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“Patton led his men into disaster?”

Three incidents are always overlooked when discussing Patton:

1. The failed (and costly — 10,000 casualties at Brest alone!)attempts to take Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire by frontal assault. Initially continued for the sake of proving the point that “the American army must finish any task it begins”, and ultimately dropped as being “totally unnecessary” (after the true scope of the disaster had become)at a time when the entire Allied effort in France was being supplied by a single port (Cherbourg).

Prior to the battle, intelligence indicated 15,000 Germans in Brest, a number which Patton pooh-poohed and claimed was only about 500 or so. When 6th Armored spearheaded the assault,m they found the original number much closer to the truth, and because poor recon had been done prior, no one realized that not only the port was fortified, but the landward approaches to it were as well. Patton never wanted to fight this battle, and true to form, because it was not a product of his fevered imagination, he performed poorly and blamed everyone else for the chaos.

2. The extremely vulnerable left flank left open to German attack in the initial stages of the Battle of the Bulge, which had caused Patton to issue an order (countermanded by Bradley) to evacuate Bastogne. Patton had allowed his center to badly outpace his left flank, and put his army in incredible danger of having German Panzers running rampant through to his rear areas. Two units of 3rd Army, 101st airborne and 10th armored, absorbed the full brunt of the attack on Bastogne with very little support until Patton corrected his error and made his famous dash northwards. In effect, Bradley probably saved Patton’s army -— and his reputation.

3. The extremly costly, and stupid, frontal assaults on Metz, which almost spelt an end to the 5th infantry division, frittered away a battalion or two at a time, in a nearly-suicidal attempt to overwhelm Fort Driant. One battalion lost 761 of 767 men sent in. The attack ultimately was called off, after massive casualties had been suffered, when Patton’s Chief of Staff threatened the German commander with the ignominy of perhaps having to eventually surrender to Zone of the Interior troops coming up behind 3rd Army (mostly African-American troops). The German commander of Fort Driant found that prospect far more dishonorable than surrendering to Patton’s COS, and duly laid down his arms.

This is another battle in which Patton is ordered to do soemthing which he does not want to do. He’d rather bypass Metz and head for the Rhine (hoping to get there before Monty). And because it’s something he does not wish to do, he again does a very bad job of it, and his soldiers paid the price.

One thing you must bear in mind about G.S. Patton; nothing was worth doing unless he thought of doing it, and was allowed ot do it as he saw fit. Insubordination and outright disobeyance of orders were Patton’s stock in trade when ordered to do something that took him away from his preoccupation; the greater glory of G.S. Patton. All through his career, Patton shows a propensity to behave perfectly callously with regards to his soldier’s lives and limbs if he does not get the orders he WANTS to get. The examples of the Brittany ports and Metz show a Patton so unenthusiatic about the orders he is given that he hardly pays any attention at all to the probelms involved in carrying them out.

Additionally, Patton was at his best in pursuit (the traditional mindset of the cavalryman) than he was in the more mundane, but often vital, issue of finding, fixing, and investing the enemy by other methods. Give Pattton a broken and defeated foe, short of armor and supplies, and he was brilliant at chasing them and enveloping them. Give Patton an assignemt where he might have to work (and which had little glory) and he dragged his feet.

Patton was also famous for underestimating his enemies, more often than not. In many ways, Patton is more like a Japanese general than an American one; he believes his enemy (with a few exceptions) is not as tough, smart, resourceful, brave, etc, as he is, and when he runs into difficulties because of these initial mental-lapses, he resorts to bull-headed tactics and sheer stubborness, believing that guts and spirit could overcome his mistakes (which he’d never admit to have made, in any case).

Didn’t mean to hijack the thread, but yes, there is a species of military commander (Patton was one, Custer, given the little I know about him, seems to be another) who tends to make mistakes caused by overconfidence.