The war will not be won in a detention cell, browbeating fanatics. Nor will it be won by offering goodies to fanatics in return for their lies.
The article also in passing speaks in revealingly stupid ways about issues like Palestine and Kashmir, which are unjust causes not noble ones, to which we can never agree, any more than the other more radical ones.
The article is also hopelessly naive about the enemy's political strategy. It does not see how they depend on division in our own countries and resentment of other great powers of our strength in the world. It glibly speaks of avoiding alienating other countries who are in fact politically committed to our defeat. The terrorists depend on the fact they are helping the interests of such countries, against ours.
Yes we need much more intelligent political warfare, no intelligent political warfare does not consist of trying to brainwash prisoners nor trying to coopt thugs by giving them money power jobs and access. Both strengthen the terrorists. The former strengthens them morally, the latter strengthens them practically, and they are fully able and willing to cash both for more recruits, more committed and happier recruits, and more operational ability.
Intelligent political warfare is not directed at the terrorists themselves. It is directed at their human environment. Its purpose is to make them hated, to energize uncommitted third parties to take our side against theirs, to start blood vendettas indeed, not to pretend they don't exist, and to ensure lots of energetic angry people are baying for their blood every day.
It is also directed at the underlying ideological and political relationships not only motivating the terrorists, but exploited by them. It paints the terrorists as ideological competitors, not merely with us, but with local governments and their elites, with existing doctrines and beliefs. It emphasizes that they are heretics and treasonous. None of which is directed at coopting them, all of which is instead directed at coopting their countrymen and their potential recruits. Without trying to make those our agents or get them to agree with us or act as though they were in Mayberry.
Successful political warfare is Ethiopia driving the Islamicists out of Somalia, it is the northern alliance spotting for us straight into Kabul, it is Kurds policing theirs own areas successfully. It is emphatically not torturing detainees to recant, or demanding Iraqi Shia act as though they were in Mayberry and must refrain from hurting their Iraqi enemies.
Intelligent politics is always directed at reducing the potential resources of the enemy and increasing ones own, by targeting neither their direct supporters (direct action, not political action, does that) nor our own. The world does not consist of committed agents of the authorities and committed terrorists. Almost everyone on earth fits neither description.
The terrorists succeed when they play to all the various audiences better than the authorities do. And it is utterly futile to instead try to "win" anything over men in our power in our prisons, already.
The publics to "play" for are -
(1) the domestic opponents of the war who are scared by the terrorists or more afraid of the immorality of the authorities. These are not in the camp of the authorities, and playing for them is a key terrorist goal. It includes the press and at the moment the entire international left.
(2) the foreign powers who want us to lose simply because it would mean a reduction in our power in the world. These cannot be played for by pretending they agree to some pious consensus condemning terrorism in speech. Their interests not their hypocrisy, their deeds not their words, matter. And there must be consequences for choosing the terrorists over us.
(3) the outright pro terrorist governments, which fund them, supply them with arms, given them safe haven, train them, provide intel and operational direction. This includes as leading examples today, Iran and Syria.
(4) the governments of the countries in which the terrorists operate or those they seek to control, but do not yet control. This includes the Iraqi and Afghan governments, the government of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It also includes a score of others important for scale or present conflict - Turkey, Algeria, Indonesia, Sudan, Somalia, etc.
(5) the peoples of the last, which are the most direct front for political warfare, the place where the terrorists expect the most in the way of new recruits and real gains in power.
(6) the people of all the others, as an independent means of leverage with their governments. Yes that means political warfare is directed at e.g. public opinion in say Spain or France, also in Iran. And not as "America is the greatest thing since sliced bread" - that is not political warfare. No, as is, the way to win your next election and defeat your domestic adversary is to take stance X on terrorist related issue Y.
(7) in addition to active management of all of the above, one also requires serious ideological analysis of the root attractions and the strategies of the terrorists themselves. You cannot expect the US to be credible to any of these people. But you can expect the US to use its resources and objectivity to understand the philosophic and political fights involved better than anyone else, and to identify the most promising indigenous intellectual and political forces to sap the strength of the terrorists and outcompete them in local ideological debate. And having identified them, to quietly further their efforts, both intellectually and in resources etc.
And furthermore, for political warfare measures to succeed, it needs to be understood right at the outset that the goal is emphatically not to prevent attacks or reduce violence, nor to "end" the conflict. It is to increase the ranks and political power of those who believe their own interests will be served by the defeat of the terrorists, and to get them to actually succeed in achieving their own ends that conflict with the interests of the terrorists. Which makes powerful enemies besides us athwart the terrorists' path to victory, with strong interests in resisting them.
The goal of the whole thing is to make people all over the world realise they can get rich and powerful stomping on terrorists or they can get poor and powerless being stomped on by us. That this needs to be explained to the sort of cynic pretend realist who wrote this article, is an index of just how stupidly this war is being waged.
