A classified memo.....given to the Slimes. How nice.
Sounds to me he was advocating everything that Bush is saying now. Is this a case of "firing the messenger"?
From the memo:
¶Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)
!!!!!!!!!!!!!
¶Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!
It appears tha the US military is the only agency working in the US. (On the other hand when it's good it's really good!!)
I liked this. Pure Rummy:
¶Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
and this:
¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
Anyway, what it shows is that Rumsfeld was a policy maker that did some thinking. No news to many here on FR, but it would be a total revelation to the sheeple who only get their news from the MSM.
The democrats,one would have majorly politicized it.
Two, Republicans lost because they were lazy, corrupt, often hateful...and there was more often than not more gridlock with a Republican majority than without.
Completely in charge of 3 branches of government and can't even get a damn bill passed.
They weren't coming together on even the most basic of principles such as taxes.
The ones on the waaaay right end of things... to them if things weren't 100% all the way over on their end of the spectrum they would say 'no way'.
They could have moved the whole country to the right a whole lot more by giving in just a little here or just a little there in a manner of compromise. Head butting Republicans cost us a whole lot of opportunity.
But hell no. They wanted it all and wanted it all to be theirs right now.
On top of that they began to believe their butts were glued to a congressional seat and that they were just owed the position.
All in all they had it coming.
this is "evidence" for Bush Jr. to axe Rummy. Rummy is not a team player, needs a bath, has bad breathe etc. Bush can "wash his hands" of Iraq and not be held responsible for confronting and bombing "our allies" Saudi Arabia for their role in the terrorist attacks on the US on Sept. 11, 2001. This is all denial and damage control coming from the traitor-in-chief.
What gets me,as a veteran is how some think Rumsfeld was talking strategy.No,NO,NO,NO,NO!!!!!He was talking TACTICAL changes. The strategy is still the same,win the war.The tactics(how to carry out the strategic goal) needs tweaking.And when you have an enemy that acts the Al-queada,Hamas,Hezbollah,et al act,no wonder we're having a rough time.Now if I were President,I'd get rid of the Geneva Convention for about a month and tell the troops tolet the enemy have it,full force!Maybe,that's why I'm not President.
What if it had been known before the election?
The GOP would have lost 80 seats.
That aint YOU, or anyone else who has a problem with the memo or its timing. Some of you folks need to have the jerks removed from your knees.
Nov. 6, 2006
SUBJECT: Iraq — Illustrative New Courses of Action
The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:
ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS
Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)
¶Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. — political, economic and security goals — to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
¶Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
¶Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
¶Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)
¶Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
¶Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.
¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
¶Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
¶Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
¶Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
¶Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.
¶Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.
¶Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.
¶Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.”
¶Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.
Below the Line (less attractive options):
¶Continue on the current path.
¶Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.
¶Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.
¶Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.
¶Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states — Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.
¶Try a Dayton-like process.
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No matter if it was known about, the MSM would have lied around it, or not reported it. And the sheeple like being lied to, especially by the media, don't they.
Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
This should have been the main focus since day one. The Iraqi army should have been reequipped with tanks and air support as fast as we could. They still rely on us for major and fundamental capabilities, and yet we wonder why they're not ready to take over their own security. We tried a similar approach with creation of the South Korean military following WWII. We intentionally denied them armor and heavy weapons, to keep them weak, like a large police force. It didn't work out for us then, and it won't now.
Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
Halfway to being a great idea. I was lucky on both rotations to have constant, uninterrupted access to Arabic linguists. Most units are in desperate need of people who can not only speak the language, but identify a Syrian from an Iranian from a Kurd at a glance. Most U.S. troops have a dim understanding of Iraqi culture, except for it's many negative aspects. Having Iraqis around U.S. troops may be a security risk, but it should be a calculated one.
The problem is that there isn't really a large pool worth of English speaking Iraqis who could serve as Katusas (Korean Augmentees to the U.S. Army, interpreters) like there is now in Korea. During the Korean war, the Katusa program enjoyed very limited success, for this very reason. Still, it's good that they're acknowledging a very crucial capabilities gap. Language and cultural barriers are real killers in a televised PR-heavy war like Iraq.
Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF ... by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)
Flat out, most government agencies have left the troops high and dry. Aside from a mission statement and PowerPoint bullet about supporting OIF, they're not in the game. I had the opportunity to work with forward deployed reps from a number of agencies, and while they were some great and dedicated people, they're treated like red headed stepchildren by the parent orgs. The orgs will basically stall requests from the deployed reps, who usually are on short rotations, to ensure that their presence is token and symbolic, but that the actual work is left to the U.S. military.
