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“Do you know why the CIA is fighting with the Pentagon about Saddam-al-Qaeda links ? Because it would show its own failure.”

As an example of CIA’s and FBI’s failure, there is the matter of the two hijackers who flew in to Los Angeles but the FBI did not locate them even though the system was “blinking red”.

Another example of the FBI’s failure was that the senior DOJ folks didn’t realize that Moussaoui’s known connection with Ibn Khattab was enough to get them access under FISA to his laptop.

These examples of failures are explained by Tenet.

It was especially crazy for Condi Rice to say that no one ever imagined that planes would be flown into landmarks, when the same had been planned with a plane flying into the Eiffel Tower and even Bojinka had involved the possible scenario of a small explosive-laden plane into Langley.

So there was lots of blame to go around. But given that the anthrax lab techs working prior to 9/11 have been captured, there is no reason to rely on the fact that the hijackers knew how to put pants on as evidence relating to anthrax. Instead, the datum of note is that Tenet for the first time listed 9/11 planner Ramzi Bin Alshibh as having a CBRN role. Previously, we knew only that KSM took over from Atef upon his death of the anthrax cell led by Sufaat and Hambali, and assisted by Barq and Wahdan. But given that the isotopes indicate that the anthrax was grown in the US, there is a very real unresolved issue of whether there were US-based supporters of Al Qaeda that picked up where Sufaat left off in June 2001 when he briefed Hambali and Ayman Zawahiri.

LM’s theory hinged on KSM being an Iraqi agent impersonating KSM. When KSM turned out to be KSM, I’m not clear on what part of her theory survived.

The more nuanced theory is whether or not an Iraqi intelligence agent (named Wael, I believe) had infilitrated Ansar Al-Islam and if so what decision-making role or tactical role he had. It was very dramatic for Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s OBL unit, to say that he was certain they were experimenting with anthrax there in 2002 and he urged the President to bomb them (but the Administration was focused instead on invasion).

As far as the suppression of information, there is lots being suppressed for the normal investigative reasons, according to one postal inspector, but no cover-up. It becomes a bit more problematic when someone working closely with OBL’s religious mentor had a top security clearance and had access to the Center for Biodefense facilities and the American Type Culture Collection. By an email, ATCC does not deny it had Ames in its patent repository (as distinguished from its online catalog).

I agree that the connections between AQ and Iraq warrant close examination — such as Ayman Zawahiri’s trip to Baghdad (I believe it was for the son’s birthday in 1998, rather than in 2000). Any Iraqi assistance on technical aspects could be extremely low-key and under the radar.

But given that no one has even noticed that Ali Timimi had access to the Center for Biodefense and ATCC facilities (and had a security clearance), it seems that should be a key line of inquiry. Occam’s Razor and all. The Washington Post reported on this line of thought by the FBI in October 2006 in an article “Hardball Tactics in an Era of Threats.”

You write:

“The fact the US government says he wasn’t able to identify a biological attack that cost the lived of 5 people and costs more than 1 billions to American taxpayers is pure joke.”

The AG says that the FBI Director Mueller expects “some sort of resolution” in the “relatively near future.”

It’s surprising that reporter had confirmed or debunked the report by an Afghan governor Sherzai that the Taliban minister Hanif had packets of anthrax and planned to mail them to government officials — the report was in January.

My own personal view is that the capture of al-Hadi, Ayman Zawahiri’s chief aide at one point, upon his attempt to return to his home country Iraq late last year, has permitted a breakthrough in Amerithrax. Although Al Qaeda’s anthrax program was highly compartmentalized, he had interaction with both Ayman and OBL, and the Weekly Standard referred to him as Ayman’s “caretaker” at one point. So maybe he has answers even if KSM and Hambali didn’t. He was a longtime jihadist in Afghanistan and had been a major in Saddam’s army.

But, as I said, there is no evidence of Saddam’s involvement in anthrax and lots of information bearing on where there know-how came from, to include documentary evidence (such as the uploaded correspondence between Ayman Zawahiri and a scientist he had on a mission to obtain pathogenic anthrax

The Defense Intelligence Agency gave me the documents along with 100 pages from Ayman’s anthrax planning documents. The correspondence is uploaded in the section: “I successfully achieved the targets.”

http:www.anthraxandalqaeda.com