'Soviets planned '67 war to stop Israel's nuclear program'

In a new book that "totally contradicts everything that has been accepted to this day" about the Six Day War, two Israeli authors claim that the conflict was deliberately engineered by the Soviet Union to create the conditions in which Israel's nuclear program could be destroyed.

Having received information about Israel's progress towards nuclear arms, the Soviets aimed to draw Israel into a confrontation in which their counterstrike would include a joint Egyptian-Soviet bombing of the reactor at Dimona. They had also geared up for a naval landing on Israel's beaches.

"The conventional view is that the Soviet Union triggered the conflict via disinformation on Israeli troop movements, but that it didn't intend for a full-scale war to break out and that it then did its best to defuse the war in cooperation with the United States," Gideon Remez, who co-wrote Foxbats over Dimona, told The Jerusalem Post Tuesday. Essentially, the Soviet Union at the time was regarded as having evolved "a cautious and responsible foreign policy," the book elaborates. "But we propose a completely new outlook on all this," said Remez.

Coinciding with the 40th anniversary of the war, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, by Remez and Isabella Ginor, is to be published by Yale University Press early next month. The title refers to the Soviets' most advanced fighter plane, the MiG-25 Foxbat, which the authors say flew sorties over Dimona shortly before the Six Day War, both to help bolster the Soviet effort to encourage Israel to launch a war, and to ensure the nuclear target could be effectively destroyed once Israel, branded an aggressor for its preemption, came under joint Arab-Soviet counterattack.

Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were also said to have been poised off Israel's shore, ready to strike back in case Israel already had a nuclear device and sought to use it.

The Soviets' intended central intervention in the war was thwarted, however, by the overwhelming nature of the initial Israeli success, the authors write, as Israel's preemption, far from weakening its international legitimacy and exposing it to devastating counterattack, proved decisive in determining the conflict.

And because the Soviet Union's plan thus proved unworkable, the authors go on, its role in stoking the crisis, and its plans to subsequently remake the Middle East to its advantage, have remained overlooked, undervalued or simply unknown to historians assessing the war over the past 40 years.

Remez said the work was based on "some documentary evidence, in combination with testimonies of rank-and-file and high-ranking participants."

Among these are quotations from the commander of the Soviets' strategic-bomber pilots, Gen. Vasily Reshetnikov, indicating that he and his colleagues were given maps for a planned mission to target Dimona, and from Soviet Foreign Ministry official Oleg Grinevsky to the effect that the outcome of the war "saved Dimona from annihilation."

The book also quotes Soviet naval officer Yuri Khripunkov detailing the orders his ship's captain gave him on June 5, 1967, to raise a 30-strong "volunteer" detachment for a landing mission in Israel. "The mission for Khripunkov's platoon was to penetrate Haifa Port - the Israeli navy's main base and command headquarters," the book states. Khripunkov was told that "similar landing parties were being assembled on board 30-odd Soviet surface vessels in the Mediterranean, for a total of some 1,000 men."

June 5 ended without any such attack, of course, because the initial Israeli attack "had been much more potent than expected."

Nonetheless, according to the authors, some aspects of the Soviets' intended direct intervention were actually put in motion, to help Egypt as Israeli forces advanced into the Sinai, before the cease-fire ended hostilities.

Remez, a longtime prominent Israel Radio journalist, fought in the Six Day War as a paratrooper. Ginor was born in the Ukraine, came to Israel in 1967 and is a noted analyst of Soviet and post-Soviet affairs. The authors, who live in Jerusalem with their teenage sons, say they "fell into this role of historical revisionism" after chancing upon Khripunkov's account of the planned naval landing - which was repeatedly postponed, only to be activated and then aborted as the ship neared the Israeli shores on the last day of the war - in a Ukrainian newspaper.

The authors acknowledge a dearth of incontrovertible documentation that would back up central aspects of their thesis, but note that "it is entirely possible that few corresponding documents ever existed," as was the case when former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev "tried in vain to find the formal resolution to invade Afghanistan, which was adopted less than a decade before he took office."

They add that key documents may have been destroyed, and note that "the accounts of numerous Soviet participants refer to orders that were transmitted only orally down the chain of command."

Historian Michael Oren, author of the landmark Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, told the Post Tuesday night that he had not found "any documentary evidence to support" the book's central claims. He noted that he had visited the Soviet archives and that "not a lot has been declassified." Oren said he had found "several reasons why the Soviets helped precipitate the war, and this wasn't among them."

Critics cited on the book's jacket are more enthusiastic. Daniel Kurtzer, former US ambassador to Israel and Egypt, for instance, says the central thesis "appears unreal until one assesses the myriad sources and deep documentation that add up to a compelling argument."

Odd Arne Westad, director of the Cold War Studies Center at the London School of Economics, states that "by placing Israeli nuclear ambitions - and the Soviet reaction - as major links in the chain of events, the authors have produced a book that will stand out in the debate about the Cold War and the Middle East."

And former US under secretary of defense Dov Zackheim says the book proves "that the Six Day War marked a major Soviet political-military defeat comparable to the Cuban missile crisis."

Sure. Here's a retrospective.

From PalestineFacts.org

What led to the Six Day War in 1967?

Excerpt:
Military Provocation By Arab Countries and Soviet Disinformation

At the same time, and unknown to the Israelis, the Soviet Union mounted a disinformation campaign pushing Egypt to join Syria against Israel. At that time, the Soviets were providing military and economic aid to both Syria and Egypt. On May 13, 1967 a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Cairo and informed the Egyptian leaders that Israel had concentrated eleven to thirteen brigades along the Syrian border in preparation for an assault within a few days, with the intention of overthrowing the revolutionary Syrian Government. This was a complete fabrication designed by the Soviets to destabilize the Middle East. Similar false information may have been given to Egypt by the Soviets as early as May 2.