For people beating the counterinsurgency drum, this is a tacit admission that the classic counterinsurgency option is off the table. Fortifying in a few large FOBs is a good way to conduct FID (foreign internal defense) in such a hostile area. We can pump in supplies, support, and training, and pump out trained Iraqi troops in an uninterrupted manner. It will drop U.S. casualties to almost nothing, which will be a great PR win. As far as winning hearts and minds, the real centers of gravity in this war, it's a solid defeat. So, a mixed bag, there.
Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.
Cut down on convention troop strength, and run 'high end capture-or-kill' Special Operations Forces by a handful of troops ("high end SOF" ain't a lot of people, ya'll realize). Redeploy conventional troops to nearby location. Like Okinawa.
Ahem.
I'm all for turning this into a "low end SOF" mission, where Green Berets conduct FID to support and strengthen the combat capabilities of a friendly regime. I've spent some time in this line of work, and while it's not fast or glamorous, it works. Using "high end SOF" is basically keeping the thunderbolt of Zeus ready to smite on our enemies as we spot them.
Door kicking is a crucial capability, to be sure, and it's sexy, both for the operators, and the bureaucrats in DC who get to toss the results into a PowerPoint presentation. Alone it hasn't brought us success, and it won't, ever, without "low end SOF" doing the dirty task of training competent ground troops. Still, many in Washington are mesmerized by the many successes of "high end SOF". They're lured into thinking that if the cut out what isn't working (conventional troops), and leave what is (high end SOF), that will bring victory. Sounds nice, but it won't work. The path to victory lies in whipping young Iraqis into soldiers, nothing else.
Wow, it's almost 2007, and we're just getting to this option? Anyone else feeling my irritation on this?
Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. ... No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
This would have been very smart, on a case by case basis, had we done it earlier. It may be too little too late now.
Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
Certainly a top contender for 2006's "Too little too late" award. I spent some time on the Syrian border, and it makes the U.S./Mexico border look like a 2,000 mile Fort Knox.
Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
Cut U.S. troops from presence patrol duties, and run them from nearby locations. Like Kuwait. Where have I heard this before? Now, it may not necessarily be a bad idea, but it's a major shift, when you realize this is coming from the DoD.
Patronage, patronage, patronage. Those words are as important to a good counterinsurgency effort as the word 'location' is to real estate. We suck at it, the Iranians are great at it. They know what they're shopping for, and aren't afraid to ask "how much for your loyalty"?
For all the money we dump into Iraq, the red tape is astounding, and the cash gets eaten largely by private contractors. What we needed to do was get the power brokers hooked on U.S. gravy. The tribal shaykhs, the imams, even former Ba'athists and unsavory religious types. Americans don't like thinking this way, but most of the world runs very smoothly on a generally discreet system of bribery. We're so afraid of negative criticism that we are often gunshy of dealing with people who are unsavory, but otherwise for sale.
Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth.
Unemployment is a major, major cause of the insurgency. People who are dismissive of this idea are generally well fed, comfortable, and positive that they can provide for their family. Iraq needed a major make work program about 3 years ago. We'd be spending pennies on the dollar for the benefit we'd get, both in security savings, and in making the Iraqis look to the government as a source of stability. Who wants to overthrow the government when it's handing out cheese? It may be stolen from the DNC handbook, but sometimes you gotta play dirty to win.
Call it the "5 year Rebuild Iraq Public Works Program", and you've just bought yourself 5 years worth of public support for the government.
Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.
This one pretty much speaks for itself.
If we pull out of the war before the mission is finished, as I now think we inevitably will, we will have created a far worse situation for our national security than we had with Saddam. The nation better grow some backbone and fast. Alas I fear that it sounds like most Americans are already ready to give up.
Got to say I hope not. Plans are always being prepared, plans way beyond this simple executive memo.
2. Mr. Rumsfeld is no longer relevant, despite his attempts to be so. In particular, he does not have the confidence of the army, an institution he deliberately offended numerous times. He should have resigned years ago, in which case our nation might have had a chance in prevailing in Iraq.
3. Like AlGore, Mr. Rumsfeld should be informed that it is not about him, but about winning in Iraq.