You're absolutely right! After all he only has 30+ years in the counter-terrorism business. Where as you have...what?
My point is not to flame, but to point out just because you disagree does not make the writer "Hopelessly stupid". It just makes him wrong in your opinion.
The war will not be won in a detention cell, browbeating fanatics. Nor will it be won by offering goodies to fanatics in return for their lies.
Where does he say this?
OTOH He dose say
Destroy the Jihadist Enterprise
The United States should focus its continuing counterterrorism campaign on the destruction of the global jihadist enterprise. This enterprise remains the principal immediate threat to U.S. national security. The pursuit of the jihadists must be implacable, unrelenting. The terrorist enterprise—its historic center and its affiliates in their current and future forms—must be defeated and destroyed. Its adherents must be dispersed, scattered, divided, deprived of glory, disillusioned, demoralized, and kept on the run, no matter how long it takes."
And again
Political warfare, rather, comprises aggressive tactics aimed at the fringes of the population, where personal discontent and spiritual devotion turn to violent expression. But political warfare does not focus exclusively on enemies who are at large, nor does it end with their capture. It targets those on their way into the enemy ranks, those who might be persuaded to quit, and those in custody. Political warfaresees the enemy not as a monolithic force, but as a dynamic population of individuals whose grievances, sense of humiliation, and desirefor revenge, honor, status, meaning, or mere adventure propel them into terrorism. Certainty of death may not dissuade the most committed zealots, but there are many others in both the process of commitment and supporting roles who can be reached. Political warfare accepts no foe as having irrevocably crossed a line; it sees enemy combatants as constantly calibrating and recalibrating their commitment. It sees every prisoner not merely as a source of operational intelligence, but as a potential convert. Political warfare is infinitely flexible and ferociously pragmatic. It accepts local accommodations to reduce violence, offers amnesties to induce divisions and defections, and cuts deals to co-opt enemies. And while it may be silly to talk about the mindset of the “Arab street,” political warfare could also target the sea of passive supporters who permit the extremists to operate.
Yes we need much more intelligent political warfare, no intelligent political warfare does not consist of trying to brainwash prisoners nor trying to coopt thugs by giving them money power jobs and access. Both strengthen the terrorists.
The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program during the Vietnam War persuaded more than 100,000 enemy soldiers to defect to the South Vietnamese side by offering them amnesty, cash, job training assistance, and homes.76 Some of the “ralliers,” as they were called, eventually drifted back to the communist side, but overall the program was an economical and certainly less-dangerous way of removing a sizable number of enemy combatants.
When I was a member of the U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam, we created yet another program, called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), in the remote areas of Vietnam where ethnic minorities often predominated. We devised the CIDG initially to enhance local self-defense capabilities but also to compete with Viet Cong recruiting. The CIDG grew to a force of over 50,000 fighters, more than a few of whom had once been in the Viet Cong.
Other innovative approaches are being pursued today by other countries. In Yemen, Islamic scholars challenged a group of defiant al Qaeda prisoners to a theological debate. “If you convince us that your ideas are justified by the Quran, then we will join you in the struggle,” the scholars told the terrorists. “But if we succeed in convincing you of our ideas, then you must agree to renounce violence.” The scholars won the debate, and a number of the prisoners renounced violence, were released, and were given help in finding jobs. Some have since offered advice to Yemeni security services—indeed, a tip from one led to the death of al Qaeda’s top leader in the country.
Turning terrorists around is not easy, and it doesn’t always work. Reportedly, some of those released in Yemen have slipped back into jihadist circles, but we should not expect, nor do we need, 100 percent success.
If the conversion is considered successful, the individual is released and helped to find a job, or even a wife, but is also kept under close surveillance. At the same time, counselors employed by the government infiltrate jihadist web sites and chat rooms to argue with al Qaeda sympathizers.
It is difficult to assess results. Saudi authorities claim that they have succeeded in changing the thinking of 250 online sympathizers, but how do we know whether they truly think differently now? About 500 jihadists have completed the prison course and been released, but critics charge that 85 to 90 percent might be faking.(To repeat: but we should not expect, nor do we need, 100 percent success.)
(Valin says) Say a large number do go back? This can also work to our advantage, by raiseing questions on jihadi web site as to weather these people really have returned to the "rightious path", or are the spies.
Successful political warfare is Ethiopia driving the Islamicists out of Somalia, it is the northern alliance spotting for us straight into Kabul, it is Kurds policing theirs own areas successfully. It is emphatically not torturing detainees to recant, or demanding Iraqi Shia act as though they were in Mayberry and must refrain from hurting their Iraqi enemies.
Pretty much agree with you.
You may not agree with what he says, but I would recommend downloading the paper or click on keyword Unconquerable Nation, for excerpts of previous chapters.