It sounds like you have studied guerilla war. I believe that we are in a world-wide guerilla war against the islamofascists. As in other guerilla wars, the best way to win is to get the people on our side, send local boys out who know the language and culture, and back them up with U.S. firepower, intel, technology, etc. Over time, our muslim allies will kill 100X as many guerillas as we will. The muslim world will slowly change as the people decide collectively that they would rather live in the 21st century instead of the 8th. This may take a very long time.
We can quibble about "civil rights" having been violated in the disappearances of the leftist scum but by the early 80's the left had been decimated as a military force, but it was an effective strategy. They eventually won some electoral victories after the military were forced from power as they have in Chile also. But their ability to impose their will by arms has for the time being been neutered.
Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum
http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-War-Terror-Counterinsurgency-Strategy/dp/0760328684
page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
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The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.
2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.
3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.
4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.
5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.
6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.
7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.
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In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.
Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed.
(snip)