The build up and aggressive intent were denied by Israel. UN Secretary General U Thant reported that UNTSO observers on the Syrian border:

... have verified the absence of troop concentrations and absence of noteworthy military movements on both sides of the [Syrian] line.

Nasser probably correctly interpreted the Soviet information as an indication to him that the time was ripe for an attack on Israel and that he had their backing. With the United States deeply distracted by the War in Vietnam, the Soviets had reason to think there would be no US intervention.

From a the recollections of a podvodnik (submariner) who trained the Egyptian navy:

An Egyptian tragedy
And then there occurred a whole bunch of catastrophies, as if to spite headquarters. The Jews stole a brand-new radio-location station, using a helicopter. The flew in across the canal, smashed the weak guard detail, hooked the wagon up to the helicopter and just took off with it. We we set up a new air-defense station, but the enemy just would not give up. They'd fly in before we got them in operation, and blow them to bits. Many of our air-defense officers were killed.
Another big event: three torpedo boats left Port Said to set some AMD-500 sea-bottom mines. The first boat flops around and then breaks off. The second drops its mine and then blows up on it; nothing was left. The third boat turns and took off to who knows where, we searched for it for a long time. The (Egyptian) command had been following them, to review their heroism, but was located on the second torpedo boat. The Arabs were setting these mines independently, without our instructors.
And so, here comes our Soviet command. It's an emergency situation. The entire directorate of mines and torpedoes comes from Moscow. The Hyde Park hotel was full of these specialists, though it's true that many never made it out of the bar. After this, the Arabs didn't trust our weapons. Bagir would follow me around, whinnying like a horse: "I've got six torpedoes at ready and six in reserve. Twelve altogether," and the he'd look at me, to see what I'd say, waiting.
So, the Egyptians decided to have a test. They'd secretly select a boat, point to whatever torpedo, and order it fired. I see that Bagir is afraid that he'll be the one. What if it blows up again? But they found another boat, they fired and all went okay. The Egyptian combat commander himself came, and brought with him a piece of an exploded torpedo: "Oh, Mister Volodya!" Why this "Oh!"? He's carrying this hunk of metal and shaking all over. Pure children.

His observations on different nationalities reminds me of something out of The Hunt for Red October:

Politically incorrect memories
Egyptians struck me as nice peopple. A bit intrusive, if you are a guest in their home - everyone demands that you eat something with them. They are disorganized like children, however. Once we had surfaced, and at any minute I might declare a crash-dive. One of their sailors is standing on the deck, listening to a tape-player. It doesn't occur to him that there's a war on. The ship commander comes out, and I point him out. The commander goes up to the sailor and tosses the Japanese tape-player overboard.
Every nationality fights differently. You can't really say anything about Russians, they are all different, like a mixed-up salad. The cossacks are the most steadfast. On watch they are hardy and efficient. You can count on them. Lithuanians can be described with only the very best of words. If I was taking part in selecting my crew, I always tried to grab as many Lithuanians as possible. They are the cleanest and most efficient of sailors, straight-A.
Latvians, however, are very different from Lithuanians. They are lazy and untrustworthy, but the worst nationality for any service has to be Muscovites. The biggest headache for a commander will always be from these.
If we have to speak of seamanship under non-standard conditions, or making technical decisions, the best of course have to be Ukrainians and Russians. Latvians are simply retarded. Tartars are often sent to the underwater fleet, and are practically identical to Russians. Jews don't serve poorly, but during all my years of service I never saw more than 5 Jewish sailors, though they make irreproachable officers. By the way, Armenians on a ship - hardly ever.
Of my former assistants, seven became ship commanders, though one later burned out. This is a very rare recommendation. Even Petrov, commander of cadres in Moscow, made a report of my example. Something along the lines of 'There are captains who brought up seven commanders, among them two Jews, outstanding commanders. For example, Zverev, who later became Combat Operations Commander, and now chief of the Baltic Fleet'.
Some Georgians came my way. They are a temperamental people, though they try from the heart. Two of my chief petty officers were Georgians. Azerbaijanians usually end up in the bilge, no one trusts them with serious jobs. They have deficient educations, no understanding whatsoever of electronics, and you can't adapt them to complicated mechanisms. The backbone of the sailors and petty officers were Slavs, but the crew of a submarine could only live as a single organism. All the boys quickly found their place in it, and acted like the fingers of a single hand. Life depends on it, even in peacetime. Although in the Army the nationalities may bunch together, it's simply not possible on a submarine. When the hatches are slammed shut and the boat dives, nationality disappears.

Ms Ginor has previously published some of the data underlying their book in academic magazines. One of the articles has been discussed here at FR:

THE COLD WAR'S LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW AND WHY THE USSR INSTIGATED THE 1967 WAR

(Long but definitely worth a read for all history "buffs".)

Actually, finds of documents in the Stasi archives support her thesis that the Soviets intentionally instigated the '67 war. However, I don't know if she and her co-author has any evidence for the more outlandish statements regarding Dimona.

Calvin Locke: Thanks for the reference to Blind Man's Bluff. Depending on when the sub took off for the Med it may support Ginor's thesis - it was just that those "dastardly" Israelis jumped the gun....and the Soviets didn't make it in time, just as the French and the British didn't make it in time in '56.

PS: I do remember from that time the worry that the Soviet Black Sea fleet had entered the Mediterranean Sea. There certainly was a Soviet military build up - not only of client states - in the neighbourhood.

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