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Some observations on the report:

The prior SSCI report said that, most of the conclusions in the National Intelligence Estimate issued prior to the war could not be proven. The SSCI wouldn't say if they were right or wrong, just that the intelligence community couldn't prove them and that is a problem. This report says they were mostly wrong, not just unsubstantiated.
This report relies extensively on the ISG report. It is taken as the final word on most issues. It ignores the difficencies in the ISG report. The ISG admitted that the subjects they interviewed had plenty of reason to lie. If they admitted participating in the activities they were asked about they could be prosecuted as war criminals. Somehow the word of former Baghdad officials is taken as gospel. The ISG report also admitted they had technical limitations resulting from security problems in Iraq.
Dr. Kay's report highlighted that PCs and labs had been wiped clean - not vandalized. Also, many of Iraq's key scientists had been murdered. It's hard to find evidence when the perps are dead and the data's been erased.
There is a bogus flip-flopping throughout the report on intentions vs. evidence. When they say they found evidence, like a centrifuge piece in a backyard, the report quickly dismisses it as individuals taking their own initiative, not part of an official program. Conversely, whenever the report admits (citing the ISG) that Saddam still fully intended to reconstitute his WMD programs, the report dismissies it saying ther was no evidence that this was taking place. It's like they're going around the block to exonerate Saddam's regime.
They seemed to ignore any evidence that wasn't in the ISG report, much of which has been posted in this thread. First the CIA says it's a slam-dunk that there are WMD then they say they were 100% wrong, no exceptions. This stinks to high heaven. The Administration acted on their conclusions so they're hanging the Administration out to dry.
It's important to emphasize that the Congress and the President based their decision to go to war on the NIE. The Democrat partisans will blame the Administration saying the findings were cherry-picked, the analysts were pressured and the report was rushed. The prior SSCI report found that the NIE was mostly a summation of estimates that had been around a long time. The "rush" to assemble it resulted in one footnote being misplaced but did not appreciably affect the results. Dr. Kay's effort, the SSCI investigation and the Robb Commission went way out of their way to find examples of the Administration pressuring analysts to change their positions. They found none.
Note that the NIE was prepared at the request of Democrat Sen. Bob Graham. Thanks to Jeffords the Dems controlled the Senate at the time and he was the committee chair.
It is very important to read the section on the "bio weapons" trailers. The media recently accused the President of lying about that, because a team had concluded they weren't bio-weapons trailers. This report makes it very clear that, when the President made those statements, he reflected the official position of the intelligence community and that position remained unchanged for a long time thereafter.

From David Kay's interim report:

On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement of the main building contained an archive of documents situated on well-organized rows of metal shelving. The basement suffered no fire damage despite the total destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes. Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of ash where individual documents or binders of documents were intentionally destroyed. Computer hard drives had been deliberately destroyed. Computers would have had financial value to a random looter; their destruction, rather than removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort to prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their contents.
All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have been clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment, shredding and burning of documents, and even the removal of nameplates from office doors.
Although much of the deliberate destruction and sanitization of documents and records probably occurred during the height of OIF combat operations, indications of significant continuing destruction efforts have been found after the end of major combat operations, including entry in May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party intelligence building in Baghdad and highly selective destruction of computer hard drives and data storage equipment along with the burning of a small number of specific binders that appear to have contained financial and intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation team at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the smoldering ashes from documents that was still warm to the touch.