansar al-Islam is located in northern Iraq and has direct ties to AQ but the report downplays what this means with regard to Iraq. LOL
p 73: Saddam did agree to dedicate programs for targeted broadcasting on behalf of OBL and to "leave the door open to further develop the relationship and cooperation between both sides."
p 74:In June 98 a senior AQ official, Abu-Hafs, visited Iraq at least once. He also possibly visited in March 98.
p. 75: Details on training from both good reports and second hand sources - emerges a pattern of AQ's enduring interest in acquiring CBW expertise from Iraq.
p 76: CIA debriefed detainee Ibn al-Shaykb al-Libi, a senior AQ operational planner, to access Iraq's potential CBW training of AQ - Iraq agreed to provide chemical or biological weapons training for 2 AQ associates beginning in 12/00. The 2 people departed for Iraq and didn't return (to where, I don't know) so al-Libi was not in a position to know if any training had taken place.
The reliability of al-Libi is uncertain.
p 78: The DCI testified to the Committee on February 11, 2003 and stated that "Iraq has provided training in poisons and gases to two AQ associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi operatives as successful."
p 79: Much later, after the war started, in July 2004, it was discovered that al-Libi recanted his claim that AQ members traveled to Iraq for chemical and biological weapons training. The Committee noted that no other reporting found in Iraq after the war began had corroborated the CBW training reports.
p 82: Detainees said that AQ and non-Iraqis trained at Salman Pak but then later recanted. No AQ associate detained since 9/11 has said they trained at Salman Pak.
p. 83: The DIA said there is no credible reporting that AQ trained at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq. He said there is fragmentary reporting that Iraq trained foreign Islamic extremists in terrorist tactics but that's not been definitely established. A November 2002 Special Analysis said "While there has been some recent unconventional training activity detected at Salman Pak in early September, it is unclear whether AQ or other Islamic extremists have been involved."
There is no question (says the report) that Iraq continues, as of 9/02, to provide safe have and an operational base for groups and individuals who direct violence against the US, Israel and other allies. (Want to bet it was Democrats pounded this home that we just couldn't, could NOT put AQ in there?)
p 86:After 9/11/01, more than a dozen AQ affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad in the spring and summer of 02 and found a secure operating environment there. (I thought there was no operational anything between Iraq and AQ?)
p 87: Senior planner Abu Masab al-Zarqawi and other AQ fighters were in northern Iraq as of 5/02. Iraqi regime was aware of his presence, at a minimum, because a foreign government service gave Baghdad identifying information.
The CIA concluded that Zarqawi was overseeing the operations of AQ members in Iraq which included poison production, terrorist training and op erational support for terrorist attack abroad. The CIA assessed that AQ's presence in northeastern Iraq was estimated at 100-200 members and began to increase after the US military campaign began in Afghanistan and an unknown number of individuals have arrived in other regions of the country including Baghdad.
p 88: A variety of reporting led CIA analysts to believe that AQ maintained a toxins laboratory in Sargat and Abu Taisir was preparing contact poisons and ingestible compounds consistent with cyanide and possibly ricin.
INR warned that AQ working with Ansar al-Islam, l ocated in Iraq near the Iranian border prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom appeared to be preparing for an attack.
P 89: CIA said they were uncertain what extent Baghdad is actively complicit in the use of this territory by AQ operatives for safehaven and transit but given the pervasive presence of Iraq's security apparatus it would be difficult for AQ to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or without at least their acquiescence.
Discussion about Zarqawi's role in the assassination of USAID official Laurence Foley in Jordan in 10/02. A detainee with knowledge of the operation said that Zarqawi directed and financed the assassination cell before, during and after the time Zarqawi spent in Baghdad.
p 90: Intelligence indicated Zarqawi had differences with OBL and probably didn't work closely with him but he contracts out his work in return for materials and financial assistance from AQ facilitators. (Sure.)
p 92: Oh this is rich - in 2005, the CIA assessed that prior to the war, the regime did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.
A 5/02 IIS document found by US forces in IRaq indicates that the regime was concerned that the US would use the presence of Ansar al-Islam in northern Iraq to support claims of links between the regime and AQ. The IIS director said these claims showed the US would continue to fabricate information to prove links between Iraq and AQ.
p 93:The Iraqi regime considered AQ and Ansar al-Islam a threat and tried to collect intelligence on them and remove them. (Sure)
The DIA reported that the exploitation of the Sargat site revealed the presence of cyanide salts which confirmed suspicions of work on a cyanide-based poison which DIA analysts noted wasn't surprising given Ansar al-Islams continued efforts to develop chemical weapons capabilities.
p 94/95: In the fall of 2001, the Czech intelligence service provided the CIA with reporting based on a single source who stated that the 9/11 hijacker Muhammed Atta met with the Prague-based IIS Chief in 4/02.
A year or so ago the CIA noted that various reports put Atta in Prague on at least 4 occasions but the CIA could confirm only 2 of the visits in 12/94 and 6/00 but neither of the trips matched the meeting between al-Ani and Atta alleged by the Czechs.
The June 02 CIA paper regarding the 4/01 meeting said they couldn't verify his travels.
This section goes on for some time and goes back and forth between whether Atta met in Prague in 4/01 or not.
All the papers the CIA have produced on this matter concludes that "while the above reporting does not conclusively contradict the occurrence of a meeting, it calls into question some aspects of the reporting."
p 98: Then there's discussion about Almed Hikmat Shakir al-Azzawi, an Iraqi national, meeting with 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar in Malaysia in 1/00.
Some reports suggest extremist contacts but a foreign government service working in partnership with the CIA reports that Shakir was not affiliated with AQ and has no connection to the IIS.